ROSCOE WASHINGTON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Roscoe Washington was convicted of escape and found sane in a bifurcated trial, but the Florida appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial because the trial court prohibited the defendant from examining jurors about the insanity defense during voir dire, violating due process.
The trial court committed error by prohibiting examination of prospective jurors concerning the insanity defense when the defendant had filed notice of intention to rely on that defense. The court also found that the statute created an irrebuttable presumption of intent that denied due process by preventing the defense from showing lack of intent to commit escape.
[1] A trial court errs by prohibiting defense counsel from examining prospective jurors regarding an insanity defense.
[2] A bifurcated trial procedure that prevents the defense from presenting evidence of lack of intent to commit the crime of escape violates due process.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“By reason of the ground rules as set forth by the court, the defense was unable to examine the jury concerning the defense of insanity. The defendant filed his notice of intention to rely upon an insanity defense and to prohibit a voir dire examination of prospective jurors concerning that defense is error.”
Establishes that prohibiting voir dire on a properly noticed insanity defense constitutes reversible error.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWashington was charged with escape on August 19, 1977, and filed notice of an insanity defense on September 22, 1977. The trial court conducted a bifu…
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R. WALLACE PACK, Associate Judge.
On August 19, 1977, Roscoe Washington was charged with escape. On September 22,1977, Washington filed a notice of intention to rely on insanity defense. Pursuant to a bifurcated trial Washington was, on November 2, 1977, found by a jury to be guilty of escape. He was, on November 3, 1977, found by the same jury to be sane at the time the offense was committed. On November 3, 1977, Washington was adjudicated guilty of escape and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. Washington now appeals from the judgment of the trial court. We reverse.
At the commencement of Washington’s trial on November 1, 1977, the court informed counsel that a bifurcated trial would be conducted on the issues of guilt and sanity.
THE COURT: This is in regard to what you call the so-called ground rules in regards to the new statute 77-312 House Bill No. 5 that became effective on September 2nd of this year. As far as the ground rules, the Court is going to very strictly interpret 918.017, insanity, and paying particular attention through the course of the trial where there is a finding of guilty or innocence regarding the defendant, there will be no mention of any nature whatsoever or reference in regard to the possibility of a plea of insanity. I would incorporate that section as to what the ground rules the Court is concerned with is 77 — 312, 918.-017.
MR. BELLER: Your Honor, I would object in this respect, in effect if there is going to be a plea of insanity, it shall be presented. You do not exclude the factors there will be a plea of insanity from being presented to the jury; and in addition, Your Honor, if it is the Court’s intention to use the same jury it will seriously restrict us on voir dire if we are limited in the mentioning of insanity of any type that might be raised.
In addition, this is another aspect which doesn’t quite go towards the insanity. It goes to the intent to commit the crime of escape — which can be adduced by circumstantial evidence. But it is a subjective thing and part of our defense involves— which would not involve the strict definition of insanity. THE COURT: I don’t think I can buy that. Intent is an element of the particular crime, is it not?
MR. BELLER: Well, it’s a determination.
THE COURT: That is a jury consideration.
By reason of the ground rules as set forth by the court, the defense was unable to examine the jury concerning the defense of insanity. The defendant filed his notice of intention to rely upon an insanity defense and to prohibit a voir dire examination of prospective jurors concerning that defense is error. Subsequent to the trial of this case, our Supreme Court in State ex rel. Boyd v. Green, 355 So. 2d 789 (Fla.1979) declared Chapter 77-312, Section 1, Laws of Florida, creating F.S. 921.131(1) unconstitutional as raising an irrebuttable presumption of intent. This irrebuttable presumption was well illustrated herein. In the bifurcated trial given Mr. Washington the defense was not allowed to show a lack of intent to commit the crime of escape, clearly a denial of due process.
We find no merit in the other points raised on appeal.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.
MOORE and BERANEK, JJ., concur.
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Lavado v. State, 492 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. 1986)…KETT, Justice. We have for review Lavado v. State, 469 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), because it directly and expressly conflicts with Pope v. State, 84 Fla. 428, 94 So. 865 (1922), Pait v. State, 112 So. 2d 380 (Fla.1959), and Washington v. State, 371 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. Henry Lavado was charged by information with armed robbery. During voir dire, defense counsel informed the prospective jurors that specific intent was an essential element of…
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Lavado v. State, 469 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)…be able to explore with prospective jurors their attitudes about these defenses. Therefore, it is error to prevent a defendant from attempting to find out whether prospective jurors are unable to accept the insanity defense, see Washington v. State, 371 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); People v. Stack, 128 Ill.App.3d 611, 83 Ill.Dec. 832, 470 N.E. 2d 1252 (1984); but see People v. Pitts, 104 Ill.App.3d 451, 60 Ill.Dec. 163, 432 N.E. 2d 1062 (1982) (although better procedure would have been to permit questionin…
Authorities Cited
- State of Fla. ex rel. Jeffrey Michael Boyd v. Green, 355 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1978)