STATE OF FLORIDA EX REL. JOSEPH WAYNE ELLIOTT, RELATOR,
v.
THE HONORABLE JAMES M. REASBECK, CIRCUIT JUDGE OF THE SEVENTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, RESPONDENT
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A defendant's request for a continuance constitutes a waiver of strict time limitations under the Speedy Trial Rule.
The defendant's motion to discharge under the Speedy Trial Rule was denied. The defendant had previously requested a continuance, which the court foun…
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PER CURIAM.
This matter has been considered on a suggestion for writ of prohibition. Defendant’s motion to discharge under the Speedy Trial Rule, Rule 3.191, Fla.R.Crim.P., was denied. An order to show cause was issued and the positions of the various parties have been considered. It is our conclusion that in accordance with State v. Kurtz, 354 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), the defendant herein waived his right to rely upon strict time limitations provided in Rule 3.191.
Defendant herein requested a continuance and the defendant now directs our attention to a transcript of a colloquy between counsel when the matter was considered. Defense counsel asserts that although he stipulated to waive speedy trial time limitations that this stipulation had certain limitations which were exceeded.
We are not at all certain that the assert-' ed stipulation was in fact of such dignity nor that it was specific enough. As stated in State v. Kurtz, supra, when the defendant’s motion for continuance was granted the provisions of the speedy trial rule were no longer applicable as far as the 180-day provision is concerned. This case like many others boils down to a hindsight argument about what two attorneys meant when they stood before a trial judge discussing the rescheduling of a trial. Defendant now •seeks to say that this discussion constitutes an exact and very limited stipulation. We held in Kurtz that the granting of the continuance effects a waiver of the strict dictates of the speedy trial rule and we believe this case to be governed by the Kurtz ruling.
The suggestion for writ of prohibition is hereby denied.
LETTS, MOORE and BERANEK, JJ., concur.
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State v. Harmon Eugene Register, 380 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)…Rule 3.191 in order to sustain an extension of the one hundred and eighty days against the adverse party, it directly supports the state’s argument in the instant case. The case most directly in point factually is State ex rel. Elliot v. Reasbeck, 369 So. 2d 102 (Fla.4th DCA 1979). The defendant there moved for a continuance but later asserted that his speedy trial waiver contained certain limitations. The appellate court observed: This case like many others boils down to a hindsight argument about what tw…
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State v. McCRERY, 429 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)…y either party for any of the exceptional circumstances set forth in subsection (f) of the Rule” and none of the other circumstances which may serve as the basis for an extension under (d)(2) were demonstrated. In State ex rel. Elliott v. Reasbeck, 369 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979), the defendant claimed entitlement to discharge under the Speedy Trial Rule because of an oral stipulation between counsel limiting his waiver of speedy trial as the attorneys stood before the trial judge discussing the reschedul…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Kurtz, 354 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)