OUTDOOR ADVERTISING ART, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1979-01-04
No. JJ-187
BOYER, Acting C. J., and MILLS and BOOTH, JJ., concur.
366 So. 2d 114 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1979) Caution
Cited by 12 cases

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Synopsis

Outdoor Advertising Art challenged the Florida Department of Transportation's sudden denial of a permit renewal based on late payment of annual fees, arguing that DOT's longstanding practice of accepting late fees constituted an enforceable administrative construction of state law. The court reversed the removal order, holding that DOT's consistent historical practice of accepting late permit fees binds the agency and must be honored.


Holding

The court held that Florida statutes authorizing DOT to regulate outdoor advertising do not prohibit the agency from accepting late fee payments, and that DOT's longstanding practice of accepting late payments constitutes a persuasive administrative construction of the statutes that binds the agency going forward.


Headnotes

[1] A state agency's longstanding administrative practice of accepting late permit fee payments constitutes a persuasive administrative construction of governing statutes, ev…

[2] A state agency may not abandon a longstanding administrative policy of accepting late permit fee payments solely because the agency now faces increased financial obligati…

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Key Quotes

“DOT's longstanding practice constitutes an administrative construction of the statutes which is persuasive with this Court”

Establishes the legal principle that consistent agency practices over time constitute interpretations of statutes that courts will honor.

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Facts & Procedural History

Outdoor Advertising Art failed to timely renew its annual permit by the January 1 due date and sought to pay the renewal fee late. DOT had historicall…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

This cause is before us on appeal from final agency action ordering removal of appellant’s outdoor advertising structure for failure of appellant to timely renew the annual permit. Other cases presently pending before this Court1 involve, inter alia, the same basic question as is presented here, to wit: May advertising signs and structures be removed by DOT on the grounds that the sign owner was late in tendering the annual permit fee? In the past DOT has routinely accepted the late payment of fees and renewed sign permits.2 The evidence establishes that this is a longstanding policy. DOT concedes the existence of its past practices in accepting late fees from sign owners, but argues that the practice is not authorized by statute and therefor may be abandoned at any time. The occasion for the abandonment of the policy at this time is the fact that the signs in question are subject to eventual removal under the Federal Highway Beautification Act,3 which Act requires 25% participation by the State in the payment of compensation to the sign owner whose sign is removed under the Act.

We hold that the Florida Statutes 4 which authorize DOT to regulate and to issue licenses and permits with regard to outdoor advertising do not prohibit DOT from accepting payment of fees after the January 1 due-date and that DOT’s longstanding practice constitutes an administrative construction of the statutes which is persuasive with this Court. State ex rel Biscayne Kennel Club v. Board of Business Regulation, 276 So. 2d 823, 828 (Fla.1973); Austin v. Austin, 350 So. 2d 102, 104 (Fla.1st DCA 1977); see, Price Wise Buying Group v. Nuzum, 343 So. 2d 115 (Fla.1st DCA 1977).

Accordingly, the order sought to be reviewed is REVERSED and the cause is REMANDED with directions that appellant be permitted to pay the annual permit fees and receive the appropriate permit.

BOYER, Acting C. J., and MILLS and BOOTH, JJ., concur. . White Advertising v. State Department of Transportation, Case # 11-90; Peterson Outdoor Advertising v. State Department of Transportation, Case # 11-88; A. W. Lee v. State Department of Transportation, 366 So. 2d 116, and Walker v. State Department of Transportation, 366 So. 2d 96.

. Fla.Stat. § 479.07(2) provides in material part:

“. . . Every application for permit shall be accompanied by payment of the fee for each advertising structure . . included in the application, which fee shall be based on the size of the advertising structure ... as follows: Four lineal feet or less, $1; over 4 lineal feet, $2 per 8 lineal feet or fraction thereof above 4. In addition thereto, the sum of $1 per advertising structure will be added.”

. 23 U.S.C. § 131.

. Fla.Stat. Chap. 479.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • State Dep't OF Revenue v. Anderson, 403 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1981)
    …ified that late registration and/or late tender of a resale certificate would not make a transaction exempt from sales tax. In reaching its holding, the district court relied on Outdoor Advertising Art, Inc. v. Florida Department of Transportation, 366 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). In that case, the First District found the Department of Transportation’s (DOT’s) longstanding practice of not removing advertising signs even though permit fees were late constituted an administrative construction of the applic…
  • Regal Kitchens, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't OF Revenue, 641 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)
    …ministrative agency may not reject a widespread policy established by usage or stated by it and relied upon by the public, Walker v. State Dep’t of Transp., 366 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Outdoor Advertising Art Inc. v. Florida Dep’t of Transp., 366 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Price Wise Buying Group v. Nuzum, 343 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), but this rule does not apply here because a technical assistance advisement is not an expression of policy. Subsection 213.22(1), Florida Statutes (1989), sta…
  • Lyman Walker, III v. State, 366 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)
    …nt of Transportation, Case # 11-90; Peterson Outdoor Advertising v. State Department of Transportation, Case # 11-88; A. W. Lee v. State Department of Transportation, 366 So. 2d 116; and Outdoor Advertising Art v. State Department of Transportation, 366 So. 2d 114. . Florida Statute § 479.07(1) and (4), amended effective January 1, 1975, to require DOT issue a permanent metal tag to be affixed by owner to each sign, states that these tags “shall be maintained on the structure until returned to the department…

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