MYRTLE BALL, APPELLANT,
v.
THOMAS ATES AND HARTFORD INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEES

Fla. 1st DCA | 1979-04-24
No. LL-151
Melvin, J., McCord, C.J., Smith, L. G., J.
369 So. 2d 1023 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1979) Positive Treatment
Cited by 14 cases

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Synopsis

The court affirmed judgment for the defendant employer and insurer, holding that an employer has no duty to warn of ordinary risks that an employee knew about and encountered while performing regular work duties.


Holding

An employer owes no duty to warn a business invitee of ordinary risks when the invitee's knowledge of the danger is equal to or superior to the employer's.


Headnotes

[1] An employer owes no duty to warn a business invitee of ordinary workplace risks when the invitee's knowledge of the danger equals or exceeds the employer's knowledge.

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Key Quotes

“a defendant's knowledge of danger must be superior to that of a business invitee in order to create a duty to warn of dangers unknown to the plaintiff”

Court explaining the legal standard for when an employer must warn of workplace hazards

Facts & Procedural History

Myrtle Ball was injured when she slipped and fell over a puddle while going to feed her employer's dogs; the water had been standing in the same locat…

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Opinion of the Court
MELVIN, Judge.

MELVIN, Judge.

Myrtle Ball fell and injured herself while working for Thomas Ates. Upon a suit against Ates and his insurer, Hartford Insurance Company, the jury verdict found Ates to be five percent negligent. The trial court subsequently entered a judgment in accordance with the motion for directed verdict by the defendants and Ball appeals. We affirm.

The evidence shows that Ball was injured when she slipped and fell as she attempted to step over a puddle as she was going out to feed Ates’ dogs. She testified that the water had been standing in that same place for at least a day, that she knew it was there, and that feeding the dogs had become one of her regular tasks. Under these circumstances we agree with the trial court that there was no showing of negligence on the part of Ates. The risk Ball encountered was an ordinary risk, not an unusual one, and she had knowledge of it equal or superior to that of Ates. In Vermont Mutual Insurance Company v. Conway, 358 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), we reversed the trial court’s denial of a directed verdict where a painter placed his ladder on a driveway which he knew had been recently hosed down and then sued the property owner for the injuries suffered when the ladder slipped. In the instant case as in Vermont Mutual the rule is that a defendant’s knowledge of danger must be superior to that of a business invitee in order to create a duty to warn of dangers unknown to the plaintiff.

AFFIRMED.

McCORD, C. J., and LARRY G. SMITH, J., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Melena Bennett and Harry Bennett v. Mattison, 382 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)
    …sed to them by defects on the leased premises, unless his knowledge of the defect is superior to that of the tenant. See Brooks v. Peters, 157 Fla. 141, 25 So. 2d 205 (1946); Wingard v. McDonald, 348 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), and Bail v. Ates, 369 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), applying the rule similarly to business invitees. Absent a statute, I think it questionable whether the rule of caveat emptor or caveat lessee is still applicable since the adoption of comparative negligence in Florida, an [*8…
  • Emmons v. Baptist Hosp. & Servicemaster Indus., Inc., 478 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)
    …te to the imposition upon the landowner of a duty to warn is that the defendant’s knowledge of the danger must be superior to that of the business invitee. Vermont Mutual Insurance Company v. Conway, 358 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Ball v. Ates, 369 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Hunt v. Slippery Dip of Jacksonville, Inc., 453 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). We next turn to the first theory enumerated above regarding landowner duty to business invitees. The plaintiff asserts that the evidence was suffic…
  • Brookie v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 213 So. 3d 1129 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017)
    …defendant to warn.”); see also McAllister v. Robbins, 542 So. 2d 470, 470 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (affirming summary judgment where there was “no question of duty to warn, since plaintiffs knowledge was equal with that of the defendants”); Ball v. Ates, 369 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (citing Vt. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Conway, 358 So. 2d 123, 124 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), and affirming grant of directed verdict for defendant, stating “rule is that a defendant’s knowledge of danger must be superior to that of a business i…

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