T. L. M., A CHILD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1979-06-05
No. LL-302
ROBERT P. SMITH and ERVIN, JJ., concur.
371 So. 2d 688 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1979) Negative Treatment
Cited by 18 cases

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Synopsis

A fifteen-year-old child was adjudicated delinquent after police found a sawed-off pool cue during a search incident to taking him into custody at a hospital. The court reversed, holding that the officer lacked authority to take the child into custody because he had no probable cause to arrest for disorderly intoxication, and therefore the search was unreasonable.


Holding

The court held that the search was unreasonable and the motion to suppress should have been granted because the officer lacked probable cause or authority to arrest the child. For a misdemeanor arrest, all elements of the offense must occur in the officer's presence, and here the officer had no evidence that the child endangered public safety or committed a disturbance in his presence.


Headnotes

[1] A search incident to a lawful arrest requires that all elements of the offense occur in the arresting officer's presence.

[2] A police officer lacks probable cause to arrest a juvenile for disorderly intoxication when the officer observes no endangerment to public safety and no disturbance occur…

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Key Quotes

“Under Section 39.03(1), Florida Statutes (1977), a child may be taken into custody "for a delinquent act, pursuant to the laws of arrest."”

Establishes the statutory standard governing when juveniles may be taken into custody.

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Facts & Procedural History

T.L.M., age fifteen, and another person were reported to be causing a disturbance at a hospital. When the police officer arrived, they were standing o…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

This is a timely appeal from a final adjudication of delinquency and commitment to the custody of Children’s Services, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, State of Florida. Appellant entered a plea of nolo contendere with express reservation of the right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. We reverse.

T.L.M. was a fifteen year old child against whom a petition of delinquency was filed for disorderly conduct and carrying a concealed weapon, to wit: a piece of sawed-off pool cue. The disorderly conduct charge was dismissed by the court after a motion and a hearing and the motion to suppress the portion of the pool sue was denied.

The motion to suppress the pool cue urged that it was illegally seized without a warrant and that the search and seizure was without probable cause. At the hearing on the motion, the police officer involved in the arrest testified that he was called to the local hospital because it was reported that two people were causing a disturbance. When he arrived, the two people involved were standing outside the hospital. He went up and talked to them ascertaining their names and ages. When he found out they were juveniles, he decided to take them to the jail and, following police department policy, he searched them before he put them in the police cruiser. The search of appellant revealed the piece of sawed-off pool cue in the waistband of his pants.

The police officer stated that he asked the juveniles to go down to the station because of their age, the time (about 2 a. m.), and they “smelled of alcoholic beverages and acted to be under the influence of alcoholic beverages at that time.” He stated that it was his practice to detain juveniles he finds in the early hours of the morning to try to find out if their parents know where they are or where they have been and to try to find out why they are out at that time of the morning. They are always searched when they are transported in the car. Appellant concedes that if the officer had the authority to take appellant to the jail, he had the authority to search appellant before putting him in the police car. The issue, then, is whether the police officer had the authority to take appellant to the jail under the circumstances. Under Section 39.03(1), Florida Statutes (1977), a child may be taken into custody “for a delinquent act, pursuant to the laws of arrest.” There is nothing in the evidence presented to indicate that the officer had probable cause to believe that appellant had committed a felony or that appellant had committed a misdemeanor in the officer’s presence. The state urges on this appeal that the officer did have the authority to arrest appellant for disorderly intoxication because of the officer’s testimony that appellant smelled of alcoholic beverages and acted as if he were under the influence. Section 856.011(1), Florida Statutes (1977) provides:

“No person in the state shall be intoxicated and endanger the safety of another person or property, and no person in the state shall be intoxicated or drink any alcoholic beverage in a public place in or upon any public conveyance and cause a public disturbance.”

In State v. Holden, 299 So. 2d 8 (Fla.1974), the Florida Supreme Court held that statute to be constitutional as a valid delegation of authority only if it “is controlled and confined to situations where the public safety is endangered.” There was no testimony by the officer that he had any reason to believe that the public safety was endangered or that he saw appellant creating a disturbance. On the contrary, he testified that when he arrived at the hospital appellant was standing talking to another person. The contention by the state that it-is sufficient for the evidence to show that appellant was intoxicated in a public place and that he caused a disturbance while under the influence even though that disturbance was committed outside the presence of the officer is not supported by case law. When there is an arrest for a misdemeanor, all elements of the offense must occur in the officer’s presence. Kirby v. State, 217 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969).

Under the circumstances of this case, we hold that the search was unreasonable and the motion to suppress should have been granted. REVERSED.

ROBERT P. SMITH and ERVIN, JJ., concur.

Dissent
MILLS, Acting Chief Judge,

MILLS, Acting Chief Judge,

dissenting:

I dissent.

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Citator

Cited By

  • Kenton Anthony Blake v. State, 433 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)
    …e the disorderly intoxication statute. We agree that appellant’s behavior did not amount to disorderly intoxication as described in Section 856.011(1), Florida Statutes, and discussed in State v. Holden, 299 So. 2d 8 (Fla.1974) and T.L.M. v. State, 371 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). However, we do not agree that all of the charges must fail along with the charge of disorderly intoxication. In Harbin v. State, 358 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), this court reversed a disorderly conduct conviction, but upheld…
  • Chamson v. State, 529 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
    …wling is a misdemeanor, a police officer may arrest without a warrant only if both elements of the crime are committed in the officer’s presence. § 901.15(1), Fla.Stat. (1985); see Carter v. State, 516 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); T.L.M. v. State, 371 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). At the suppression hearing, the police officer testified that he found Chamson crouching near a dumpster in a public alley. He stated that Chamson’s answers did not dispel his concerns for the safety of businesses immediately…
  • Towne v. State, 495 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
    …nly the officer’s own observations will be considered in determining probable cause to arrest. S. 901.15(1), Fla. Stat. (1983); State v. Ecker, 311 So. 2d 104 (Fla.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019, 96 S.Ct. 455, 46 L.Ed.2d 391 (1975); T.L.M. v. State, 371 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Springfield v. State, 481 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). Upon observing conduct which the officer considers suspect, he must then “ ‘be able to point to specific and articula-ble facts, which, taken together with rational infer…

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