KEVIN BRADLEY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 2009-01-28
No. 4D08-3671
GROSS, C.J., WARNER and DAMOORGIAN, JJ., concur.
998 So. 2d 1213 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (2009) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

Kevin Bradley appealed the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that his CPC scoresheet improperly included a burglary offense committed before the Criminal Punishment Code's effective date (October 1, 1998). The Fourth District reversed, holding that offenses committed under different sentencing regimes require separate scoresheets calculated under the rules in effect at the time of each offense.


Holding

The court held that separate scoresheets must be prepared for offenses committed before and after the CPC's effective date, with each offense sentenced under the guidelines in effect when it was committed. The 1998 burglary should have been scored on a separate guidelines scoresheet, and the attempted strong-arm robbery should have been the primary offense on the CPC scoresheet.


Headnotes

[1] A Criminal Punishment Code scoresheet is improperly calculated when an offense committed prior to the enactment of the CPC is used as the primary offense.

[2] When a defendant is sentenced for offenses committed under different versions of sentencing guidelines or the code, each offense must be sentenced under the guidelines or…

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Key Quotes

“When a defendant is before the court for sentencing for more than one felony and the felonies were committed under more than one version or revision of the former sentencing guidelines or the code, each felony shall be sentenced under the guidelines or the code in effect at the time the particular felony was committed ....\n”

Establishes the controlling statutory requirement that separate sentencing rules apply when offenses are committed under different regimes

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Facts & Procedural History

Bradley pleaded guilty in four cases and received concurrent sentences of 5.9 years in prison on a single CPC scoresheet in October 2004. The burglary…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Kevin Bradley appeals the denial of a rule 3.800(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence. Because his sentence for four offenses was calculated on a single Criminal Punishment Code scoresheet when the primary offense occurred prior to the enactment of the CPC, the scoresheet was in error, and it adversely affected the length of his sentence. The state concedes error, and we reverse.

On October 14, 2004, Bradley entered a plea in four cases (98-10196, 99-11406, 99-17622, and 04-013031) and was sentenced to concurrent terms of 5.9 years in prison, the lowest permissible sentence on his CPC scoresheet. The record reflects that this was not a negotiated sentence. The offense in 04-013031 was possession of cocaine, a third degree felony punishable by a maximum of five years in prison unless the CPC score exceeded the statutory maximum. § 921.0024(2), Fla. Stat. (2004). In his rule 3.800(a) motion, Bradley argued that the scoresheet was improperly calculated. The offense of burglary of a dwelling in the 1998 case (98-10196) was committed on April 22, 1998 before the effective date of the CPC and should not have constituted the primary offense on a CPC scoresheet. He asked the court to resentence him to the lowest permissible sentence based on a corrected scoresheet. In its response below, the state argued that the offenses were properly scored. The trial court denied Bradley’s motion.

Bradley is correct that the burglary offense, which was committed April 22, 1998, should not have been listed as the primary offense on his CPC scoresheet. The CPC applies only to offenses committed on or after October 1, 1998. § 921.002, Fla. Stat. Separate scoresheets should have been prepared for the offenses committed before and after the effective date of the CPC. Section 921.002(2), Florida Statutes, provides:

When a defendant is before the court for sentencing for more than one felony and the felonies were committed under more than one version or revision of the former sentencing guidelines or the code, each felony shall be sentenced under the guidelines or the code in effect at the time the particular felony was committed ....

See also Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.704(d)(3); Dillard v. State, 728 So. 2d 725 (Fla.1999) (recognizing that pending offenses committed under different versions of the sentencing guidelines require separate score-sheets).

In this case, the 1998 burglary should have been scored as a primary offense on a separate guidelines scoresheet, and it appears that the attempted strong arm robbery in 99-17622 should have been listed as the primary offense on the CPC score-sheet.

Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the trial court to resentence appellant with corrected scoresheets.

Reversed and remanded for resentencing.

GROSS, C.J., WARNER and DAMOORGIAN, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Gautreaux v. State, 95 So. 3d 1012 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)
    …when they should have been scored on a 1995 sentencing guidelines scoresheet and that thus he is entitled to be resentenced on those three counts using corrected scoresheets.1 This claim is cognizable in a rule 3.800(a) motion. See Bradley v. State, 998 So. 2d 1213, 1214 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). We conclude that Gautreaux is entitled to be resentenced on two of the counts. In count two of the information, Gau-treaux was charged with racketeering pursuant to section 895.03(3), Florida Statutes (1997). In count thr…

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