GREGORY LAURENCE ANDERSON AND THRESSA J. ANDERSON, APPELLANT,
v.
JOHN C. WOLF, CONI G. WOLF, ET AL., APPELLEE
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The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed a summary judgment granted in favor of the Wolfs in a residential real estate purchase dispute, holding that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment before discovery was complete. The court concluded that additional discovery was necessary to determine whether genuine issues of material fact existed.
The trial court erred in granting summary judgment because substantial discovery remained incomplete, and the court could not be reasonably certain that no genuine issues of material fact existed. The motion for a continuance of the summary judgment hearing to permit additional discovery should have been granted.
“a summary judgment should not be granted until the facts have been developed to such an extent that the court may be reasonably certain that there are no genuine issues of material fact to be determined”
Establishes the governing legal standard for summary judgment and the requirement that discovery must be sufficiently complete
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThis case involves the purchase and sale of a residence between Gregory and Thressa Anderson (buyers) and John and Coni Wolf (sellers). The case had b…
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PER CURIAM.
The appellants, Gregory Anderson and Thressa Anderson, have asked this court to review the grant of a summary judgment in favor of the appellees, John C. Wolf and Coni Wolf, in this ease involving the purchase and sale of a residence. Although this case is quite ancient, and we certainly comprehend the trial court’s decision to grant a summary judgment, we conclude, nevertheless, that we must reverse.
It is well-settled that a summary judgment should not be granted until the facts have been developed to such an extent that the court may be reasonably certain that there are no genuine issues of material fact to be determined. See, e.g., Singer v. Star-510 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); Kemper v. First Nat’l Bank of Dayton, Ohio, 277 So .2d 804 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973). In the present case there is substantial discovery yet to be completed, and that discovery should resolve whether there are any remaining issues of fact. We conclude, therefore, that the motion of the appellants for a continuance of the summary judgment hearing to allow for additional discovery should have been granted.
Accordingly, we reverse the final summary judgment and remand this ease to the trial court for the completion of discovery. The reversal of the summary judgment is, however, without prejudice to its reassertion by the appellants if appropriate.
REVERSED and REMANDED with INSTRUCTIONS.
MONACO, EVANDER and COHEN, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Authorities Cited
- Theresa Singer Ad Litem for Ann Doe v. Star, 510 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)
- Kemper v. The First Nat'l Bank OF Dayton, 277 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)