RAYMOND PRESTON WARREN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Raymond Preston Warren appeals his convictions for escape, armed robbery, and carrying a concealed firearm, arguing that the trial court improperly admitted testimony about his prior arrests and charges and failed to instruct the jury that lawful custody was an essential element of escape. The court agrees and reverses, holding that such evidence violated the proper standards for admitting evidence of collateral crimes and that the omitted jury instruction was reversible error.
Yes on both counts. The court reversed Warren's convictions, holding that evidence of collateral crimes identical to those on trial was improper and that the trial court must instruct the jury on all essential elements of the offense charged, including that escape must be from lawful custody.
[1] Evidence of collateral crimes for which a defendant is not on trial is inadmissible if offered solely to prove the defendant's bad character or propensity to commit crime…
[2] Testimony concerning a defendant's prior arrests and charges unrelated to the current offense is inadmissible when it serves only to demonstrate a propensity to commit si…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“evidence of collateral crimes for which the defendant is not on trial may be admissible if relevant to prove some fact in issue other than the bad character of the defendant or his propensity to commit crime”
Establishes the legal standard for when evidence of other crimes may be admitted, citing Williams v. State
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWarren escaped from a detective's custody while being transported to county jail by threatening the officer with a gun and handcuffing him to a parked…
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HOBSON, Judge.
Appellant Raymond Preston Warren appeals his convictions for escape, armed robbery and carrying a concealed firearm. He contends that the trial court erred in allowing testimony into evidence concerning arrests and charges other than those for which he was being tried. He also argues that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that an essential element of the crime of escape was that the escape was from lawful custody. We agree with appellant’s arguments and reverse.
At trial, a detective from the Hillsbor-ough County Sheriff’s Department testified that appellant escaped from his custody while being transported to the county jail after a dental appointment. Appellant effected the escape by threatening the officer with a gun and handcuffing him to a nearby parked car. Appellant then drove away in the officer’s vehicle.
On cross-examination the officer denied defense counsel’s suggestion that appellant had paid the officer to permit the escape. On redirect, the following dialogue took place between the prosecutor and the officer:
Q. You had had occasion to see Mr. Warren’s jail card?
A. Yes, sir. Q. To your knowledge what was Mr. Warren in jail for at the time he escaped?
A. Multiple petit larceny armed robberies.
MR. ARNOLD: Your Honor, at this time I object and move for a mistrial. It is highly prejudicial and at this time I move for a mistrial.
THE COURT: Denied. Go ahead.
Q. Are you aware that any of the past— You were aware, then, of the offenses that the defendant was presently in jail for at that time?
A. Yes, sir. It was there to be seen.
Q. Were you aware of any other factors that came to your attention during the course of your job about this defendant?
A. He had a hold on him or at least one hold. He had a background of at least one escape.
MR. ARNOLD: Your Honor, again I object and move for a mistrial. This is irrelevant.
THE COURT. Overruled. Go ahead. (Emphasis supplied)
Prior to instructing the jury, the court submitted its proposed jury instruction on escape to counsel for both sides. Defense counsel agreed to the instruction on the condition that the court also instruct that one of the essential elements of the crime was that the defendant had escaped from lawful custody. The court declined to add this element.
The Supreme Court of Florida held in Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654, 659 (Fla.1959), that evidence of collateral crimes for which the defendant is not on trial may be admissible if relevant to prove some fact in issue other than the bad character of the defendant or his propensity to commit crime. Here the State argues that the testimony in question was elicited solely for the purpose of rehabilitating the witness. In this event, the prosecutor should have brought forth evidence of the officer’s good character rather than testimony showing appellant’s propensity for committing armed robbery and escape. Under the criteria of Williams v. State, supra, comments on appellant’s prior record of crimes, identical to those on trial, were improper. There are two reasons the trial court erred in not instructing the jury that to find appellant guilty of the crime of escape the State must prove he escaped from lawful custody. The first is that the trial court must instruct the jury as to each and every essential element of the offense charged. The consequences of a failure to so instruct were discussed by the Florida Supreme Court in Croft v. State, 117 Fla. 832, 158 So. 454 (1935):
[A] charge attempting to define the offense which does not cover material elements of the offense is necessarily misleading and prejudicial to the accused. It is equivalent to directing the jury that it is not necessary for the state to prove any elements of the offense except those included in the definition given by the court.
The second is that an essential element of the crime of escape is that the defendant escaped from “lawful custody.” King v. State, 42 Fla. 260, 28 So. 206 (1900); Fulford v. State, 113 So. 2d 572 (Fla.2d DCA 1959).
Because the issues discussed are disposi-tive of the instant case, we do not address ourselves to the other points raised by appellant.
We reverse appellant’s conviction and remand this cause for a new trial.
GRIMES, C. J., and RYDER, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Fouts v. State, 374 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)…e had been convicted of a crime, sentenced, and committed to a state correctional institution. Therefore, the fact of his prior conviction was an essential element of the crime charged and the state was required to prove it. Accord, Warren v. State, 371 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 2d DCA, 1979). However, that does not mean it was proper to allow the state to introduce into evidence the nature of the prior crime. [*25] The prejudicial effect in a criminal trial of evidence of a collateral crime committed by the accused…
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Stanford Legray Knight v. State, 374 So. 2d 1065 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)…new trial is required for other reasons, we point out that it was error, as argued in the appellant’s point II, to permit evidence that Knight had been arrested (on another occasion) for a crime not related to the present charges. Warren v. State, 371 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Whitehead v. State, 279 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973); see Clark v. State, 337 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). At the retrial, the contents of the officer’s conversation with Knight, which were relevant on the issue of premedita…
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Sullivan v. State, 430 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)…ho was previously committed to the Pinellas County Jail. To support a conviction for escape under section 944.40, Florida Statutes (1981), the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant escaped from “lawful custody.” Warren v. State, 371 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Maggard v. State, 226 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969). We believe the state has met its burden of proof. In Fulford v. State, the defendant, John Cornelius Fulford, was charged with escape while serving a felony sentence. At trial…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959)
- Elbert Croft v. State, 117 Fla. 832 (Fla. 1935)
- King v. State, 42 Fla. 260 (Fla. 1900)
- Fulford v. State, 113 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959)