DONE INVESTMENTS, N. V., APPELLANT,
v.
GERALD FORMAN ET AL., APPELLEES
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This case concerns whether a trial court can extend a mortgagor's redemption period after a judicial sale but before a title certificate is issued. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that it had the discretion to extend the redemption period under these specific circumstances.
Yes, the trial court had the authority to extend the mortgagor's redemption period. The court found that under the circumstances, where no certificate of title had been issued and no objections were filed, the trial court could properly exercise its discretion to extend the redemption period.
[1] A trial court has discretion to extend a mortgagor's redemption period beyond the statutory period if no certificate of title has been issued.
[2] A trial court may adopt procedures for judicial sales set forth in Section 45.031, Florida Statutes, but may deviate from them in certain circumstances.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Under these circumstances, in our opinion, the trial court could properly within its discretion extend the mortgagor’s period for redemption.”
Establishes the appellate court's conclusion on the trial court's authority.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant, Done Investments, appealed several orders from a foreclosure action, including the approval of the mortgagor's redemption of the property, …
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KEHOE, Judge.
Appellant, plaintiff below, brings these consolidated appeals from certain orders entered by the trial court in a foreclosure action. These orders, inter alia, approved appellees’ redemption of the subject property, vacated a public sale of that property to appellant, cancelled appellant’s mortgage of record and discharged its lis pendens on the property. Appellees St. George Enterprises, Ltd., and Peter Harsany also appeal from the final summary judgment of foreclosure. All of the appeals were consolidated for all appellate purposes. For purposes of this opinion, Done Investments will be referred to as “appellant” and all of the other parties as “appellees.” We affirm.
The sole issue presented for review by appellant is whether the trial court had the authority to extend the mortgagor’s time for redemption beyond the ten day period provided for in Section 45.031(3), Florida Statutes (1977), if the property had been judicially sold and no objections to the sale were filed.
Our review of the record shows that the trial court partially adopted, as it was permitted to do, the procedures for judicial sales set forth in Section 45.031. Here the final judgment, contrary to the provisions of Section 45.031, fixed a specific time for redemption. Further, at the time the trial court entered its order extending by three and one-half days the mortgagor’s time for redemption beyond the original ten day period, no certificate of title had been issued by the clerk of the court. Under these circumstances, in our opinion, the trial court could properly within its discretion extend the mortgagor’s period for redemption. Although we are unaware of any cases directly on point on this issue, we are persuaded by the reasoning set forth in Walter v. Gallman, 286 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973), and Allstate Mortgage Corporation of Florida v. Strasser, 277 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973), and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.550(b) as it relates to stays. See also Rosen v. Hunter, 277 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969). Accordingly, the final summary appealed is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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John Crescent, Inc. v. Collins E. Peterson and Margaret E. Peterson, 401 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)…are aware of one instance after adoption of the amendment in which the period of redemption was extended beyond the ten day period that separates the judi [*1152] cial sale and issuance of certificate of title.1 In Done Investments, N.V. v. Forman, 369 So. 2d 650, 651 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), the court said: Our review of the record shows that the trial court partially adopted, as it was permitted to do, the procedures for judicial sales set forth in Section 45.031. Here the final judgment, contrary to the provi…
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Sonson v. Flagler Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Miami, 564 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)…. Fischer v. Knuck, 497 So. 2d 240 (Fla.1986); Knott v. Knott, 395 So. 2d 1196, 1198 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), review denied, 411 So. 2d 383 (Fla.1981); Smith v. First Nat’l Bank of Pompano Beach, 336 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); Done Inves. v. Forman, 369 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. dismissed, 374 So. 2d 99 (Fla.1979). Treating the appellate papers, as requested, as, in part, an application for prohibition, prohibition is denied. Fischer, 497 So. 2d at 240. No motion for rehearing will be permitted.…
Authorities Cited
- Allstate Mortg. Corp. OF Fla. & Inca Int'l Corp. v. Strasser, 277 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)
- Walters v. Gallman, 286 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973)