CLINTON DAVID ROBINSON, PETITIONER,
v.
THE HONORABLE HUMES T. LASHER, JUDGE OF CIRCUIT COURT OF 17TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA, RESPONDENT

Fla. 4th DCA | 1979-02-28
No. 78-2070
DOWNEY, C. J., and ANSTEAD and DAUKSCH, JJ., concur.
368 So. 2d 83 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1979) Caution
Cited by 26 cases

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Synopsis

Robinson sought discharge from a manslaughter charge under Florida's speedy trial rule after the state failed to try him within 180 days of his initial arrest for reckless driving arising from the same incident. The court granted the petition, holding that speedy trial time on later-filed charges based on the same incident is measured from the date of the original arrest, and the state cannot circumvent speedy trial protections by nolle prossing the initial charge and filing a new one.


Holding

Yes. Speedy trial time on charges later filed but based on the same incident is measured from the date of arrest on the earlier charges. The state cannot enlarge the speedy trial period by untimely filing new charges or by nolle prossing the original charges.


Headnotes

[1] Speedy trial time on charges later filed, but based on the same incident, is measured from the date of arrest on earlier charges, even if the earlier charges are dropped.

[2] A state cannot enlarge the time for speedy trial by the untimely filing of a charge or by nolle prosequi of a prior charge arising from the same incident.

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Key Quotes

“although earlier charges arising from the same incident are dropped, speedy trial time on charges later filed, but based on the same incident, is still measured from the date of arrest on the earlier charges”

Establishes the core legal principle that speedy trial protection cannot be circumvented by filing successive charges based on the same incident.

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Facts & Procedural History

Robinson was arrested on January 25, 1978, and charged with reckless driving following an accident in which a passenger was killed. On August 9, 1978—…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

The petitioner claims he is entitled to discharge under the speedy trial rule, Fla.R. Crim.P. 3.191. Petitioner was arrested and charged with reckless driving on January 25, 1978, as a result of an accident in which a passenger in petitioner’s automobile was killed. On August 9, 1978, 196 days after his initial arrest, an information was filed charging the petitioner with manslaughter as a result of the same incident giving rise to the previous arrest. On August 24, the reckless driving charge was nolle prossed by the state. In response to this court’s order to show cause, the respondent did not reply to petitioner’s arguments on the merits and sought relinquishment of jurisdiction to rule on a pending motion for discharge. That request was granted and the respondent entered an order thereafter simply denying petitioner’s motion for discharge. The respondent has not shown cause why the petition should not be granted. In the recent case of State v. Thaddies, 364 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), this court noted:

In similar circumstances this court has held that although earlier charges arising from the same incident are dropped, speedy trial time on charges later filed, but based on the same incident, is still measured from the date of arrest on the earlier charges. Clark v. State, 318 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). (Id. at 820)

Here, the state had 180 days from January 25 to try the petitioner. That time had expired by August 8 when the manslaughter charge was filed. The alleged victim of the manslaughter died on January 25, 1978. Hence, all of the circumstances giving rise to the charges of reckless driving and manslaughter occurred on January 25. The state could not enlarge the time for speedy trial by the untimely filing of the manslaughter charge or by its nolle prosequi of the reckless driving charge, Thaddies, supra ; and the respondent has alleged no other basis for extending the time for speedy trial. The petitioner is entitled to be discharged.

Accordingly, the petition for writ of prohibition is granted and the respondent is hereby directed to discharge the petitioner. DOWNEY, C. J., and ANSTEAD and DAUKSCH, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By (13 total)

  • State v. Clifton, 905 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)
    …o custody, even for crimes not charged in the information filed by the state. See Reed v. State, 649 So. 2d 227 (Fla.1995); State v. Hanna, 858 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Walker v. State, 390 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Robinson v. Lasher, 368 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); State v. Thaddies, 364 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Deloach v. State, 338 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); Clark v. State, 318 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); see also Burk v. Washington, 713 So. 2d 988 (Fla.1998); Gibson. Th…
  • State v. Roxie Lynn Hanna, 858 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)
    …ed on same conduct), Carter v. State, 432 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (driving intoxicated; revoked license), State v. Kelly, 407 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981) (trafficking in two different pistols as part of same transaction), Robinson v. Lasher, 368 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979) (reckless driving resulting in manslaughter), Crain v. State, 302 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974) (driving under the influence of a prohibited drug; possession of prohibited drug found in car). Here, the distribution of obscenity…
  • Weed v. State, 411 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 1982)
    …ADKINS, Justice. This is a petition for writ of certiorari seeking review of a decision by the District Court of Appeal, First District, reported as State v. Weed, 373 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), which conflicts with Robinson v. Lasher, 368 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); State v. Thaddies, 364 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); State ex rel. Smith v. Nesbitt, 355 So. 2d 202 (Fla.3d DCA 1978); State ex rel. Williams v. Cowart, 281 So. 2d 527 (Fla.3d DCA 1973), and Wilcox v. State, 248 So .2d 692 (Fl…

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