RONALD PEREZ, SR., APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
ROOMS TO GO AND BROADSPIRE SERVICES, INC., APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS

Fla. 1st DCA | 2008-12-24
No. 1D08-2234
KAHN, WEBSTER, and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur.
997 So. 2d 511 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (2008) Caution
Cited by 24 cases

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Synopsis

This case concerns a workers' compensation claimant's entitlement to change physicians. The appellate court affirmed the denial of a change in primary care physician but reversed the granting of a change in orthopedic physician, holding that the statute allows only one physician change per accident, not per specialty.


Holding

The court held that the statute permits only one total change of physician for any single accident, regardless of the specialty. Therefore, the claimant was not entitled to a second change of physician for his orthopedic treatment.


Headnotes

[1] A claimant in a workers' compensation case is limited to one change of physician during the course of treatment for any single accident.

[2] The statutory right to one change of physician in workers' compensation treatment for a single accident does not entitle a claimant to a one-time change per medical speci…

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Key Quotes

“Because section 440.13(2)(f), Florida Statutes (2004), limits a claimant to “one change of physician during the course of treatment for any one accident,” we reverse the issue on cross-appeal.”

This quote states the core legal principle applied to reverse the lower court's decision on the cross-appeal.

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Facts & Procedural History

The claimant, Ronald Perez, Sr., sought a change in his orthopedic physician after already having received a change in his primary care physician. The…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

In this workers’ compensation proceeding, Ronald Perez, Sr., claimant and appellant, appeals the order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) denying his request for certain medical treatment. On cross-appeal, the Employer/Carrier, appel-lees and cross-appellants, assert that the JCC erred in granting claimant’s request for a change in physician. We affirm the issue on appeal without further comment. Because section 440.13(2)(f), Florida Statutes (2004), limits a claimant to “one change of physician during the course of treatment for any one accident,” we reverse the issue on cross-appeal. In an order dated January 17, 2007, the JCC denied claimant’s request for a change in primary care physician, finding claimant had previously requested and received such a change. In a subsequent merits hearing, claimant sought a change in his orthopedic physician. The JCC noted his previous finding regarding claimant’s entitlement to a change in primary care physician, but found claimant had not yet requested a change in orthopedic physician. Consequently, he granted claimant’s request. This was error. Section 440.13(2)(f) provides, in relevant part:

Upon the written request of the employee, the carrier shall give the employee the opportunity for one change of physician during the course of treatment for any one accident.

In construing a statute, this court looks to its plain language. See Fla. Dep’t of Educ. v. Cooper, 858 So. 2d 394, 396 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). Section 440.13(2)(f) is unambiguous. It clearly states that claimants are only entitled to one change of physician while being treated for any one accident. Thus, the statute does not entitle a claimant to a one-time change per specialty. Here, the JCC found claimant had already availed himself of his right to a change in physician when he obtained a change in his primary care doctor. As a result, the JCC erred by granting claimant’s request for a change of orthopedic physician.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

KAHN, WEBSTER, and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By (11 total)

  • …s de novo. See Lombardi v. S. Wine & Spirits, 890 So. 2d 1128, 1129 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (holding statutory interpretation is subject to de novo review). In construing a statute, courts must first look to its plain language. See Perez v. Rooms To Go, 997 So. 2d 511, 512 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). “A basic tenet of statutory interpretation is that a ‘statute should be interpreted to give effect to every clause in it, and to accord meaning and harmony to all of its parts.’ ” Jones v. ETS of New Orleans, Inc., 798 So.…
  • Torres v. Costco Wholesale Corp. & Liberty Mut. Ins. Grp., 115 So. 3d 1111 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)
    …Statutes (2001), either party may obtain an IME “[i]n any dispute concerning overutilization, medical benefits, compensability, or disability.” § 440.13(5)(a). To construe this statute, we first look to its plain language. See Perez v. Rooms To Go, 997 So. 2d 511, 512 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (“In construing a statute, this court looks to its plain language.”). [*1113] Here, the relevant and plain statutory language requires a “dispute” as the condition precedent to an IME. This was made clear in Lehoullier v. Ge…
  • Debrah Gadol v. Masoret Yehudit, 132 So. 3d 939 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)
    …hich permits a claimant to select a doctor, if the claimant so elects, should the E/C fail to provide a change of physician (of the E/C’s choosing) within five days of receiving the claimant’s request for a one-time change. See Perez v. Rooms To Go, 997 So. 2d 511, 512 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (holding that, in construing statute, courts must first look to its plain language). As demonstrated in Pruitt (where the claimant never named his selection of doctor, and treated with the employer/carrier’s selection of alt…

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