EUGENIA S. BRANNEN, APPELLANT,
v.
SOUTHEAST BEACH STATE BANK, APPELLEE
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The court held that the intangible tax paid by the bank on a promissory note was a reasonable expense attributable to the loan, which the borrowers could contractually assume without violating usury laws.
Appellant challenged a bank's action on a promissory note, arguing that the bank's collection of an additional amount to cover the intangible tax rend…
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SMITH, Acting Chief Judge.
Appellant, resisting the bank’s action on a promissory note given by appellant and her deceased husband, urges that the note, bearing the statutory maximum interest rate of ten percent annually, was rendered usurious by the bank’s collection from the makers of an additional $317.73 for the payment of the intangible tax which the State levied on the value of the note against the owner bank. Sections 199.-032, .052, 687.03(1), Florida Statutes (1977). The trial court held that the anticipated intangible tax payable by the bank was, like a documentary stamp tax, an actual and reasonable expense directly attributable to the loan, and so was subject to contractual assumption by the borrowers without regard for statutory interest limits. We agree. See Financial Federal Savings and Loan Ass’n v. Burleigh House, Inc., 305 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974).
No error appears in the trial court’s decision rejecting, upon a trial, appellant’s affirmative defense of estoppel. See Lopez v. Lopez, 90 So. 2d 456 (Fla.1956).
The judgment is AFFIRMED. The bank’s motion for an allowance of fee money for its counsel’s appellate services is GRANTED in the amount of $1,000.
ERVIN, J., and MITCHELL, HENRY CLAY, Jr., Associate Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Pignato v. Great W. Bank, 664 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)…mortgage transaction is identical. They are merely two more taxes collected by the government. Moreover, under Florida law, the two taxes are treated similarly for purposes of computation of usury interest. See Brannen v. Southeast Beach State Bank, 365 So. 2d 422, 422 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). The Eleventh Circuit cited no authority for its determination that the purpose of the intangible tax precluded its exclusion from the finance charge under 12 C.F.R. section 226.4(e)(1). We cannot find any authority for thi…
Authorities Cited
- Lopez v. Lopez, 90 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 1956)
- Fin. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Burleigh House, Inc., 305 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)