EXXON CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
GERALD A. LEWIS, COMPTROLLER, STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1978-12-29
No. JJ-364
BOYER, Acting C. J., and MILLS, J., concur.
371 So. 2d 129 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1978) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

Exxon appealed an agency determination that its severance tax refund claims were barred under Florida Statute § 211.06(2), which imposed a one-year filing deadline. The First District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that § 215.26 controls and provides a three-year period for filing refund applications with the Comptroller.


Holding

Section 215.26 controls and provides a three-year period after accrual of the right to a refund within which a taxpayer must file an application with the Comptroller. Section 211.06(2) merely authorizes the DOR to process adjustments within one year of payment but does not bar refund claims filed outside that period.


Headnotes

[1] A taxpayer may apply for a refund of overpaid taxes within three years after the right to such refund accrues, as provided by Florida Statute § 215.26.

[2] Florida Statute § 211.06 does not require a taxpayer to claim severance tax refunds within one year of payment, but rather authorizes the Department of Revenue to adopt r…

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Key Quotes

“We hold that § 215.26 controls and allows three years after accrual of the right to a refund within which the taxpayer can file application with the Comptroller for the refund. That statute expressly provides that unless filed within the three-year period "such right shall be barred", thereby signaling its effect as a non-claim statute.”

Establishes the court's holding that § 215.26 is the controlling statute and operates as a three-year non-claim statute for tax refunds.

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Facts & Procedural History

Exxon sought severance tax refunds for the period March 1, 1974 through December 31, 1976. The Department of Revenue (DOR) denied the claims as barred…

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Opinion of the Court
BOOTH, Judge.

BOOTH, Judge.

This cause is before us on appeal from final agency action holding Exxon’s claims for severance tax refunds for the period March 1, 1974 through December 31, 1976 are barred under Florida Statute § 211.-06(2). The issue on appeal is whether Florida Statute § 211.06(2)1 applies and bars the claim (as contended by DOR) or whether Florida Statute § 215.262 applies and the claims are timely filed (as contended by appellant). We hold that § 215.26 controls and allows three years after accrual of the right to a refund within which the taxpayer can file application with the Comptroller for the refund. That statute expressly provides that unless filed within the three-year period “such right shall be barred . ”, thereby signaling its effect as a non-claim statute.

As to Florida Statute § 211.06, its apparent function is to authorize the DOR to adopt regulations for processing taxpayer adjustments within one year of payment of the tax. Under this statute the DOR, as the collecting agency, is permitted to initially pass upon and determine refund questions during the first year following payment, though application to the Comptroller for release of any appropriated monies needed for refunds is still contemplated. No language in § 211.06 puts the taxpayer on notice that, as claimed by DOR, severance tax refunds can only be claimed within the one year following payment, and we reject that strained construction in favor of the clear language of § 215.26 allowing a three-year period for tax refunds.

Accordingly, the ruling ' below is REVERSED and the cause REMANDED for consideration on the merits.

BOYER, Acting C. J., and MILLS, J., concur. . Fla.Stat. § 211.06(2):

“The department is authorized and empowered to adjust and make proper settlements and refunds in cases of overpayment of the tax or where payment is made when no tax is due or when payment is made through error, under regulations prescribed by it, and there is hereby appropriated a sufficient amount for the comptroller to refund said taxes, when and if on proper application and proof filed with him within 1 year from the date of the payment of such taxes, he deems it necessary to make such refunds, and this provision shall in no way prejudice any right of action that may accrue to any person liable for the payment of the tax to contest in any court of competent jurisdiction the payment of any or all of the taxes imposed herein.”

. Fla.Stat. § 215.26:

“(1) The comptroller of the state may refund to the person who paid same, or his heirs, personal representatives or assigns, any moneys paid into the state treasury which constitute:
(a) An overpayment of any tax, license or account due; (2) Application for refunds as provided by this section shall be filed with the comptroller within 3 years after the right to such refund shall have accrued else such right shall be barred and such application shall be on a form to be prescribed by the comptroller and shall be sworn to and supplemented with such additional proof as is necessary to establish such claim; provided, such claim is not otherwise barred under the laws of this state.”

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Citator

Cited By

  • Causeway Lumber Co., Inc. v. Lewis, 410 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)
    …ommunity, Inc., 222 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969). (Legislature is capable of and has in certain statutes stated that the failure to comply with a credit or exemption filing requirement waives that right for all time). See also Exxon Corp. v. Lewis, 371 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). [*514] Notwithstanding the complete absence of any language drafted by the Legislature into Fla.Stat. § 212.17(3) which states that the credit remedy is exclusive or that the refund remedy is not available, the COMPTROLLER sugge…

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