IRWIN WEINBERG, APPELLANT,
v.
HARVEY LOZMAN, M.D., HARVEY LOZMAN, M.D., P.A., F/K/A LOZMAN & WEINBERG, P.A., A PROFESSIONAL SERVICES CORPORATION ORGANIZED UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEES

Fla. 3d DCA | 1978-11-28
Nos. 78-261, 78-262
Before PEARSON and HUBBART, JJ., and CHARLES CARROLL (Ret.), Associate Judge.
364 So. 2d 841 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1978) Positive Treatment
Cited by 14 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Weinberg appeals the dismissal of his action to enforce a settlement agreement from prior litigation between him and Lozman. The court reverses, holding that a settlement agreement is a contract that can be enforced independently and that the trial court erred in dismissing for lack of jurisdiction.


Holding

The trial court erred in dismissing for lack of jurisdiction. A settlement agreement is a contract between the parties and can be enforced independently as a separate action, regardless of whether the underlying case has been dismissed. The case must be remanded for the trial court to determine whether the claimed settlement constitutes a binding agreement.


Headnotes

[1] A court has jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement entered into by parties in a prior, dismissed action, provided the agreement itself is a valid and enforceable…

[2] A settlement agreement is a contract between the parties, independent of any judgment entered in the litigation it resolves.

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Key Quotes

“A settlement agreement is not only the basis upon which a judgment may be entered, but is also a contract between the parties.”

Establishes the dual nature of settlement agreements as both judgments and independent contracts

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Facts & Procedural History

Weinberg and Lozman were members of a professional association. Weinberg sued Lozman for dissolution of the association and division of assets. Before…

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Opinion of the Court
PEARSON, Judge.

PEARSON, Judge.

The plaintiff in the trial court, Irving Weinberg, appeals an order dismissing his complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The order reads as follows:

“THIS CAUSE came on for hearing upon the motion of the various Defendants to dismiss. The Court has reviewed the file, heard argument of counsel and considered the applicable law. Plaintiff attempts to state causes of action for breach of contract and specific performance upon an alleged ‘Stipulation of Settlement’ entered into in the case of Weinberg v. Lozman, Case No. 75-27052. That case terminated by an Order of Dismissal entered August 26, 1977. The court finds that it is without the requisite jurisdiction to enforce the ‘Stipulation of Settlement’ entered into under the style of the terminated case, and that the document is further insufficient on its face to support-an independent contractual-cause-of action.-1 It is therefore . . ”

Plaintiff and defendant were members of a professional association. In the cause referred to in the trial court’s order as Weinberg v. Lozman, the present plaintiff sued for a dissolution of the professional association and a division of the assets. Thereafter, before the filing of defensive pleadings, the parties entered into what was either a settlement or an attempted settlement of their differences. This agreement was entered into in the presence of the court and recorded by a court reporter. See Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.030(d). It was orally approved by the trial court. Thereafter, no further proceedings were had in that cause. Subsequently, the cause was dismissed by the court for failure to prosecute.

The present action was brought by the same plaintiff, Weinberg, in an attempt to enforce what he describes as a settlement of the prior litigation. As pointed out in the above order, the trial court dismissed the complaint upon the sole ground of lack of jurisdiction to proceed. We hold that the trial court was in error in so doing. We note at this juncture that the trial court did not pass upon defendant’s allegation that the claimed settlement was insufficient to constitute a settlement of the first cause.

A settlement agreement is not only the basis upon which a judgment may be entered, but is also a contract between the parties. See Bohlman v. Big River Oil Company, 124 N.W. 2d 835, 837 (N.D.1963); and Galusha v. Sherman, 105 Wis. 263, 81 N.W. 495, 497 (1900). Plaintiff’s complaint seeking to enforce the claimed settlement agreement is not an attempt to enforce a settlement which has been made a part of a final judgment. The validity of plaintiff’s action must be determined upon the basis of the laws of contract. If the defendant procured a cessation of activity in the cause upon the basis of an enforceable contract, then the fact that the cause was dismissed for lack of prosecution is not a bar to the enforcement of that contract.

Therefore, we reverse the order holding that the trial court did not have jurisdiction, and remand the cause for a determination by the trial court of whether the claimed stipulation constitutes a binding agreement between the parties which can now be enforced in a separate action.

Reversed and remanded.

. This portion of the order, including the stricken words, . and that the document is further insufficient on its face to support an independent contractual cause of action,” appears here as it does in the original order.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Crosby Forrest Prods., Inc. v. Byers, 623 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)
    …, Singer Island Civic Ass’n v. Casetta, Ltd., 527 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), rev. denied, 536 So. 2d 243 (Fla.1988). A judgment may be entered based upon a settlement agreement and it becomes a contract between the parties. Weinberg v. Loz-man, 364 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). Below, Southern did not argue that they did not breach the contract. They sought relief below from the consequences of their breach because the breach was the result of a mistake. On appeal, Southern argues in support of the tri…
  • BAL Harbour Vill. v. City OF N. Miami, 678 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)
    …o the settlement agreement. We disagree. The time limits here are jurisdictional. If Bal Harbour were to establish that there was a breach of the settlement agreement by North Miami, it would be confined to contract remedies. See Weinberg v. Lozman, 364 So. 2d 841, 842 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). If Bal Harbour established fraudulent inducement, it would be entitled to such remedies as may be authorized by law. However, such remedies do not include authority for initiating a challenge to Ordinance 888 after the juris…
  • F.I.T. Aviation, Inc. v. Gleason, 510 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)
    …ercial Developers v. Formrite, 450 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). See also Maryland Casualty Company v. Florida Produce Distributors, 498 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986). A settlement agreement is a contract between the parties. Weinburg v. Lozman, 364 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). Here, the appellants concede that there was a contract effective March 10, 1986, and thus Gleason was entitled to payment plus interest from that date. The appellants also contend that section 627.425 does not apply to them beca…

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