ROBERT TROUP, APPELLANT,
v.
JERRY HEACOCK, D/B/A J. M. HEACOCK INSURANCE, INC., APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Troup appeals from a judgment against him and an injunction preventing him from competing in insurance sales in Volusia County. The court reversed, finding that Heacock materially breached the employment contract by unilaterally reducing Troup's guaranteed weekly draw from $125 to $100 and then $50, thereby releasing Troup from all contractual obligations including a non-compete clause.
The contract is not enforceable against Troup because Heacock materially breached it by reducing the weekly draw without consent. This material breach released Troup from all contractual obligations, including the non-compete clause. The injunction is reversed as contrary to equity and would constitute inverse peonage.
[1] A party who materially breaches an employment contract by unilaterally reducing the employee's draw may not enforce a non-compete clause contained within that contract.
[2] Ambiguities in a contract drafted by one party are construed against the drafter and in favor of the other party.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The contract was drawn by J. M. Heacock and, therefore, the ambiguities contained therein are to be construed against him and in favor of Robert Troup. This contract is not enforceable against Robert Troup.”
Establishes the rule of contract interpretation against the drafter and the court's holding that the contract cannot be enforced.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHeacock and Troup entered into an employment contract for insurance sales, with Troup to receive $125 weekly as a draw with no provision for reduction…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Enforceability Of Non-Compete Agreements cases and more on FLexlaw
MELVIN, Judge.
Robert Troup appeals from a final judgment entered against him and in favor of Jerry Heacock, d/b/a J. M. Heacock Insurance, Inc., and also from a final judgment that enjoined Troup from competing in the sale of life or health insurance policies in the Volusia County area, excluding New Smyrna Beach and cities west of Daytona Beach and their service areas, for a period beginning April 25, 1978, and ending April 24, 1980. Heacock and Troup entered into an employment contract whereby Troup was to sell insurance for Heacock. This contract was subject to termination at the will of Heacock, contained no provision for training for Troup, and no requirement with reference to the amount or quota of insurance to be sold. Under the contract, Troup was to receive $125 weekly as a draw. The contract did not provide that the weekly draw could be reduced. The contract also provided:
“(e) That, should MR. ROBERT TROUP either quit or be fired from his job with JERRY HEACOCK, d/b/a J. M. HEAC-OCK INSURANCE, INC., during, this indefinite period of between January 2, 1977 and whenever, that ROBERT TROUP hereby agrees not to compete in the sale of any of the aforedescribed types of insurance in the Volusia-Flagler County area for a period of three (3) years without prior written consent of JERRY HEACOCK, d/b/a J. M. HEA-COCK INSURANCE, INC.”
The contract was drawn by J. M. Heacock and, therefore, the ambiguities contained therein are to be construed against him and in favor of Robert Troup. This contract is not enforceable against Robert Troup. We find that Jerry Heacock breached the same by reducing the $125 weekly draw provided for in the agreement to the sum of $100 per week, and then later to $50 per week, all without the consent of Robert Troup. Thereafter, for whatever reason that was pleasing to Jerry Heacock, he fired Robert Troup. Having unilaterally reduced the amount stipulated for Troup’s weekly draw, such action had the legal effect of releasing Troup from any obligation to Heacock. 7 Fla.Jur. “Contracts”, Sections 164, 175.
The contract having been materially altered and breached by Jerry Heacock, it follows that the judgment herein appealed from, which represented Heacock’s claim for reimbursement for sums paid Troup while in the employ of Heacock is reversed.
The injunction order referred to is contrary to equity and, if allowed to stand, would result in inverse peonage. Therefore, the same is also reversed with directions that as to each asserted claim by Heacock, judgment be entered in favor of Troup.
McCORD, C. J., and BOOTH, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Bradley v. Health Coal., Inc., 687 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)…rule is that a material breach of the Agreement allows the non-breaching party to treat the breach as a discharge of his contract liability.” In the Matter of Walter W. Thomas, Debtor, 51 B.R. 653, 654 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1985) (citing Troup v. Heacock, 367 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), 11 Fla. Jur.2d Contracts § 169 (1981)); see also Air Ambulance Network, Inc. v. Floribus, 511 So. 2d 702, 703 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) review denied, 520 So. 2d 584 (Fla.1988); Cordis Corp. v. Prooslin, 482 So. 2d at 490. If the emplo…
-
Marshall Constr., Ltd. v. Coastal Sheet Metal & Roofing, Inc., 569 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)…he breach as a discharge of its duty to pay Coastal until such time as Coastal repaired the defective roof and fulfilled its contractual duties. See Beefy Trail, Inc. v. Beefy King Int’l, Inc., 267 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972); Troup v. Heackcock, 367 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). In light of the fact that the terms of the contract required substantial completion by July 25, 1988, and that Coastal refused to return to work until it was paid, Marshall was completely justified in determining that a material…
-
Kupscznk v. Blasters, Inc., 647 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)…the motion to dissolve that Blasters’ unilateral reduction of his commission constituted a prior breach of their employment agreement, rendering the noncompetition agreement a nullity and thus impossible to breach. He has relied on Troup v. Heacock, 367 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), a case we find not applicable in the present setting. The trial court in Troup refused to enforce a covenant not to compete that was part of a written employment agreement providing Troup, an insurance salesman, with a $125 week…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence