RALPH R. CRABTREE, A SINGLE MAN, APPELLANT,
v.
EDWARD C. ROGERS AND JULIANNE ROGERS, HIS WIFE, APPELLEES
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The court held that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on the slander of title claim and that costs for deposition copies are not properly assessable.
Appellant sued appellees for slander of title, trespass, and conspiracy. Appellees moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted, also den…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant brought suit against appellees for slander of title, trespass, and conspiracy and asked for compensatory and punitive damages. After appellees answered, setting forth several affirmative defenses, they moved for summary judgment and appellant moved for partial summary judgment. The trial court granted appellees’ motion, denied appellant’s, and awarded costs to appellees for copies of depositions. We reverse the grant of summary judgment and the award of costs and affirm the denial of partial summary judgment.
A review of the record and the controlling law reveals that there are genuine is sues of material fact and neither party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Specifically, as to the slander of title count, the complaint does state a cause of action and the affirmative defense of good faith reliance on the survey creates a factual dispute which cannot be resolved on summary judgment. Annot., 129 ALR 179 (1940); Annot., 137 ALR 2d 840 (1955).
Since the summary judgment is reversed, costs must also be reversed. We note, however, that costs for copies of depositions are not properly assessable. Florida Greyhound Lines v. Jones, 60 So. 2d 396 (Fla.1952).
Appellees’ petition for attorney’s fees is DENIED.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
McCORD, C. J., and BOOTH and LARRY G. SMITH, JJ., concur.
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Int'l Patrol & Detective Agency, Inc. v. AETNA Cas. & Sur. Co., 396 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)…ng costs for copies of depositions in any case. Paul v. Allstate Insurance Company, 380 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1980). Likewise, this court has stated in dicta that “costs for copies of depositions are not properly assessable.” Crabtree v. Rogers, 370 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). The Fourth District Court of Appeal, on the other hand, has held that Jones did not set down an [*777] ironclad rule against taxing costs of copies of depositions and that such costs may be taxable if the copies served a useful…
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Arlington Towers Condo. N., Inc. v. Allington Towers N., Inc., 415 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)…whereby malice is presumed. See Gates v. Utsey, supra. We hold that the association’s affirmative defense of good faith creates a factual dispute as to the malicious intent element of a cause of action for slander of title. See Crabtree v. Rogers, 370 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). We recognize that malice will be presumed if the disparagement of title to real property is false, causes damage, and is not privileged. Gates v. Utsey, supra. The presumption of malice, however, can be overcome by the showing o…
Authorities Cited
- Florida Greyhound Lines v. Jones, 60 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1952)