SYLVIA HOFFMAN, APPELLANT,
v.
GERALD M. HOFFMAN, APPELLEE
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The Third District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court's determination that child support obligations terminated when the oldest child reached age 18. The court held that pre-1973 divorce decrees requiring support until a child is 'emancipated' or 'self-supporting' continue until age 21 as a matter of law, unless the child becomes married, self-supporting, or otherwise emancipated before that age.
The court held that pre-July 1, 1973 divorce decrees requiring child support until a child is 'emancipated' or 'self-supporting' obligate the obligor to continue payments until the child reaches age 21, unless the child becomes married, self-supporting, or otherwise emancipated before that age. The 1973 statute lowering the age of majority to 18 does not apply retroactively to pre-1973 awards.
[1] Child support awards entered prior to July 1, 1973, obligate the payor until the child reaches twenty-one years of age, unless the child becomes married or self-supportin…
[2] The statute lowering the age of majority to eighteen does not retroactively alter child support awards made prior to its effective date of July 1, 1973.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The law is well-settled that a divorce decree entered prior to July 1, 1973, requiring a husband to make child support payments to his wife, either until majority or without specifying a termination date therein, obligates the husband on the face of the decree to make child support payments until the child reaches his twenty-first birthday.”
Establishes the controlling legal principle that pre-1973 decrees require support until age 21
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn a March 29, 1973 final judgment of dissolution, the court awarded child support of $300 per month for each of three children to continue until each…
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SCHWARTZ, Judge.
In a final judgment of dissolution entered on March 29,1973, the court provided for an award of child support of $300.00 per month for each of the parties’ three children which “shall continue until each child is emancipated, or self-supporting.” Over five years later, in the order which is now under review, a successor judge determined that the support required by the judgment for the oldest child terminated when she reached the age of 18. This was error. In Manganiello v. Manganiello, 359 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), this court clearly established the law to the contrary of the determination below. At 359 So. 2d 27-28, it was held:
“The law is well-settled that a divorce decree entered prior to July 1, 1973, requiring a husband to make child support payments to his wife, either until majority or without specifying a termination date therein, obligates the husband on the face of the decree to make child support . payments until the child reaches his twenty-first birthday. The only method by which a husband may absolve himself of such obligation of support prior to the child reaching twenty-one is if he files a motion to modify under Section 61.14, Florida Statutes (1977), and is able to show that the child has since become married or self-supporting. This result is in no way changed by Section 743.07, Florida Statutes (1977), lowering the age of majority to eighteen because the statute by its express terms does not operate retroactively to alter or change child sup port awards made prior to July 1, 1973, the effective date of the statute. Finn v. Finn, 312 So. 2d 726 (Fla.1975); Daugherty v. Daugherty, 308 So. 2d 24 (Fla.1975); Adams v. Adams, 340 So. 2d 1290 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Field v. Field, 291 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974).” [emphasis supplied]
The husband-appellee points out that the final judgment involved in this case provided that support would cease when a child "is emancipated,” rather than, as in, for example, Daugherty v. Daugherty, 308 So. 2d 24 (Fla.1975), when he or she attains “majority.” This argument is unsound. As the appellee concedes, the only basis for concluding that the child in question has become “emancipated” is that she has reached 18, the age of majority as provided by Sec. 743.07, Fla.Stat. (1977).1 Since, as the Manganiello decision makes clear, that statute specifically provides that it does not apply to pre-July 1, 1973 awards such as this one, it is obvious that the distinction drawn between the terminology employed in the various cases makes no legal difference whatever. The order below is therefore reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.
Reversed and remanded.
. For this reason, there is no purpose for an evidentiary hearing on remand and we reject the husband’s suggestion that we order one. The obligation of support continues until 21 as a matter of law, unless the child becomes married, self-supporting or otherwise emancipated before then.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Cronebaugh v. van Dyke, 415 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)…en (18), has no effect on the rights and obligations of parties under a dissolution judgment, prior to its effective date. Daugherty v. Daugherty, 308 So. 2d 24 (Fla.1975); Burgdorf v. Burgdorf, 372 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Hoffman v. Hoffman, 371 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). Swallick v. Swallick, 351 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). In each of these cases the party seeking enforcement of a child support obligation was the mother (or former wife) and the children were over eighteen (18) years of age.…
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Zakarin v. Zakarin, 565 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)…twenty-one to eighteen by a 1973 enactment of the legislature, the change has no retroactive effect on the general support aspect of the judgment of divorce in this case which was entered in 1969. See § 743.07, Fla. Stat. (1989); Hoffman v. Hoffman, 371 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (where divorce decree was entered before July 1, 1973, father was obligated to pay child support until daughter reached age twenty-one, even though statute was later enacted lowering age of majority to eighteen). In other states…
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Fungaroli v. Giles, 414 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)…tinues until each child reaches twenty-one, the law allows him to petition the court for modification based on a substantial change in circumstances — either his or theirs. Mahaffey v. Harper, 405 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Hoffman v. Hoffman, 371 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Manganiello v. Manganiello, 359 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). In his petition for modification, Giles alleged two bases for reduction of support: (1) that the son was eighteen, and (2) that the son was emancipated (i.e., not liv…
Authorities Cited
- Finn v. Finn, 312 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1975)
- Daugherty v. Georgette Daugherty, 308 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1975)
- Field v. Field, 291 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)
- Manganiello v. Manganiello, 359 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
- Adams v. Adams, 340 So. 2d 1290 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)