IN RE ESTATE OF MADGE FORNASH, DECEASED. JAMES A. GARLAND, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF MADGE FORNASH, DECEASED, APPELLANT,
v.
HELEN BARNES, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1979-05-30
No. 78-873
OTT and RYDER, JJ., concur.
372 So. 2d 128 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1979) Positive Treatment
Cited by 5 cases

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Synopsis

A personal representative of an estate appeals a judgment entered in favor of a claimant (the decedent's niece) who filed a claim against the estate. The court reversed the judgment, holding that when an objection to a claim is filed, the claimant must file an independent action within 30 days under Florida Statute 733.705(3), rather than seeking a hearing through alternative procedural motions.


Holding

The court held that when an objection to a claim has been filed by the personal representative, the claimant is limited to 30 days from the date of service of the objection to bring an independent action upon the claim. The alternative procedure of filing a motion for hearing under F.S. 733.705(5) was improper in this context. The court also noted that the trial court may, in its discretion and after notice, entertain a motion to extend the time for filing an independent action.


Headnotes

[1] A claimant must bring an independent action within 30 days of service of an objection to a claim against an estate.

[2] An independent action upon a claim against an estate requires the filing of a separate action.

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Key Quotes

“The claimant shall be limited to 30 days from the date of service of an objection within which to bring an independent action upon the claim”

Establishes the statutory requirement that the claimant must file an independent action within 30 days of receiving notice of the objection, not proceed through alternative motions.

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Facts & Procedural History

A claimant who was the decedent's niece filed a statement of claim against the estate within the three-month claim period. The personal representative…

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Opinion of the Court
HOBSON, Acting Chief Judge.

HOBSON, Acting Chief Judge.

Claimant, decedent’s niece, filed her statement of claim against the estate within the three-month claim period and the personal representative filed a timely objection to this claim. Subsequently, claimant filed a motion to extend time for filing action and the court entered an order granting claimant additional time to file a petition for further proceedings to initiate suit on the claim. Claimant then filed a document entitled Motion for Court to Set Hearing pursuant to F.S. 733.705(5). Whereupon the personal representative moved to dismiss this document and require a more definite statement as to the allegations of the claim. This motion was denied. The cause came on for hearing without further pleadings or responsive documents as to the issue and the court entered judgment in favor of claimant. The personal representative’s motion for rehearing was denied.

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to require the claimant to file an independent action pursuant to Section 733.705(3), Florida Statutes (1977). We believe that appellant’s argument has merit and, therefore, reverse the final judgment entered in favor of the claimant.

The statutory requirement of Section 733.705(3) contains the following:

(3) The claimant shall be limited to 30 days from the date of service of an objection within which to bring an independent action upon the claim, (emphasis added)

“Independent action” as defined in Costin v. Estate of Pridgeon, 349 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), requires “the filing of a separate action upon a claim against an estate to which an objection has been filed . .” This requirement allows pleadings and responses sufficient to set the issues before the court prior to hearing.

In view of the foregoing, it is not necessary for us to address the remaining issues raised by appellant. The final judgment under review is hereby reversed. In all fairness to the appellee, the trial court should, after notice, entertain a motion to extend the time for filing an independent action upon the claim. Section 733.705(3), Florida Statutes (1977).

OTT and RYDER, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • In re Est. of Daniel DeGEORGE, 385 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)
    …PER CURIAM. Affirmed. In re Estate of Fornash, 372 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). SCHEB, C. J., and HOBSON and GRIMES, JJ., concur.…
  • Simpson v. Est. OF H. James Simpson, Jr., 922 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)
    …of a separate action upon a claim against the estate. In re Pridgeon’s Estate, 349 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). This requirement allows pleadings and responses sufficient to set the issues before the court prior to hearing. In re Fomash’s Estate, 372 So. 2d 128, 129 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). In proceeding to the merits of Mark’s claim and determining ownership of the 10.5 shares, the probate court effectively denied Mark the right to fully litigate the validity of his claim in an independent action. We therefor…
  • Grant v. Kunke Pr, 397 So. 3d 758 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024)
    …cause "the merits of [the] claim should have been determined in an independent action"). "This requirement allows pleadings and responses sufficient to set the issues before the court prior to hearing." Id. at 1030 (citing In re Fornash's Est., 372 So. 2d 128, 129 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)). Although the trial court gave Jennifer the opportunity to amend or file her claim within forty-five days, she failed to do so. Thus, her claim is barred. Even so, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion i…

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