DALE CARSON, ETC., ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
RICHARD FRANKLIN MILLER, ET AL., APPELLEES
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The Florida Supreme Court held that a proposed administrative rule for regulating the density of prisoners in county and municipal detention facilities violated state law because it improperly delegated rulemaking authority to the Secretary rather than establishing fixed standards by rule. The court answered a certified question from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in the negative.
The proposed rule does not comply with section 951.23(2)(b) because the statute requires the Department to adopt rules establishing 'standards and requirements' governing detention population density through proper rulemaking procedures, not merely to delegate discretionary authority to the Secretary to ascertain appropriate capacities.
[1] A statute requiring the adoption of rules and regulations prescribing standards and requirements for prisoner housing per unit of floor space is not satisfied by delegati…
[2] Administrative agencies must discharge their rulemaking duties by adopting rules, not by delegating such authority to individual officials.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Section 951.23(2)(b) requires that "standards and requirements" governing the density of detention populations be prescribed by rules adopted in the manner specified in section 120.54, Florida Statutes (1978 Supp.). The Department did not discharge its rulemaking duty by delegating to the Secretary authority to "ascertain" proper housing capacities of the state's detention facilities.”
Establishes that the statute requires formal rulemaking with fixed standards, not delegated discretionary authority.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Department of Offender Rehabilitation proposed rule 33-8.02(10), which authorized the Secretary to ascertain maximum prisoner housing numbers for …
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[*11] PER CURIAM:
We have for resolution the following question certified from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals pursuant to section 25.031, Florida Statutes (1977), and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.510:
WHETHER THE RULE PROPOSED BY THE SECRETARY OF THE FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF OFFENDER REHABILITATION COMPLIES WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 951.23(2)(b), FLORIDA STATUTES.
We hold that this question must be answered in the negative.
Section 951.23(2)(b) provides:
The Department of Offender Rehabilitation is . directed to adopt rules and regulations prescribing standards and requirements with reference to . the number of county and municipal prisoners who may be housed therein per specified unit of floor space
Appellant Wainwright, Secretary of the Department of Offender Rehabilitation, asserts that rule 33-8.02(10) of the Florida Administrative Code satisfies the statute by requiring that
[t]he Secretary shall ascertain the maximum numbers of prisoners that can properly be housed in any detention facility. . . . The Officer-in-Charge . . . shall thereafter insure that the actual prisoner populations do not exceed such maximum numbers; provided, however, that the Secretary may authorize exceptions or modifications when in his opinion there is good cause for such action.
The assertion is untenable.
Section 951.23(2)(b) requires that “standards and requirements” governing the density of detention populations be prescribed by rules adopted in the manner specified in section 120.54, Florida Statutes (1978 Supp.). The Department did not discharge its rulemaking duty by delegating to the Secretary authority to “ascertain” proper housing capacities of the state’s detention facilities. We have consistently held that unambiguous statutory language must be accorded its plain meaning. Thayer v. State, 335 So. 2d 815 (Fla.1976); McDonald v. Roland, 65 So. 2d 12 (Fla.1953); A. R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 102 Fla. 1141, 137 So. 157 (1931); Van Pelt v. Hilliard, 75 Fla. 792, 78 So. 693 (1918).
In carrying out its rulemaking duty, the Department is not obliged to establish a single uniform square footage requirement for all existing county and municipal detention facilities, without regard for variables such as cell sizes, dayroom sizes, recreational area sizes, open cell block areas, individual cell block areas, or common open areas. Section 951.23(2Xb) requires the promulgation of “standards” which are determinative of population densities in varying situations, and the choice of a particular scheme satisfying the statute is left to the Department, to whose action this Court would accord a strong presumption of regularity. See Florida Citrus Commission v. Gift, Inc., 91 So. 2d 657 (Fla.1956). Yet plainly the Department must act by rules.
Rule 33-8.02(10), as proposed by the Secretary of Offender Rehabilitation, does not comply with the requirements of section 951.23(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1977). The certified question posed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals is answered in the negative.
It is so ordered.
ENGLAND, C. J., BOYD, OVERTON, SUNDBERG and ALDERMAN, JJ., and SMITH, Associate Justice, concur. ADKINS, J., dissents.
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Eugene Holly, M.D. v. Albert W. Auld, M.D., 450 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1984)…no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning. A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 102 Fla. 1141, 1144, 137 So. 157, 159 (1931). See also Carson v. Miller, 370 So. 2d 10 (Fla.1979); Ross v. Gore, 48 So. 2d 412 (Fla.1950). It has also been accurately stated that courts of this state are without power to construe an unambiguous statute in a way which would extend, modify, or limit, its express terms or its reasonable…
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Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 1992)…ment of Legal Affairs v. Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, Inc., 434 So. 2d 879, 882 (Fla.1983); Citizens v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 425 So. 2d 534, 542 (Fla.1982); St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Co. v. Hamm, 414 So. 2d 1071, 1073 (Fla.1982); Carson v. Miller, 370 So. 2d 10, 11 (Fla.1979); Thayer v. State, 335 So. 2d 815, 817 (Fla.1976); McDonald v. Roland, 65 So. 2d 12, 14 (Fla.1953). The sum of these cases is that this Court is without power to construe an unambiguous statute. In the case before us, the legislature…
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State v. Barnes, 595 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1992)…rcumstances, this Court has no authority to change the plain meaning of a statute where the legislature has unambiguously expressed its intent. Graham v. State, 472 So. 2d 464 (Fla.1985); Jenny v. State, 447 So. 2d 1351 (Fla.1984); Carson v. Miller, 370 So. 2d 10 (Fla.1979); State v. Egan, 287 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1973). We note that this construction of the statute, in accordance with its plain meaning, may cause many more defendants to be sentenced as habitual offenders, resulting in longer prison terms, and thu…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- A. R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 102 Fla. 1141 (Fla. 1931)
- Abbey v. Abbey, 102 Fla. 1141 (Fla. 1931)
- Van Pelt v. Hilliard, 75 Fla. 792 (Fla. 1918)
- Thayer v. State, 335 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1976)
- McDONALD v. Roland, 65 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1953)
- Fla. Citrus Comm'n v. Golden Gift, Inc., 91 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1956)