NATHAN SIEGEL AND MELVIN FISHER, APPELLANTS,
v.
DOROTHY ROSE GILLMAN, APPELLEE
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Purchasers sought specific performance of a 1968 real estate sales contract after the seller refused to close at the agreed price. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of specific performance, holding that the purchasers' unreasonable delay of over one year in making a demand to close after the last fixed closing date barred their claim.
The court held that purchasers who did not close on the last fixed closing date were entitled to close thereafter only if they made a tender or demand to close promptly within a reasonable time. Because more than a year elapsed after October 1, 1975, before the purchasers took action, their delay was unreasonable and provided sound basis for denying specific performance.
[1] A party seeking specific performance of a real estate contract may be denied relief if they unreasonably delay in tendering performance or demanding closure after the agr…
[2] A delay of over a year after the final stipulated closing date, followed by a letter setting a deadline for the seller to request further extension rather than demanding…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Under this land sales contract, where time was not made of the essence, the purchasers who did not close on or before the last fixed closing date, would have been entitled to close thereafter, provided a tender or demand to close would be made by the purchasers promptly, that is, within a reasonable time.”
Establishes the legal standard that even when time is not of the essence in a sales contract, purchasers must make a prompt demand to close within a reasonable time to enforce their rights.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSiegel and Fisher entered into a real estate sales contract with Dorothy Rose Gillman in November 1968, with an initial closing date of November 1, 19…
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PER CURIAM.
The appellants, who were the plaintiffs below, seek reversal of an adverse judgment, entered following a non-jury trial. Thereby, plaintiffs’ claim for specific performance of a real estate sales contract was denied. We hold no reversible error has been shown, and affirm.
On November 8, 1968, the plaintiffs Nathan Siegel and Melvin Fisher (as purchasers) entered into a written contract with Dorothy Rose Gillman (as seller) joined by her husband, Isidor Gillman, for the sale of certain described improved real property. The contract, which did not state that time should be of the essence, fixed November 1, 1969, as the date for closing the sale. When that time arrived, the seller requested and obtained a stipulation extending the time for closing to January 2, 1970. Thereafter, the seller requested, and obtained from the purchasers, seven further extensions of time for closing. By the last of those extensions, the closing date fixed was October 1, 1975. No closing occurred on or before that date.
More than a year later, on December 17, 1976, the purchaser Fisher sent a letter to the seller referring to the prior extensions which had been made at the seller’s request, and stating as follows:
“If you desire a further extension, sign the enclosed Stipulation of Extension and return to this office within ten days; otherwise we shall assume that you do not desire a further extension and will accordingly set a closing date.”
Replying thereto through an attorney by letter, the seller informed the purchasers that the matter had been in default since October 1,1975, and that she did not intend to sell the property at the 1968 contract price. Thereafter, on February 1, 1977, the purchasers filed this action for specific performance.
Under this land sales contract, where time was not made of the essence, the purchasers who did not close on or before the last fixed closing date, would have been entitled to close thereafter, provided a tender or demand to close would be made by the purchasers promptly, that is, within a reasonable time. Where more than a year elapsed after the closing date of October 1, 1975, before the purchasers took any action, the action they took was not a demand or effort to close the sale. Their first action of that character was later in February of 1977, when they filed a suit to enforce the sales contract. That unreasonable delay by the purchasers, after the closing date, was sound basis for the trial court’s denial of their claim for specific performance. Asia v. Hiser, 38 Fla. 71, 20 So. 796, 798-799 (1896); Hathcock v. Societe Anonyme La Floridienne, 54 Fla. 631, 45 So. 481 (1907); Greenfield v. Bland, 99 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958); Perry v. Benson, 107 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958).
Judgment affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Seymour Blaustein and Miriam Blaustein v. Weiss, 409 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)…ing. There is no excuse given whatever for refusal to go through with the contract though the plaintiff was ready, able and willing to do so. Appellants’ letters of October 5th, 10th and 16th clearly comply with the point made in Siegel v. Gillman, 365 So. 2d 1041, 1042 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978): Under this land sales contract, where time was not made of the essence, the purchasers who did not close on or before the last fixed closing date, would have been entitled to close thereafter, provided a tender or demand t…
Authorities Cited
- Sim Asia v. Hiser, 38 Fla. 71 (Fla. 1896)
- In re McCLANAHAN, 99 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958)
- Hatchcock v. Societe Anonyme La Floridienne, 54 Fla. 631 (Fla. 1907)
- Gale D. Perry v. Benson, 107 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958)