JOHN SCOTT HUSTED, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Defendant Husted pled nolo contendere to marijuana charges after his motion to suppress was denied. He appealed, arguing his consent to search was tainted by an allegedly unlawful police stop. The court affirmed, holding that the trial judge's findings that Husted was warned of his right to refuse consent and gave voluntary consent were supported by the record and broke any chain of coercion from the prior stop.
The court affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress, holding that the trial judge's findings that Husted was warned of his right to refuse and gave voluntary consent were supported by the record. The warning broke the connection with any prior illegal police activity, rendering the consent untainted and voluntary.
[1] A defendant's voluntary consent to a search, given after being advised of the right to refuse, can render the consent untainted by any prior unlawful police activity.
[2] A warning of the right to refuse consent to a search can dissipate any coercion flowing from a potentially illegal prior police action.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“That the consent given by the Defendant was not tainted by the initial unlawful stop.”
The trial judge's factual finding that supported the suppression motion denial
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePolice officers at Miami International Airport stopped Husted in the concourse and requested permission to search his luggage. Husted consented to the…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Tainted Consent cases and more on FLexlaw
SCHWARTZ, Judge.
The defendant pled nolo contendere below, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress the marijuana which formed the basis of the charge against him. The contraband was seized by Dade County Public Safety Department officers at the Miami International Airport after Husted gave them permission to search his luggage. He contends here that his consent was irremedially “tainted” by the fact that it was given after, as he contends and as the trial judge found, the police unlawfully stopped him in the airport concourse. See Taylor v. State, 355 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 361 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 1978) and cases cited.
We need not and specifically do not pass upon the issue of whether the stop of the defendant was under the circumstances in any way improper,1 because the trial judge specifically found:
“4. That the Defendant, in fact, freely and voluntarily consented to a search of his luggage after having been advised of his right to refuse said search.
5. That the consent given by the Defendant was not tainted by the initial unlawful stop.”
The factual conclusion that the officers specifically told Husted of his right to withhold his consent is fully supported by the record. State v. Nova, 361 So. 2d 411 (Fla.1978); Rodriquez v. State, 189 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966). And it is well-settled that the trier of fact may properly find that such a warning breaks the connection with any prior illegal police activity so as to render a subsequent consent un-“tainted,” un-coerced, and truly voluntary in character. As the court said in Bretti v. Wainwright, 439 F. 2d 1042, 1045, 1046 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 943, 92 S.Ct. 293, 30 L.Ed.2d 257 (1971):
“We need not here decide whether the arrest of appellant was legal or not, for, even if illegal, we think that the subsequent consent was untainted . . . ”
*.*
While warnings prior to a consensual search may not have the same indispensability as those required prior to a confession . . . they do help ensure that the consent is free, voluntary, and untainted by the arrest’s possible illegality. In the instant case the presence of these warnings leads us to conclude that any coercion flowing from the possible illegality of appellant’s arrest was dissipated. We therefore hold that the evidence supports the conclusion that appellant voluntarily consented to the search of his apartment.”
Accord: St John v. State, 363 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Taylor v. State, supra, at 355 So. 2d 185 (“Such an advisement by the officer given prior to the challenged consent might very well have broken the chain of presumptive coercion created by the prior illegal search; . . .”); see Longo v. State, 157 Fla. 668, 26 So. 2d 818 (1946); United States v. Fike, 449 F. 2d 1 (5th Cir. 1971). Since the denial of the motion to suppress was thus properly based upon the evidence and the applicable law, the judgment under review is
Affirmed.
. But see the principles enunciated in United States v. Wylie, 186 U.S.App.D.C. 231, 569 F. 2d 62 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 944, 98 S.Ct. 1527, 55 L.Ed.2d 542 (1978).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (31 total)
-
Shapiro v. State, 390 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 1980)…must be gauged by established Fourth Amendment principles. A warrantless seizure of the jeans clearly occurred. At no time did the defendant consent to a search by the detective. Cf. Myles v. State, 374 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Husted v. State, 370 So. 2d 853 (3d DCA 1979). No contraband was in plain view. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971). The defendant was in the process of closing his bag when the officer reached in; there was no evidence that the bulge repr…
-
Royer v. State, 389 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)…action. Bailey v. State, 319 So. 2d at 28; Sheff v. State, 329 So. 2d 270 (Fla.1976). Accord, e. g., United States v. Ballard, supra; State v. Frost, supra; Pomerantz v. State, 372 So. 2d 104, 111 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). Since, unlike Husted v. State, 370 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) and United States v. Mendenhall, supra, in both of which the defendant was specifically informed of the right to refuse consent, but like Frost, there was no proof at all of any “break in the chain of illegality,” Royer’s consent…1 / 2
-
State v. Frost, 374 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)…v. State, 355 So. 2d 180, 184 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 361 So. 2d 835 (Fla.1978); United States v. Ballard, 573 F. 2d 913 (5th Cir. 1978); and there is admittedly nothing in this record to overcome that presumption. Compare Husted v. State, 370 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). The arrest which was based upon the discovery of the marijuana in the briefcase — as well as the subsequent discovery of the larger quantity of cannabis which followed that [*597] arrest5 — may therefore be sustained only if the…
Previewing 3 of 31 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (12 total)
- Taylor v. State, 355 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
- Longo v. State, 157 Fla. 668 (Fla. 1946)
- Ternes v. North Dakota, 435 U.S. 944 (U.S. 1978)
- Black v. United States, 435 U.S. 944 (U.S. 1978)
- United States v. Wylie, 569 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
- Onelio Garcia Rodriquez v. State, 189 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)
- Chalk v. United States, 404 U.S. 943 (U.S. 1971)
- Harvin v. United States, 404 U.S. 943 (U.S. 1971)
- State v. Nova, 361 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1978)
- Bretti v. Louie L. Wainwright, 439 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir. 1971)