HAROLD FLATT AND CHET FLATT, HIS WIFE, APPELLANTS,
v.
CITY OF BROOKSVILLE, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1979-03-14
No. 78-26
HOBSON, Acting C. J., and BOARD-MAN, J., concur.
368 So. 2d 631 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1979) Positive Treatment
Cited by 15 cases

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Synopsis

The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court's determination that homeowners could not recover compensation for damage to personal property destroyed by a city-constructed drainage system that caused flooding. The court held that the Florida Constitution's takings clause entitles property owners to full compensation for both real and personal property destroyed by government action.


Holding

Property owners are constitutionally entitled to recover full compensation for damage to both real and personal property destroyed by governmental action. The Florida Constitution's takings clause makes no distinction between real and personal property, and no enabling statute is required to implement this constitutional right.


Headnotes

[1] Damage to personal property is recoverable in an inverse condemnation proceeding.

[2] The constitutional provision for full compensation in eminent domain does not distinguish between real and personal property.

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Key Quotes

“No private property shall be taken except for a public purpose and with full compensation therefor . . . .”

The Florida Constitutional provision on which the taking claim is based, establishing no distinction between real and personal property

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Facts & Procedural History

Appellants Flatt and his wife instituted inverse condemnation proceedings against the City of Brooksville after a drainage system constructed by the C…

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Opinion of the Court
SCHEB, Judge.

SCHEB, Judge.

Appellants challenge the trial court’s holding that they were not entitled to recover compensation for damage to their personal property occurring as a result of a “taking” by appellee City. We reverse.

Appellants/plaintiffs instituted inverse condemnation proceedings against appellee City to recover for damage to their home and personal property.1 Appellants alleged that a drainage system constructed by the City caused surface water to flood their land and home. The trial court determined that there had been a taking by the City, and we affirmed. City of Brooksville v. Flatt, 345 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).

A jury trial was then conducted to determine how much compensation appellants were entitled to. Appellants sought to introduce evidence of the value of their personal property destroyed by the flooding. The court declined to receive such evidence, and entered a final order holding that damage to personal property was not recoverable “under the eminent domain provision of the Florida Constitution and applicable Florida Statute.”

Article X, § 6(a), Fla.Const. provides, “No private property shall be taken except for a public purpose and with full compensation therefor . . . .” Thus, no apparent distinction is made between real and personal property. This constitutional provision does not require enabling legislation to be effective, Jacksonville Expressway Authority v. Henry G. DuPree Co., 108 So. 2d 289, 294 (Fla.1958), so it is immaterial that there is no statute specifically authorizing recovery for loss of personal property. Only by allowing such recovery can a property owner receive his constitutional entitlement to “full compensation” for his loss.

We agree with the general principle stated in Kirkpatrick v. City of Jacksonville, 312 So. 2d 487, 489 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975) where the court said:

[A]n aggrieved property owner whose real or personal property has been destroyed by unwarranted governmental action may institute a proceeding to compel the governmental body to exercise its power of eminent domain and award just compensation to the owner. (Emphasis supplied.)

Accordingly, the order of the trial court is reversed and this cause remanded for a trial on the issue of the value of appellants’ personal property damaged or destroyed as a result of the City’s taking.2

HOBSON, Acting C. J., and BOARD-MAN, J., concur. . A public body is, of course, liable to the same extent in an inverse condemnation action as it would be if it were a petitioner in a direct condemnation action. State Road Department v. Lewis, 190 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966).

. We do not have the transcript of the initial trial before us. Upon remand the trial court must exercise caution to ensure that appellants do not recover for any losses they were compensated for in the initial trial.


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Citator

Cited By

  • …t “[n]o private property shall be taken except for a public purpose and with full compensation therefor paid to each owner....” This provision applies equally to real and personal property, including motor vehicles. See Flatt v. City of Brooksville, 368 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). In this instance, it could not be more plain that the state deprived respondents of the use of their property for a period of two years after the court ordered the vehicle returned. Accordingly, we reject the state’s argument th…
  • …affirm the trial judge’s finding in this regard. Florida law recognizes that items of personal property may be “taken” in a condemnation proceeding under our constitution even though no statute prescribes such a remedy. Flatt v. City of Brooksville, 368 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). Although affirming this portion of the judgment, we must again ask the trial court on remand to amplify the partial final judgment to reflect the specific items of personal property “taken” as indicated in the record. AFFIRMED I…
  • State v. Mid-Florida Growers, Inc., 541 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)
    …ment also includes prejudgment interest. . The parties to this action agree that the containerized plants which were destroyed in this case are personal property. Personal property may be taken by inverse condemnation. Flatt v. City of Brooksville, 368 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). Citrus agriculture demonstrates the difficulty in distinguishing between fructus natu-rales and fructus industriales. Summerlin v. Orange Shores, Inc., 97 Fla. 996, 122 So. 508 (1929); 63 Am.Jur.2d Property § 19, p. 251 (1984). B…

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