DONALD LEE RINGEL, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT

Fla. | 1978-11-09
No. 52311
ENGLAND, C. J., and BOYD, OVER-TON and SUNDBERG, JJ., concur.
366 So. 2d 758 Florida Supreme Court (1978) Positive Treatment
Cited by 16 cases

Opinion of the Court
ADKINS, Justice.

ADKINS, Justice.

This cause is here on Petition for Writ of Certiorari reported by certificate of the District Court of Appeal, 4th District, that its decision reported in 352 So. 2d 88 is one which involves a question of great public interest. See Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution.

The question certified as being of great public interest is as follows:

“Do the provisions of Section 39.02(5)(c) of the Florida Statutes relating to the treatment of juvenile offenders as adults apply to violations of the law the penalty for which includes but may also be less than life imprisonment?”

We answer this question in the affirmative and also hold that a juvenile indicted and convicted as an adult, Section 39.-02(5)(c), Florida Statutes (1975), is subject to the statutory minimum sentencing provision of Section 775.087, Florida Statutes (1975).

We approve and adopt the opinion of the District Court of Appeal.

It is so ordered.

ENGLAND, C. J., and BOYD, OVER-TON and SUNDBERG, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Eve Postell v. State, 383 So. 2d 1159 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
    …incarcerated in an adult facility. State ex rel. Powers v. Schwartz, 355 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). The indicted child is, upon conviction, subject to the adult minimum sentencing provision of Section 775.087, Florida Statutes. Ringel v. State, 366 So. 2d 758 (Fla.1978). As the statute so plainly says, the indicted child is to be “handled in every respect as if he were an adult.” . In contrast, the child who, after a waiver hearing, is transferred by the juvenile court for adult prosecution retains the…
  • D.C.W. v. State, 445 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 1984)
    …ult by seeking a grand jury indictment was that he was allegedly an aider and abettor of armed burglary, an offense punishable by life imprisonment. § 810.02(2)(b), Fla.Stat. (1979);2 see Ringel v. State, 352 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), approved, 366 So. 2d 758 (Fla.1978). Although the March 18 indictment was later abandoned, a new indictment containing the sanie charge was returned on May 6, 1981. Petitioner then moved to dismiss that portion of the indictment which alleged in effect that his offense of…
  • Ritchie v. State, 670 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 1996)
    …e by death or life imprisonment were thereafter to be sentenced as adults without entitlement to the procedural safeguards provided by section 39.111. Duke, 541 So. 2d at 1171. The Tomlinson court also recognized, in accordance with Bingel v. State, 366 So. 2d 758 (Fla.1978), that the language “punishable by death or by life imprisonment” as used in section 39.02(5)(c)3., includes first-degree felonies for which life imprisonment is the maximum punishment. Tomlinson, 589 So. 2d at 363. Accordingly, the court…

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