AUBREY EDWARD HARVILLE, APPELLANT,
v.
JEANETTE E. HARVILLE, APPELLEE
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The court held that even if the trial court improperly considered the appellant's current wife's income, there was sufficient other evidence to support the modification order.
The former husband appealed an order increasing child support and alimony, arguing the trial court erred by considering his current wife's income. The…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant, former husband of appellee, seeks review of an order increasing child support and alimony payments to appellee entered upon appellee’s Petition to Modify Alimony and Child Support.
Appellant contends the trial court erred by allowing into evidence and considering, over objection, testimony concerning appellant’s successive wife’s income. In Paragraph One (1) of the order appealed from, the trial court found that:
1. . [Tjhere has been a material change in the financial position of the respondent, Aubrey Edward Harville, in that he has remarried and undertaken additional obligations, but since April 1, 1976 his income has also increased as shown by the evidence.
From this order, it is unclear whether the trial court relied upon the evidence of appellant’s successive wife’s income to support his finding that appellant’s income had increased. Such reliance would have been clearly erroneous. Condon v. Condon, 295 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974). However, without consideration of appellant’s successive wife’s income, there was evidence to support the trial court’s findings. The totality of the circumstances clearly support the trial court’s order. Accordingly, the order appealed from is AFFIRMED.
Appellee’s motion for appellate attorney’s fees is provisionally granted and the cause is remanded to the trial court to determine the appropriate amount in accordance with Dresser v. Dresser, 350 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
MILLS, Acting C. J., ERVIN, J., and MASON, ERNEST E., Associate Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Arnold v. Miller, 404 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)…was $6,100; the father’s was $17,-800. Both parties had remarried in the interim, and their respective spouses were employed. Whether or not the trial judge should have considered spouses’ incomes was not raised on appeal. See, Harville v. Harville, 369 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); [*1167] Condon v. Condon, 295 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); and Birge v. Simpson, 280 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973). Nor is it certain, because he gave no reason for denying the petition, that the trial judge did in fact cons…
Authorities Cited
- Peavy v. State, 350 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)
- Dresser v. Dresser, 350 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)
- Tolbert Enters., Inc. v. Sonnenblick-Goldmansoutheast Corp., 295 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)
- Condon v. Condon, 295 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)