STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
TRACEY BOYD AND JOHN D. BOYD, APPELLEES
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The Florida appellate court reversed the discharge of two defendants who invoked the speedy trial rule, holding that their counsel's waiver of speedy trial rights in the initial proceeding applied to a subsequently filed consolidated information charging the same criminal conduct.
The appellees' waiver of speedy trial rights made at the October 27, 1977 hearing applied to the November 10, 1977 consolidated information because that information charged the same criminal conduct as the original informations. Therefore, the discharge motion should have been denied.
[1] A waiver of speedy trial for one charge arising from the same criminal episode applies to additional charges stemming from that same episode.
[2] A defendant's waiver of speedy trial rights for a charge is effective for subsequently added charges if the court finds both charges arose from the same set of facts.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“counsel for a defendant may effectively waive the defendant's rights under the speedy trial rule”
Establishes the foundational principle that speedy trial waivers are valid when made by defense counsel
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Boyds were arrested on January 31, 1977, on marijuana importation charges. The State filed separate informations on February 4, 1977, charging Joh…
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RYDER, Judge.
The State appeals an order discharging appellees under the speedy trial rule. Having reviewed the briefs and the record, we find that its argument has merit.
As always in speedy trial cases, time is important and both parties have presented many dates for our consideration. Fortunately, only four of them are necessary to our decision. On January 31, 1977, law enforcement officials arrested both appel-lees on charges stemming from the importation of marijuana. Four days later, the State filed an information charging appel-lee John Boyd with bringing a controlled substance into Florida, possession of cannabis over five grams, and possession of cannabis with intent to deliver. The State filed a similar information against Tracey Boyd charging him with the same crimes with which it charged his brother and with conspiracy to bring a controlled substance into Florida.
Sometime later, after both sides had conducted extensive discovery, the State moved to consolidate the cases of appellees and those of two other defendants. In response, appellees moved for a continuance and the court held hearings on both motions. In the continuance hearing on October 27, 1977, the following exchange took place:
THE COURT: All right. You have already waived speedy trial according to your motion.
MR. MORAN [defense counsel]: Yes, sir, we have.
THE COURT: On behalf of both of the Boyds?
MR. MORAN: Oh, yes. There’s never been an issue in that regard?
The court granted the continuance motion and stated in its written order that counsel for appellees had waived the speedy trial periods.
On October 31, 1977, the court heard the motion to consolidate but reserved its ruling. As a result of this, on November 10, 1977, the State filed a new information and in that one instrument charged appellees and two other men with the three offenses which were common to the separate infor-mations earlier filed against appellees.
Finally, on January 4, 1978, appellees presented a motion for discharge from prosecution under the November 10, 1977 information. The court granted the motion and the present appeal followed.
In order to reach a decision in this case, we need only set forth two principles of law. The first is that counsel for a defendant may effectively waive the defendant’s rights under the speedy trial rule, Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191. State ex rel. Gutierrez v. Baker, 276 So. 2d 470 (Fla.1973). The second principle is that where the State files a second information against a defendant which charges the same crime as did the first information and is also based upon the same criminal conduct as the first, any waiver of speedy trial which the defendant made under the first information applies to the second information as well. See Homer v. State, 358 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); State v. Luck, 336 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976).
Applying these principles to the facts of this case, it becomes clear that the trial court should have denied the motion for discharge. By his statement made at the October 27, 1977 hearing, appellees’ counsel clearly waived the application of the speedy trial rule to the State’s case. Moreover, that waiver applied to the information filed on November 10, 1977 since it charged appellees with the same criminal conduct as did the original two informa-tions.
Accordingly, we REVERSE the order of discharge and REMAND this case for further proceedings.
GRIMES, C. J., and HOBSON, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Muller v. State, 387 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…urt. .As stated, Circuit Court Case No. 76-261 did not spring from either of the criminal episodes involved in Circuit court Case Nos. 75-1023 or 75- 6768. Were that the case, then the earlier continuance would impact Muller’s claim. State v. Boyd, 368 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Homer v. State, 358 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); State v. Luck, 336 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). . To its credit, the State does not rely on the reason given by the trial court for its ruling. The trial court ruled that wh…
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Udell Shirley Stevens v. State, 383 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)…irst information. However, either the two charges arose from the same criminal conduct or episode or else they did not. If they did, then appellant’s waiver of speedy trial for the first charge was also a waiver for the second charge. State v. Boyd, 368 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Homer v. State, 358 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); State v. Luck, 336 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). If they did not, then the arrest of the appellant on the first charge did not constitute his arrest on the second charge. Eith…
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State v. Corlew, 382 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)…conduct or criminal episode as the original information. Homer v. State, 358 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); State v. Luck, 336 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). Corlew, however, seeks to sustain the trial court’s ruling on the basis of State v. Boyd, 368 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). He asserts that Boyd stands for the proposition that a speedy trial waiver does not apply to an amended information charging a more serious crime than the original information. We disagree. Although Boyd involved a second inform…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State of Fla. ex rel. Juan Gutierrez v. Honorable Paul Baker, 276 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1973)
- State v. Luck, 336 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)
- Hernandez v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 358 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
- Homer v. State, 358 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)