LEE HIRAM MARTIN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Martin challenges his conviction involving a firearm by arguing that a pistol does not qualify as a "firearm" under Florida's statutory definition because ammunition is excluded from the definition of "explosive." The court rejects this interpretation and affirms the conviction, holding that pistols are clearly firearms under the statute.
A pistol is a firearm within the meaning of section 790.001(6), Florida Statutes. The exclusion of ammunition from the definition of "explosive" does not apply to the term "explosive" as used in the firearm definition when read in context with the entire chapter.
[1] Penal statutes must be strictly construed, but not so strictly as to emasculate the statute and defeat the obvious intention of the legislature.
[2] A statute should be construed to give effect to the evident legislative intent, regardless of whether such construction varies from the statute's literal meaning.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Undoubtedly penal statutes must be strictly construed. However, they must not be construed so strictly as to emasculate the statute and defeat the obvious intention of the legislature.”
Establishes the proper standard for interpreting penal statutes—strict construction that does not undermine legislative intent.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMartin was charged with a firearm-related offense. He argued that under Florida Statutes section 790.001(6), a pistol is not a "firearm" because that …
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BOOTH, Judge.
The primary issue presented on this appeal is whether a pistol is a “firearm” within the meaning of section 790.001(6), Florida Statutes (1977). Applying established principles of statutory construction, we conclude that it is and affirm.
Appellant argues that the technical definition of “firearm” given in Chapter 790 does not include a pistol because section 790.001(6) defines firearm as “any weapon . which will . . . expel a projectile by the action of an explosive,” and yet section 790.001(5)(a) excludes “[sjhotgun shells, cartridges, or ammunition for firearms” from the definition of “explosive.” Thus, according to appellant, a pistol, because it expels a projectile by the action of firearm ammunition, is not a “firearm” within the meaning of the statute. We reject this interpretation.
Undoubtedly penal statutes must be strictly construed. However, they must not be construed so strictly as to emasculate the statute and defeat the obvious intention of the legislature. State v. Hooten, 122 So. 2d 336 (Fla.2nd DCA 1960); Associated Dry Goods Corp. v. Dept, of Revenue, 335 So. 2d 832 (Fla.lst DCA 1976). The Supreme Court of Florida recently reiterated in Griffis v. State, 356 So. 2d 297 (Fla.1978), that a statute should be construed so as to give effect to the evident legislative intent, “regardless of whether such construction varies from the statute’s literal meaning.” It is fundamental that a statute should not be construed to bring about an unreasonable or absurd result. Sharon v. State, 156 So. 2d 677 (Fla.3d DCA 1963); State v. Ba-bun, 233 So. 2d 171 (Fla.3d DCA 1970). Adoption of appellant’s position would lead to an absurd result here in that it would exclude pistols, shotguns, rifles, and any other commonly considered firearms from the statutory offenses involving firearms. We cannot presume that the legislature intended to enact such purposeless, useless legislation. Sharer v. Hotel Corp. of America, 144 So. 2d 813 (Fla.1962); Carlile v. Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission, 354 So. 2d 362 (Fla.1977).
Section 710.001, Florida Statutes (1977) states that the definitions given in that section are to apply to the words used in the chapter, “except where the context otherwise requires.” Reading the various provisions of the Chapter in context, we conclude that the exclusions from the definitions of “explosive” given in section 790.-001(5)(a)-(d) do not apply to the term “explosive” as used in the definition of “firearm” given in section 790.001(6). The legislature by its subsequent enactment of Chapter 78-200, Laws of Florida, has expressly codified this construction.
Appellant’s other point being without merit, the judgment and sentence are AFFIRMED.
McCORD, C. J., and MELVIN, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Carlile v. Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm'n of the State of Fla., 354 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 1977)
- Sharer v. Hotel Corp. OF Am., 144 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1962)
- Elbert Bryan Griffis, III v. State, 356 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 1978)
- Sharon v. State, 156 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963)
- State v. Hooten, 122 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960)
- State v. Teofilo Babun and Santiago Babun, 233 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970)
- Associated DRY Goods Corp. v. The Dep't OF Revenue, 335 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)