THE HOME INSURANCE COMPANY, A FOREIGN CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
LOUIS MENDELSON AND FLORENCE MENDELSON, HIS WIFE, APPELLEES
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Home Insurance Company appealed a trial court judgment finding that it had cancelled and reissued an excess liability policy to Florida resident Louis Mendelson, triggering Florida's statutory requirement to offer $1,000,000 in uninsured motorist coverage. The appellate court affirmed, holding that competent, substantial evidence supported the trial court's factual findings.
The trial court's factual finding that Home had cancelled and reissued the policy was supported by competent, substantial evidence, and therefore the judgment that the policy automatically provided $1,000,000 in uninsured motorist coverage under Section 627.727 was affirmed.
[1] A Florida statute requiring uninsured motorists coverage applies when an excess liability insurance policy is issued to a Florida resident, even if the policy face states…
[2] A factual determination by a trial court sitting without a jury, supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record, will be affirmed on appeal.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial judge, sitting without a jury, found that the appellant-defendant, Home Insurance Company, had cancelled and then reissued a $1,000,000 excess liability insurance policy to the plaintiff-appellee Louis Mendelson”
Establishes the key factual finding that triggered the statutory requirement for uninsured motorist coverage
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHome Insurance Company issued a $1,000,000 excess liability insurance policy to Louis Mendelson. Home contended it had merely continued an existing po…
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SCHWARTZ, Judge.
After a lengthy trial, at which both the facts and the inferences properly to be drawn from them were in hot dispute, the trial judge, sitting without a jury, found that the appellant-defendant, Home Insurance Company, had cancelled and then reissued a $1,000,000 excess liability insurance policy to the plaintiff-appellee Louis Men-delson, who was then a resident of Florida; he thereby rejected the defendant’s contrary contention that Home had merely continued the effectiveness of an already existing policy issued while Mendelson had been a resident of New York.
Pursuant to this finding, the court held that Section 627.727, Florida Statutes (1975), was applicable and that, since Home had not offered Mendelson $1,000,000 in uninsured motorists coverage as the statute requires, the policy was deemed automatically to provide that coverage, notwithstanding the $25,000 UM limits stated on its face. See Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Green, 327 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), cert, denied, 336 So. 2d 1179 (Fla.1976).
We have carefully reviewed the extensive record below and have concluded that it contains competent, substantial evidence which supports the factual determination which formed the basis of the judgment below. See Atlantic & Gulf Properties, Inc. v. Palmer, 109 So. 2d 768 (Fla.3d DCA 1959), 60 Am.Jur.2d, Payment, §§ 82-83. Since that is the case, the judgment rendered by the trial court acting as the finder of fact must be and is affirmed. Strawgate v. Turner, 339 So. 2d 1112 (Fla.1976); Department of Transportation v. Morehouse, 350 So. 2d 529 (Fla.3d DCA 1977), cert. denied, 358 So. 2d 129 (Fla.1978); DeLalio v. Food Palace, Inc., 330 So. 2d 835 (Fla.3d DCA 1976), cert. denied, 341 So. 2d 1081 (Fla.1976); Courshon v. Fontainebleau Hotel Corp., 307 So. 2d 901 (Fla.3d DCA 1975).
Affirmed.
CHARLES CARROLL, Associate Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. Although handled in the form of a cancellation and reinstatement, that was not the legal effect of the transaction. The “cancellation” notice was not a cancellation, but by its terms and legal effect was a notice that the policy was cancelled unless certain premium payment should be made within a designated date. Timely payment was made to an agent of the insurer. When that occurred, the fact that the method employed by the insurance company to recognize and implement the continuance of the insurance was by “reissuing” the policy, instead of sending the insured a notice that because of the payment the policy continued, is not material. The payment for which the policy was “reissued” was not made as a payment of a premium for a new or separate policy, but was a payment of premium on the existing policy, and because of such payment, according to the terms of the “cancellation” notice, the policy never became cancelled. It is the substance of the transaction and not its shadow that determines its legal effect, which in this instance was the uninterrupted continuance of the policy. In my opinion, the judgment should be reversed.
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Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Inez Sheffield, 375 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)…ute to offer UM coverage to the plaintiff at the time it issued the amended policy.3 Since it admittedly did not, the trial court correctly determined that UM protection was deemed provided by operation of [*601] law. See Home Ins. Co. v. Mendelson, 367 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). The judgment under review is therefore Affirmed. HENDRY, J., dissents. . See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Duffy, 237 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970). . Hartford argues that the expansive definition of “renewal” contained in Sec. 627.72…
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Mixson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 388 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…Co. v. Cofield, 110 Fla. 315, 148 So. 549 (Fla.1933); Interstate Fire Insurance Co. v. Hamilton, 356 So. 2d 1348 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); and Security Life & Trust Co. v. Jones, 202 So. 2d 906 (Fla.2d DCA 1967). Accord, Home Insurance Co. v. Mendelson, 367 So. 2d 1071 (Fla.3d DCA 1979) and Travelers Indemnity Co. of Rhode Island v. Mirlenbrink, 345 So. 2d 417 (Fla.2d DCA 1977). For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. . Mrs. Mixson had a second…
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Ready State Bank v. Meiselman, 741 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)…e of any default under the Lease that [it was] reasonably capable of curing.” In this state of the record we cannot, of course, interfere with the decision below. Westerman v. Shell’s City, Inc., 265 So. 2d 43 (Fla.1972); Home Ins. Co. v. Mendelson, 367 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). Meiselman separately argues in case number 99-164 that the expenses of the receivership imposed on the leasehold should have been taxed as cost against the bank. We find no error in this ruling. D.S. Ware Co. v. Green, 696 So.…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Strawgate v. Dorothea Chase Turner, 339 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 1976)
- Dep't OF Transp. of the State of Fla. v. Morehouse, 350 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)
- Atl. & Gulf Props., Inc. v. Palmer, 109 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959)
- AETNA Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Green, 327 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)
- DeLALIO v. Food Palace, Inc., 330 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
- Courshon v. Fontainebleau Hotel Corp., 307 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)