STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
DAVID ALLEN MILLER, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1979-03-02
No. 78-1553
BOARDMAN, Acting C. J., and SCHEB, J., concur.
369 So. 2d 619 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1979) Negative Treatment
Cited by 8 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

The State appealed the trial court's suppression of evidence from an inventory search of the defendant's truck. The appellate court reversed, holding that police officers have no duty to inform an arrestee that his vehicle will be impounded before conducting an inventory search.


Holding

Police officers have no duty to tell a silent arrestee that his car is being impounded. The failure to provide such notice does not violate the defendant's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment, and requiring such notice would place an unnecessary burden on police without providing additional protection to defendants.


Headnotes

[1] An inventory search of a vehicle is permissible when conducted as part of the impoundment process.

[2] Law enforcement officers are not required to inform an arrestee that their vehicle will be impounded.

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Key Quotes

“we do not think that a law enforcement officer has a duty to tell a silent arrestee that his car is being impounded”

Establishes the core holding that police have no duty to inform arrestees of impoundment

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Facts & Procedural History

Officers observed Miller drive through a red light and initiated a traffic stop. When asked for his driver's license, Miller produced a license receip…

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Opinion of the Court
DANAHY, Judge.

DANAHY, Judge.

The state appeals from an order granting a motion to suppress evidence found in an inventory search of appellee’s truck. We agree with the state that the trial court’s ruling was in error. The basic facts underlying this case are these. Officers Hanson and Lainio were sitting in their cruiser when they saw appellee drive through a red light at the intersection of Nebraska Avenue and Linebaugh in Tampa. They motioned for him to stop, and he drove into the parking lot of No-land’s Glass Company.

When Officer Hanson asked appellee for his driver’s license, appellee gave him a license receipt. After some further discussion Hanson discovered that the license receipt was not appellee’s and arrested him for obstruction of justice. The two officers placed appellee in their cruiser and then inventoried the contents of the truck as they prepared to impound it. During the inventory process, they discovered a controlled substance, phencyclidine, which became the object of the motion to suppress.

The trial court granted appellee’s motion to suppress because it found that the police officers had failed to tell appellee that they were going to impound his truck. The state now argues that the court was in error because there was no evidence upon which the court could base its ruling, and we must admit that we are hard pressed to find any evidentiary support for the court’s finding. However, we need not consider this point further because, in any case, we do not think that a law enforcement officer has a duty to tell a silent arrestee that his car is being impounded. If we were to hold otherwise, we would not in any way be increasing a defendant’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Consequently, we would be placing an unnecessary burden on the police in the already difficult situation which an arrest usually produces. Cf. State v. Dearden, 347 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (holding that an officer need not tell a defendant of the options to impoundment).1

Accordingly, we reverse the order granting the motion to suppress and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BOARDMAN, Acting C. J., and SCHEB, J., concur. . Of course, what we have said should not be interpreted to mean that the police may in any way mislead a defendant as to their intention to impound or that a defendant may otherwise be denied the right to request a reasonable alternative to impoundment.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Sanders v. State, 403 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 1981)
    …at 387 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980), holding that a law enforcement officer has no duty to advise a silent arrestee of alternatives to his vehicle’s impoundment. This holding is in accord with previous Second District decisions in State v. Miller, 369 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), and State v. Dearden, 347 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), and in conflict with the decisions of the Fourth District in Session v. State, 353 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Jones v. State, 345 So. 2d 809 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); State…
  • Miller v. State, 403 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. 1981)
    …OVERTON, Justice. This is a petition for writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal, reported at 369 So. 2d 619 (Fla.2d DCA 1979), and concerns the im-poundment and inventory search of a motor vehicle owned by the petitioner. The police failed to advise the petitioner, who was present, of alternatives other than im-poundment. There is conflict that needs reso…
    1 / 2
  • State v. Miller, 404 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)
    …DANAHY, Judge. This case is before us on remand from the Florida Supreme Court, which in Miller v. State, 403 So. 2d 1307 (Fla.1981), reversed our decision in State v. Miller, 369 So. 2d 619 (Fla.2d DCA 1979). Briefly, the relevant facts, as stated in our original opinion, were that officers Hanson and Lainio saw Mr. Miller drive his truck through a red light, and they motioned for him to stop. He then drove into the parking lot of a n…

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