CHARLES H. CRANDON, N. P. LOWREY, PRESTON B. BIRD, HUGH PETERS AND VAL C. CLEARY, AS MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA, AND CECIL A. TURNER, AS ZONING DIRECTOR OF DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, EX REL., ROBERT URICHO, SR., GEORGE URICHO AND ROBERT URICHO, JR., CO-PARTNERS DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE FIRM AND STYLE NAME OF SUNNY SOUTH AIRPORT
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Florida Supreme Court held that an involuntary cessation of a nonconforming airport use due to government order during wartime does not constitute a discontinuance under zoning regulations that would strip the property of its nonconforming status. The court affirmed a mandamus judgment allowing the airport operator to resume operations after the cessation of hostilities.
The court held that the involuntary cessation of the airport use by direct act of sovereign federal authority does not constitute a discontinuance that strips the property of its nonconforming status, and therefore the property retains the right to resume airport operations.
“The use of the property for an airport was interrupted by virtue of a superior authority and was, in every sense, involuntary. Can it then be maintained that the property will not further enjoy the same status of a nonconforming use?”
Establishes the central legal question of whether involuntary cessation constitutes discontinuance under zoning law.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRelator operated an airport on 120 acres in Dade County from 1933 to 1942, when it was closed by order of the Civil Aeronautics Authority as a wartime…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Nonconforming Use cases and more on FLexlaw
This appeal is from a judgment in mandamus for relator.
Relator operated an airport on a large portion of a tract of land, comprising one hundred and twenty acres, in Dade County, Florida, from 1933 to .1942, at which time it was closed by direction of the Civil Aeronautics Authority as a war measure. After the cessation of hostilities the same authority granted permission to relator to reopen the airport. Respondent Dade County resists the further use of the property as an airport because in 1937 the Legislature enacted Chapter 17883 and pursuant to same in 1938, by resolution, the county zoned the locus in quo against such use. Section 33 of the Resolution reads:
“Nothing contained in these Regulations shall be deemed or construed to prohibit a constitution of the particular lawful use or uses of any land, building, structure, improvement or premises legally existing in the respective zones at the time this resolution becomes effective ...”
Section 34 of the Resolution provided:
“No building or premises wherein or whereon a nonconforming usage is discontinued for a period of at least six months . . . shall again be devoted to any use prohibited by this resolution in said zone.”
The use of the property for an airport was interrupted by virtue of a superior authority and was, in every sense, involuntary. Can it then be maintained that the property will not further enjoy the same status of a nonconforming use ?
*135On one occasion we had before us a case involving a nonconforming use. See City of Miami Beach et al. v. State ex rel. Parkway Company, Inc., 128 Fla. 118, 174 So. 443. There this court did not elucidate on the meaning of “discontinued” but rather said it meant what it said. Several cases from other jurisdictions have been called to our attention. See Haller Baking Company’s Appeal, 295 Pa. 257, 145 Atl. 77; Ullman, State’s Attorney, ex rel. Eramo v. Payne, 127 Conn. 239, 16 Atl. (2nd) 286; State ex rel. Schaetz v. Manders, 206 Wis. 121, 238 N.W. 835; Adams v. Kalamazoo Ice & Fuel Company, 245 Mich. 261, 22 N.W. 86. We do not attach a great deal of weight to these cases because of the factual difference and the dissimilarity of the zoning regulation. We cite them for whatever benefit the Bench and Bar may get from them. The facts in the case at bar are more compelling for a continuance of the use than the above cases. Here the relator had no choice but to cease using the property. Here the cessation in use was by no act of anyone in privity with the landowner. The discontinuance was by a direct act of the sovereign power of the United States. Because of these factors we are not required to determine whether “discontinuance” as used in the resolution contemplates an intent to abandon the use of the property. Neither are we required to say that discontinuance is synonymous with abandonment.
We have duly considered all questions presented on the appeal and finding no error the judgment is affirmed.
CHAPMAN, C. J., TERRELL and BUFORD, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Lewis v. City OF Atl. Beach, 467 So. 2d 751 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)…Caused by Difficulties Unrelated to Governmental Activity, 56 A.L.R.3d 14 (1974). Neither attrition nor abandonment occurs where a nonconforming use is interrupted or discontinued involuntarily by compulsion of governmental action. Crandon v. State, 158 Fla. 133, 28 So. 2d 159 (1946). See generally, Annot., Zoning: Right to Resume Nonconforming Use of Premises After Involuntary Break in the Continuity of Nonconforming Use Caused by Governmental Activity, 56 A.L.R.3d 138 (1974). Temporary cessation of a nonc…
-
Hobbs v. Dep't OF Transp., 831 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)…ity to issue a new permit where it was clear the property had not been used for over six months. In reaching this decision, the court emphasized the fact that no “effort was made to renew the license.” Id. at 582. In Crandon v. State ex rel. Uricho, 158 Fla. 133, 28 So. 2d 159 [*749] (1946), an airport in Dade County was closed in 1942 by the Civil Aeronautics Board as a war measure. When the war was over, the county sought to prohibit the airport from reopening based on an ordinance which prohibited contin…
-
Persaud Props. FL Invs., LLC v. THE Town of Fort Myers Beach (Fla. 2d DCA 2020)…2d at 432 ("[A] discontinuance provision is one of the methods by which nonconforming uses may be gradually eliminated over the course of time. Other methods include attrition, destruction, and obsolescence."), with Crandon v. State ex rel. Uricho, 28 So. 2d 159, 160 (Fla. 1946) ("[W]e are not required to determine whether 'discontinuance' as used in the resolution contemplates an intent to abandon the use of the property."), and Lewis, 467 So. 2d at 754-55 ("The general rule is that nonconforming uses may…1 / 2
Authorities Cited
- City of Miami Beach v. State, 128 Fla. 118 (Fla. 1937)