MAUREEN T. MULLANE AND JOHN J. DUNNE, APPELLANTS,
v.
TWYLAH M. LORENZ, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that an award of attorney's fees cannot be based solely on the self-serving testimony of the attorney seeking the fees.
Following a mortgage foreclosure, the defendant accepted an offer of judgment, leaving only attorney's fees to be determined. The trial court awarded …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Offer Of Judgment cases and more on FLexlaw
LETTS, Judge.
This case arises out of a mortgage, foreclosure based on failure to pay taxes and insurance. The defendant filed an offer of judgment which was accepted leaving open only the question of “reasonable attorney’s fees.” The court awarded $4,000. We reverse.
The problem in this case is that at the hearing on attorney’s fees, no expert testimony was adduced other than from the lawyer himself claiming the fees. This is clearly inadequate as we held in Lamar v. Lamar, 323 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). As was stated in Lyle v. Lyle, 167 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964),
We are not concerned with the amount of the fee, but with the manner in which it was awarded. The appellant lays much stress on the need for expert testimony in addition to the statement made by [his] wife’s attorney and we agree with his contention. . Aside from the principle that the value of personal serv ices is proven by expert witnesses, the self-serving nature of the testimony given by the attorney who performs the services precludes the court from making an award based solely on his testimony. The evidence in this cause is insufficient to meet the foregoing requirements.
Accordingly, the award of the attorney’s fees is hereby reversed and this cause is remanded to the trial court for a further hearing thereon.
The appellant’s other contention, that the court had no basis to award any attorney’s fees, is rejected. The appellant made an offer of judgment, which offer included “reasonable attorney’s fees . the amount of same to be determined by the court.” This offer of judgment was duly accepted and the appellant may not now be heard to complain.
REVERSED AND REMANDED IN ACCORDANCE HEREWITH.
CROSS and MOORE, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Crittenden Orange Blossom Fruit v. Stone, 514 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1987)…olved. Yet, it is well settled that the testimony of an expert witness concerning a reasonable [*353] attorney’s fee is necessary to support the establishment of the fee. In Re Estate of Cordiner, 497 So. 2d 920 (Fla.2d DCA 1986); Mullane v. Lorenz, 372 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Lyle v. Lyle, 167 So. 2d 256 (Fla.2d DCA), cert. denied, 172 So. 2d 601 (Fla.1964). For much the same reason that we distinguish worker’s compensation proceedings from other civil cases with respect to the taxing of the fee of…
-
Geraci v. Kozloski, 377 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979)…gagor is improper. Evidence should be adduced so that the full range of cross examination will be afforded both parties. Demaso v. Demaso, 345 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1977); Thoni v. Thoni, 179 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1965); cf. Mullane v. Lorenz, 372 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979). Appellees filed cross assignments of error directed to two orders of the trial court, entered post final judgment on March 29, 1978, and October 3, 1978, and after the notice of appeal from the final judgment was filed. We, of…
-
Island Hoppers, Ltd. v. Norma Beard Keith for the Estate of Marsha K. Beard, 820 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)…al grounds. This court has often held that an award of attorney’s fees must be “substantiated” by expert testimony in addition to that of the lawyer claiming the fee. See Tanner v. Tanner, 391 So. 2d 305, 305 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Mullane v. Lorenz, 372 So. 2d 168, 168 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Lamar v. Lamar, 323 So. 2d 43, 44 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). Examination of these cases reveals that the rule requiring the testimony of an independent expert traces back to Lyle v. Lyle, 167 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964). In su…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Lyle v. Lyle, 167 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964)
- Lamar v. Lamar, 323 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)