DANIEL R. CURBELO, INDIVIDUALLY AND D/B/A INDEPENDENT FORMS CONSULTANTS, WILLIAM W. VICKERY, INDIVIDUALLY AND D/B/A INDEPENDENT COMPUTER SYSTEMS AND SUPPLIES, AND CHARLES BEHAR, INDIVIDUALLY AND D/B/A INDEPENDENT BUSINESS FORMS AND SUPPLIES, APPELLANTS,
v.
UARCO, INCORPORATED, APPELLEE
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PER CURIAM.
Affirmed.
HOBSON and OTT, JJ., concur. GRIMES, C. J., concurs in part, dissents in part with opinion.
GRIMES, Chief Judge,
concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I concur that the court properly entered an order permanently enjoining the appellants, Curbelo and Behar, from selling products competitive with any product of the appellee within prescribed territories for a period of one year pursuant to Section 542.-12(2), Florida Statutes (1977). However, the appellant, Vickery, denied signing the salesman’s agreement which contained the provisions of the covenant not to compete. No one testified that Vickery signed, and there was evidence presented that the signature on the agreement was a forgery. The court seemed to have found as much because the injunction against Vickery was predicated upon a theory of ratification by virtue of his having later signed a territorial rider which refers to the original salesman’s agreement.
Vickery testified that he understood that he was subject to a salesman’s agreement, but he denied knowing the specific provisions thereof. No one said that Vickery was aware that the salesman’s agreement contained a covenant not to compete. I cannot see how signing a territorial rider which consisted of nothing more than customer lists and which did not contain any of the provisions of the salesman’s agreement or purport to incorporate them therein can be a basis to restrain Vickery’s right to work. There was insufficient evidence of a knowing ratification. Cf. Chemical Corn Exchange Bank & Trust Co. v. Frankel, 111 So. 2d 99 (Fla.3rd DCA 1959).
I would reverse the order with respect to Vickery.
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State v. Phoenix, 428 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)…officers could not make a valid citizen’s arrest merely because they happened to be in uniform or happened to be in a police car at the time they inadvertently witnessed a felony outside their jurisdiction would be ridiculous. See State v. Williams, 366 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). In the present case, the trial court was apparently misled by language in the case law. The court concluded that the sheriff and his officer were powerless to make a valid citizen’s arrest because they used police equipment to c…
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State v. Shipman, 370 So. 2d 1195 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979)…o obtain a warrant, a private citizen may make such an arrest and justify his failure to obtain a warrant by proving the person arrested was actually guilty of the felony. (Emphasis added; citations omitted) (Id. at 703) See also State v. Williams, 366 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 2d DCA, opinion issued January 10, 1979); State v. Jimerson, 330 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); and State v. Crum, 323 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). However, Puleo’s actions would not be sustainable as those of a private citizen if Puleo was…
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Hyer v. State, 462 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)…urisdiction when they arrested him. While we agree with defendant that under the facts of this case, the arrest was not lawful on the basis of the “fresh pursuit” doctrine, see State v. Phoenix, 428 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); State v. Williams, 366 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), we find that the arrest was a valid citizen’s arrest. A police officer cannot use the color of his office to obtain evidence, not obtainable by a private citizen, upon which to base a citizen’s arrest. In this case, however, the…
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- Chem. Corn Exch. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Frankel, 111 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959)