THOMAS E. CHALIFOUX, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
NERI SANCHEZ; KURT BROWNING, JR., IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF STATE, STATE OF FLORIDA; CONNIE CLICK, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SUPERVISOR OF ELECTIONS, OSECOLA COUNTY, FLORIDA; GWEN CHANDLER, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SUPERVISOR OF ELECTIONS, OKEECHOBEE COUNTY, FLORIDA; BILL COWLES, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY OF SUPERVISOR OF ELECTIONS, ORANGE COUNTY, FLORIDA; AND LORI EDWARDS, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SUPERVISOR OF ELECTIONS, POLK COUNTY, FLORIDA, APPELLEES
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Thomas Chalifoux appeals a trial court's temporary injunction disqualifying him as a candidate for Florida House District 79 for failing to comply with the Resign-to-Run Law. The appellate court affirmed the injunction, holding that a non-Republican elector had standing to challenge Chalifoux's candidacy in the Republican primary and that Chalifoux failed to meet statutory requirements.
The court affirmed that a non-Republican elector has standing to challenge a candidate's compliance with the Resign-to-Run Law. The statute does not require the challenging elector to be registered with the party whose primary is involved, and the court rejected Chalifoux's argument that enforcement authority should be limited to party members.
[1] An elector, as defined by statute, has standing to enforce Florida's Resign-to-Run Law regardless of party affiliation.
[2] A court should not infer limitations on statutory enforcement powers that the legislature did not explicitly include.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Section 99.012(5) places the responsibility for enforcing the Resign-to-Run Law on an elector or the Department of State without requiring either to have a party affiliation.”
Establishes that the statute grants enforcement authority to any elector regardless of party registration
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceChalifoux was running as a candidate for House District 79 in the Republican primary but failed to meet the requirements of section 99.012(3), Florida…
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BARFIELD, J.
Thomas E. Chalifoux, Jr., appeals the trial court’s temporary injunction disqualifying him as a candidate for House District 79 in the republican primary and directing the supervisors of election in the affected counties to post notices at polling places and with absentee ballots that votes for Chalifoux would be disregarded (ballots had already been printed).
Chalifoux failed to meet the requirements of section 99.012(3), Florida Statutes (2007), Florida’s Resign-to-Run Law. The merits of his appeal are controlled by Varn v. Vasilinda, 985 So. 2d 1241, (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), and his venue contest is without merit. We affirm.
Chalifoux challenged the standing of Neri Sanchez, appellee, to bring this action contending that Sanchez, an elector as defined in section 97.021(13), was not registered as a republican, and, therefore, was not qualified to contest the candidacy in the republican primary. Section 99.012(5) places the responsibility for enforcing the Resign-to-Run Law on an elector or the Department of State without requiring either to have a party affiliation. It could have done so, if it chose to place limitations on the elector, as it did elsewhere in the election laws. See §§ 100.361, 101.021, and 102.168, Fla. Stat. (2007). Appellant argues that since appel-lee cannot vote in the primary under section 101.021, he is not a qualified elector under section 99.012(5). We reject appellant’s argument that the court should equate enforcement of qualifying laws with voting entitlement. The courts should not write into clear and unambiguous legislation what the legislature chose not to include.
WOLF and PADOVANO, JJ„ concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Torres v. Shaw (Fla. 1st DCA 2022)…various grounds, including “[i]neligibility of the successful candidate for the nomination or office in dispute”); see also §§ 97.023(3), 99.097(5), 101.161(3)(c)(2), Fla. Stat. (contemplating private rights of action). And in Chalifoux v. Sanchez, 991 So. 2d 432, 433 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), for example, we approved the standing of an elector to challenge a candidate’s noncompliance with a qualifying law expressly because the law “places the responsibility for enforcing the Resign–to–Run Law on an elector.” Se…
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Oliver v. State (Fla. 2d DCA 2024)
Authorities Cited
- Varn v. Vasilinda, 985 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)