MARTHA S. CONROY, APPELLANT,
v.
ANDREW JACKSON CONROY, APPELLEE
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In a dissolution of marriage proceeding, the trial court ordered the wife to pay her own attorney $16,000 in fees. The appellate court affirmed the judgment on alimony and property division but reversed the attorney's fee award, holding that Florida law prohibits courts from ordering a party to pay attorney's fees absent a charging lien claim.
The trial court lacked authority to order the wife to pay her attorney's fees absent a charging lien claim at the time of judgment. Florida law clearly prohibits such orders in dissolution proceedings as in other actions.
[1] In dissolution proceedings, a trial court lacks authority to order a party to pay their own attorney's fees absent a claim for a charging lien.
[2] A trial court's order requiring a party to pay their own attorney a specific fee, without a claim for a charging lien, deprives the litigant of due process.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial court has no authority, absent a claim for a charging lien, to enter an order or judgment requiring a party to pay his or her attorney for representation during that proceeding”
Establishes the core holding that Florida law prohibits trial courts from ordering parties to pay their own attorney's fees without a charging lien claim
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMartha Conroy sought dissolution of marriage and alleged she needed funds to hire an attorney, requesting her husband pay reasonable fees. At trial, t…
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SCHEB, Judge.
The wife challenges those parts of the trial court’s judgment of dissolution of marriage in which the court dealt with alimony, disposition of property, and the award of attorney’s fees. After careful review, we have concluded the court erred only in its award of attorney’s fees.
In her counterpetition for dissolution, the wife alleged that she needed funds to employ an attorney and requested that the court order her husband to pay her lawyer a reasonable fee. At the final hearing, her counsel presented an expert witness who testified that a reasonable fee would be not less than $15,000 nor more than $20,000. The husband did not contest the reasonableness of this amount but argued that he should not be responsible for his wife’s fees. The court agreed with the husband’s position, and ordered each party to pay his own attorney’s fees. Further, in Paragraph 4 of the judgment the court ordered:
[Tjhat a fair and reasonable fee to the attorneys for the Wife in this cause will be the sum of Sixteen Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($16,000.00) for which, pursuant to this Order, the Wife will be financially responsible for payment.
It is with this provision that we find fault.
The rule in this state is quite clear that in dissolution proceedings, as in other actions, the trial court has no authority, absent a claim for a charging lien, to enter an order or judgment requiring a party to pay his or her attorney for representation during that proceeding. Cristiani v. Cristiani, 114 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959); Kucera v. Kucera, 330 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); Chaachou v. Chaachou, 122 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960). The reasons for this rule become obvious in a case such as the present one where a litigant finds herself in an adversarial relationship with her own counsel concerning his fee and thus is deprived of her right to due process in the determination of that fee. Consequently, there having been no claim for a charging lien at the time the court entered its judgment, the trial court was without authority to order the wife to pay her attorney a $16,000 fee.1
We vacate Paragraph 4 of the court’s judgment which we quoted above. We affirm the judgment in all other respects.
HOBSON, Acting C. J., and BOARD-MAN, J., concur. . We note that subsequent to the entry of judgment appellant’s counsel made a claim for a charging lien. Once our mandate goes down, they will of course be able to pursue this remedy or seek redress in a separate action. See Cristiani v. Cristiani, supra; Weksler v. Stamatinos, 314 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975), cert. den. 336 So. 2d 108 (Fla.1976); Kurzweil v. Simon, 204 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Dralus v. Dralus, 627 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)…client to pay his or her lawyer. An exception to that rule occurs when, as here, the lawyer seeks to impose a charging lien in the dissolution case. See Lochner v. Monaco, Cardillo & Keith, P.A., 551 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Conroy v. Conroy, 370 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 381 So. 2d 765 (Fla.1980).6 Mr. Coleman seeks to impose a charging lien on the wife’s remaining assets for the unpaid balance of his fee. He has thus submitted for the court’s determination the issue of what, if any…
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Conroy v. Conroy, 392 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)…this court. We affirmed the judgment in all respects except that we held that the court had no authority, absent a claim for a charging lien, to require a party to pay his or her attorney for representation during that proceeding. Conroy v. Conroy, 370 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). Our opinion included a footnote which observed that subsequent to the entry of the final judgment, Mrs. Conroy’s counsel had made a claim for a charging lien, and we suggested that once our mandate had gone down, the attorneys wo…
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Lochner v. Monaco, Cardillo & Keith, P.A., 551 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)…d. Brady v. Jones, 491 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). [*584] Furthermore, other than by charging lien, a trial court has no authority to enter an order - or judgment requiring a party to pay for his representation in a proceeding. Conroy v. Conroy, 370 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), cert. den., 381 So. 2d 765 (Fla.1980). Cristiani v. Cristiani, 114 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959); see also Behar v. Root, 393 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Herold v. Hunt, 327 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). Because we conclude…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Khudourie Chaachou v. Fredericka Phillips Chaachou, 122 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960)
- Kurzweil v. Simon, 204 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)
- Kucera v. Kucera, 330 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)
- State of Fla. ex rel. Deauville Realty Co., Inc. v. Cannon, 114 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959)
- Luise Cristiani v. Daviso Cristiani, 114 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959)
- Weksler v. Constantinos Stamatinos, 314 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)