HOWARD DUNNIGAN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The Florida Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Florida's theft statutes, rejecting challenges that the definitional provisions were unconstitutionally vague and represented an improper delegation of legislative power. The court held that the statutory terms have plain legal meanings ascertainable from common law and that the catchall phrase 'other conduct similar in nature' is sufficiently definite when applied to similar theft-related offenses.
The court held that the theft statute's definitional provisions are not unconstitutionally vague. Each listed term has a plain legal meaning ascertainable from common law and decisional law. The phrase 'other conduct similar in nature' is sufficiently definite when applied to the similar theft-related offenses enumerated in the statute, and the principle of ejusdem generis properly sustains its use.
[1] Statutes are presumed constitutional.
[2] A statute is not unconstitutionally vague if its terms have plain legal meanings readily ascertainable from common law and decisional law.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Each of the terms listed in subsection (2)(d)l has a plain legal meaning that is readily ascertainable from the common law and decisional law of this state.”
Establishes that the statutory terms are not unconstitutionally vague because they have plain, ascertainable legal meanings.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDunnigan appealed a trial judge's order upholding the constitutional validity of Section 812.014, Florida Statutes. He raised two constitutional chall…
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PER CURIAM.
The order of the trial judge upholding the constitutional validity of Section 812.014, Florida Statutes (1977), is affirmed. See State v. Allen, 362 So. 2d 10 (Fla.1978).
Appellant also raises on appeal two additional points regarding the asserted unconstitutionality of the theft statutes which were not presented in State v. Allen, supra. He contends that the definitional provisions of Section 812.012(2)(d) are impermissibly vague and uncertain, and that they represent an improper delegation of legislative power in violation of Article II, Section 3 of the Florida Constitution. Section 812.012(2) (d) provides:
“(2) ‘Obtains or uses’ means any manner of:
* * * * * *
(d)l. Conduct previously known as stealing; larceny; purloining; abstracting; embezzlement; misapplication; misappropriation; conversion; or obtaining money or property by false pretense, fraud, or deception; [or]
2. Other conduct similar in nature.”
As to the first point, appellant specifically argues that some of the terms in subsection (2)(d)l have multiple and inconsistent meanings, and that the phrase “other con duct similar in nature,” which we ruled excessively vague in the context of another law in Driver v. Van Cott, 257 So. 2d 541 (Fla.1971), is too indefinite to apply because the types of conduct to which it refers are not really similar. The second point, predicated on the asserted vagueness of the same phrase, is that police, prosecutors, and judges are vested with unbridled discretion to determine the kind of conduct that will be considered “similar in nature.” We disagree.
Each of the terms listed in subsection (2)(d)l has a plain legal meaning that is readily ascertainable from the common law and decisional law of this state. The fact that some words have two or more meanings does not necessarily render them unconstitutionally vague, since it is manifestly clear to a person of ordinary intelligence what was intended by the legislature’s use of each term in the context of the theft statutes. As for the prohibition against “other conduct similar in nature,” we believe that the principle of ejusdem generis may be properly employed to sustain its use in this provision. Unlike the situation presented in Driver v. Van Cott, supra, where the phrase was used in reference to diverse and unrelated classes of conduct, the present statute encompasses criminal acts which are quite similar to the extent that they all have as their object the unlawful deprivation of property belonging to another. Because these terms are sufficiently definite and similar, it cannot be said that the legislature has failed to provide adequate standards to guide prosecutorial or judicial discretion in the enforcement of the law.
It follows that the trial judge ruled correctly in upholding the constitutionality of Sections 812.012 and 812.014, and the order denying the motion to dismiss is accordingly affirmed. This case is remanded to the County Court for Pinellas County for proceedings consistent herewith.
It is so ordered.
ENGLAND, C. J., and ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, SUNDBERG, HATCHETT and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (67 total)
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State v. Monty Ray Belgrave and Stephen Roger Smith, 364 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 1978)…tutionally overbroad in scope in that it does not require proof of criminal intent.” We have recently rejected the contention that Section 812.014 is unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. State v. Allen, 362 So. 2d 10 (Fla.1978); Dunnigan v. State, 364 So. 2d 1217 (Fla.1978). An additional point raised by appellees in their motion to dismiss that was not expressly ruled upon by the trial judge and has not previously been addressed by this Court is that Section 812.014 violates the constitutional prohibition…
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State v. Lewis, 364 So. 2d 1223 (Fla. 1978)…perty, as now encompassed by the omnibus theft statute. We have similarly rejected the suggestion that Section 812.014 improperly delegates excessive discretion to law enforcement officials, thereby allowing selective prosecution. Dunnigan v. State, 364 So. 2d 1217 (Fla.1978). The only points raised by appellee in defense of the trial court’s ruling that have not previously been addressed by this Court are that Section 812.014 infringes upon the right to acquire, possess, and protect property guaranteed by Ar…
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Woulard v. State, 365 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 1978)…tion to dismiss on the grounds that Section 812.014 is unconstitutional, is affirmed. See State v. Allen, 362 So. 2d 10 (Fla.1978); State v. Lewis, 364 So. 2d 1223, (Fla. 1978); State v. Belgrave, 364 So. 2d 1225, No. (Fla. 1978); Dunnigan v. State, 364 So. 2d 1217, (Fla. 1978). This case is transferred to the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, for consideration of the remaining issues raised by appellant. ENGLAND, C. J., and ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, SUNDBERG, HATCHETT and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur.…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Allen, 362 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1978)
- Honorable B. J. Driver v. Talbot M. VAN Cott, 257 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 1971)