JAMES D. AKERS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Akers was convicted of armed robbery committed on July 28, 1973, but charged on December 7, 1977, which exceeded Florida's two-year statute of limitations for prosecution. The court reversed the conviction because the State failed to prove at trial that prosecution was timely commenced, a jurisdictional fact the State bears the burden to establish.
No. The State failed to carry its burden of proving at trial that prosecution was timely commenced. Although a timely arrest warrant tolls the statute of limitations, the State must produce evidence at trial establishing this jurisdictional fact. The trial court erred in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal.
[1] Prosecution for offenses not punishable by death must be commenced within two years after commission.
[2] The timely issuance of an arrest warrant constitutes commencement of a prosecution for the purpose of tolling the statute of limitations.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The time within which an offense is committed is a jurisdictional fact in all cases subject to limitation.”
Establishes that proof of timely prosecution commencement is a jurisdictional requirement, not merely procedural.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAn armed robbery occurred on July 28, 1973. An arrest warrant was issued on August 1, 1973 and delivered to the sheriff's office on August 2, 1973, wh…
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MILLS, Acting Chief Judge.
A jury convicted Akers of armed robbery. The trial court adjudicated him guilty and sentenced him to seven years imprisonment. He appeals contending the court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal based on the State’s failure to adduce evidence during the trial that the prosecution of the crime was commenced within the two year statute of limitations. We agree and reverse.
On 7 December 1977, the State filed an information charging Akers with an armed robbery which occurred on 28 July 1973. Akers filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the prosecution of the case was not commenced within two years after the offense charged occurred.
At the hearing on the motion, the State adduced evidence that an arrest warrant was issued on 1 August 1973 and delivered to the sheriff’s office on 2 August 1973 where it was filed in suspense awaiting Akers’ discharge from an out of state prison. The arrest warrant was given to a deputy on 15 September 1975 for service but service was not obtained until 10 November 1977. Akers’ motion was denied.
The State did not amend its information to allege these facts nor did it produce evidence at trial that prosecution of the crime was commenced within the period of limitation. The timely issuance of a warrant constitutes commencement of a prosecution for the purpose of tolling the statute and an information filed beyond the statutory period is effective to continue a prosecution thus begun. Rouse v. State, 44 Fla. 148, 32 So. 784 (1902); Horton v. Mayo, 153 Fla. 611, 15 So. 2d 327 (1943).
Prosecution for offenses not punishable by death must be commenced within two years after commission. Section 932.465(2), Florida Statutes (1973).
“The time within which an offense is committed is a jurisdictional fact in all cases subject to limitation.” Mitchell v. State, 157 Fla. 121, 25 So. 2d 73 (1946). “A most significant burden of proof is placed upon the State in order to proceed once the jurisdiction of the court is questioned [by] the raising of the statute of limitations.” State v. King, 282 So. 2d 162 (Fla.1973).
As to all offenses not punishable by death, not only should the information allege, but the State must prove, the institution of prosecution for the offense charged within two years after the offense was committed. Horton v. Mayo, supra.
Upon the trial of a criminal case, the law places the burden of proof on the prosecution to show that the commission of the offense as charged was committed within the two year period prescribed by statute. Lowe v. State, 154 Fla. 730, 19 So. 2d 106 (1944).
As required by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(b), Akers timely moved to dismiss the information. The motion should have been granted because the information on its face showed that the crime charged was barred by the statute of limitations. However, on the basis of the facts submitted by the State at the hearing, the State should have been permitted to amend its information to allege these facts. This was not done but is not an issue before us. Nevertheless, the State should have moved to amend its information which it did not do. Having failed to do this, the State should have produced the evidence at trial which it produced at the hearing on Akers’ motion. See Horton v. Mayo, supra. This it did not do and by failing to prove this jurisdictional fact it failed to carry the burden of proof required of it by law. The trial court should have granted Akers’ motion for judgment of acquittal.
The law applicable to this case compels us to reverse the judgment appealed.
ERVIN, J., concurs.
MASON, ERNEST, E., Associate Judge, concurs in part and dissents in part.
Associate Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree that the judgment and sentence should be reversed but I do not agree that the appellant should be discharged. Rather, the cause should be remanded with direction to the trial court to set aside the judgment and sentence with leave to the State to amend the information to allege facts which, if proven, would toll the running of the statute of limitations.
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Myron Fleming v. State, 524 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)…diction of the court is challenged by the raising of the statute of limitations, the state has the burden of establishing that the offense is not barred [*1147] by the statute of limitations. State v. King, 282 So. 2d 162 (Fla.1973); Akers v. State, 370 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). A prosecution for escape, which is a second degree felony, must be commenced within three years after it is committed. Section 775.15(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981). To determine when a prosecution commences, we look to section…
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Andrews v. State, 392 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)…en the code became effective, and that therefore those provisions have prospective application only. Reino v. State, 352 So. 2d 853, 861 (Fla. 1977). The trial court had no jurisdiction and the purported conviction must be reversed. Akers v. State, 370 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). The judgment and sentence are vacated and the case remanded to the court below with instructions to dismiss the information. DANAHY and CAMPBELL, JJ., concur. . The conspiracy was unsuccessful, but of course that has no bearin…
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Studnicka v. Honorable James T. Carlisle, 553 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)…ss. Below, the state failed to meet its burden of showing that the statutory periods for prosecuting Counts II and III, which facially appear to have run, were tolled. This calls into question the jurisdiction of the trial court. See Akers v. State, 370 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). So far as the appendix that is before us shows, no evidentiary hearing was held to determine whether the limitation period was in fact tolled, making the indictment timely, nor has the state sought to amend the indictment. We n…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Lowe v. State, 154 Fla. 730 (Fla. 1944)
- State v. King, 282 So. 2d 162 (Fla. 1973)
- Horton v. Mayo, 153 Fla. 611 (Fla. 1943)
- Ira S. Jones v. Giller, 153 Fla. 611 (Fla. 1943)
- Anderson Mitchell v. State, 157 Fla. 121 (Fla. 1946)
- Rouse v. State, 44 Fla. 148 (Fla. 1902)