STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
DAVID F. SPEARMAN, APPELLEE
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The State appealed a trial court's decision dismissing a burglary charge against David Spearman who struck a homeowner at the threshold with his hand and arm extended into the residence. The appellate court reversed, holding that under Florida's burglary statute, entry includes insertion of any part of the body, not just whole-body intrusion.
The court held that Spearman's actions constituted burglary because entry under Florida's burglary statute includes insertion of any part of the body, and the undisputed facts established a prima facie case of burglary with intent to commit an offense.
[1] A burglary conviction may be based on the insertion of any part of the defendant's body into a structure, not just the entire body.
[2] The plain language of a statute must be followed when determining whether undisputed facts establish a prima facie case of guilt.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the unqualified use of the word "enter" in a burglary statute does not confine its applicability to intrusion of the whole body but includes insertion of any part of the body or of an instrument designed to effect the contemplated crime”
Establishes the controlling legal principle that entry under burglary statutes includes partial intrusion, not just whole-body entry
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSpearman knocked on Sam Dunson's front door. When Dunson opened the door, Spearman struck Dunson in the forehead, with his hand and arm entering the r…
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BOARDMAN, Judge.
Appellee/defendant David F. Spearman was charged by information with burglary. He filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 3.190(c)(4) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. The relevant, undisputed facts are as follows. Appellee knocked on the front door of the residence of Sam Dunson. Dunson opened the door, and appellee struck Dunson in the forehead. Appellee’s hand and arm entered the residence when he struck Dunson.
After a hearing the trial court found that there were no disputed material facts; that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that appellee went to Dunson’s residence with the intent to commit an assault, and that there was an entry into the enclosed structure by appellee’s hand and arm. The trial judge then found appellee’s actions could be construed to be a burglary with intent to commit an assault. Nonetheless, the court concluded that the legislature did not intend this to be a burglary and granted the motion to dismiss.
Section 810.02(1), Florida Statutes (1977), provides: “ ‘Burglary’ means entering or remaining in a structure or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the defendant is licensed or invited to enter or remain.” A structure is defined in Section 810.011(1) as “any building of any kind, either temporary or permanent, which has a roof over it, together with the curtilage thereof.”
It is well established that the unqualified use of the word “enter” in a burglary statute does not confine its applicability to intrusion of the whole body but includes insertion of any part of the body or of an instrument designed to effect the contemplated crime. State v. Whitaker, 275 S.W. 2d 316 (Mo.1955); Commonwealth v. Myers, 223 Pa.Super. 75, 297 A. 2d 151 (1972); Foster v. State, 220 So. 2d 406 (Fla.3d DCA 1969); 13 Am.Jur.2d Burglary § 10 (1964). The legislature is presumed to recognize the meaning of the terms it employs. Furthermore, appellee’s entire body intruded into the curtilage of Dunson’s residence.
In view of the plain language of the statute, it cannot be said that the undisputed facts do not establish a prima facie case of guilt.
REVERSED and REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
GRIMES, C. J., and SCHEB, J., concur.
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Henderson Nurse v. State, 658 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)…ry of an unoccupied structure. § 810.02(3), Fla.Stat. (1991). It is well settled that the insertion of any part of the defendant's body into a protected structure with larcenous intent, as here, is a completed burglary. See, e.g., State v. Spearman, 366 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). The mere fact that the defendant [*1080] replaced the clippers when caught red-handed does not change this result. More to the point, however, this scenario cannot possibly amount to an attempted burglary under any view of the ev…
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Stanley v. State, 626 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)…y must be made by some part of the body or an instrument used not only for the breaking but for the purpose of committing the felony. Foster v. State, 220 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 225 So. 2d 913 (Fla.1969). See also State v. Spearman, 366 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). In this case, the state only proved that there was a new hole in the wall and that Stanley had drywall residue on his pants. This circumstantial evidence is not inconsistent with the hypothesis that there was only a breaking an…
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Baker v. State, 622 So. 2d 1333 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)…defendant. Foster v. State, 220 So. 2d 406 (Fla.3rd DCA), cert. denied, 225 So. 2d 913 (Fla.1969); W.R. LaFave & A.W. Scott, Jr., 2 Substantive Criminal Law § 8.13(b) (1986); C.E. Torcia, 3 Wharton’s Criminal Law § 333 (1978); see State v. Spearman, 366 So. 2d 775 (Fla.2nd DCA 1978). Despite this apparent misconception, the trial court correctly instructed the jury that a “structure” could include the enclosed grounds immediately surrounding the building. Fla.Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 136; see § 810.011(1) an…
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- Foster v. State, 220 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)