CHRISTOPHER THOMAS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
CHRISTOPHER THOMAS, APPELLANT,
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
997 So. 2d 476
Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (2008)
Positive Treatment
Cited by 3 cases
Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Christopher Thomas, appeals an order striking his motion for the return of property. Appellant is correct that the trial court erred in finding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider his motion given that trial courts have the inherent authority to direct the return of property seized from a criminal defendant if that property is no longer needed as evidence against him or her. See Coon v. State, 585 So. 2d 1079, 1080 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). However, we affirm on the basis of the “tipsy coachman” doctrine given that Appellant’s motion was facially insufficient. See McCants v. State, 671 So. 2d 221, 221 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); see also Justice v. State, 944 So. 2d 538, 539 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).
AFFIRMED.
BARFIELD, DAVIS, and HAWKES, JJ., concur.
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Bailey v. State, 93 So. 3d 518 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)…d to the return of the necklace. The fact that the property was previously entered into evidence at the trial level is insufficient to deny the motion without a hearing. Rather the State must show a continuing need for the property. Thomas v. State, 997 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). The trial court also found that the motion was untimely because Section 705.105, Fla. Stat. requires a motion for return of property be filed within 60 days of the “conclusion of the proceeding” or date of the mandate. However,…
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Sch. Bd. OF LEE Cnty. & Johns E. Co., Inc. v. Leila Huben, 165 So. 3d 865 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)…itation.” But to us the two statutes are more alike than dissimilar, and it appears significant that they both use the word “months” in contradistinction to the use of the word “weeks” in other statutes. Cf., e.g., Auman v. Leverock’s Seafood House, 997 So. 2d 476, 478 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (reaffirming that 104-week cap on temporary disability benefits, found in section 440.15, Florida Statutes, creates “bank” from which benefits are drawn and calculated cumulatively). Applying section 440.093(3) to the insta…
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Holl v. United Parcel Serv. & Liberty Mut. Ins., 140 So. 3d 1062 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)…t apply to temporary disability benefits due to the 104-week limit on temporary disability benefits, defined by case law as a “bank” to draw from rather than a cap or time limit by which benefits must be taken, see Auman v. Leverock’s Seafood House, 997 So. 2d 476, 478-79 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). There is nothing inherent in the nature of a “bank” of benefits that would preclude a further limit on the same group of benefits. All of the foregoing reasons convince us that the JCC did not err here. AFFIRMED. MARS…
Authorities Cited
- Coon v. State, 585 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Blackwell v. State, 944 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)
- McCANTS v. State, 671 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)