ROBERT L. BELL, APPELLANT,
v.
A. JAY CRISTOL ET AL., APPELLEES
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Bell appeals from a summary judgment entered in favor of Cristol and others in a dispute between attorneys over the division of contingent fees. The court reversed, finding that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether the fee-sharing agreement complied with professional responsibility rules and thus summary judgment was premature.
Summary judgment was improperly entered because genuine issues of material fact existed as to the provisions of any fee-division agreement and whether such agreement met the requirements of Disciplinary Rule 2-107 regarding proportional division based on services performed and responsibilities assumed.
[1] Summary judgment is premature when genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the terms of a fee division agreement between attorneys.
[2] The validity of an oral agreement for the division of attorneys' fees is subject to the requirements of Disciplinary Rule 2-107, Florida Bar Code of Professional Responsi…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial court's entry of summary judgment in this cause was premature”
The court's primary holding that summary judgment should not have been entered given the existence of disputed material facts.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties are all licensed Florida attorneys involved in a contingent fee case. Appellees claimed a percentage interest in the fees pursuant to an a…
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KEHOE, Judge.
Appellant, defendant below, brings this appeal from a summary judgment entered by the trial court in favor of appellees, plaintiffs below. The parties are all attorneys at law licensed to practice in Florida. The nature of the action was for the recovery of attorneys’ fees arising out of an alleged oral agreement between the parties in regard to the division of fees in a contingent fee case. Appellees alleged % interest in the fees; whereas appellant denied this allegation. Upon appellees’ motion for summary judgment, the trial court entered an order of summary judgment in their favor. We reverse.
In our opinion, the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in this cause was premature. Our review of the record shows that at the time of the entry of the summary judgment there existed genuine issues of material facts in regard to the provisions of any division of fees agreement between the parties and whether such agreement met the requirements of Disciplinary Rule 2-107, Florida Bar Code of Professional Responsibility, as it relates to the question of whether the division of fees was made in proportion to the services performed and the responsibilities assumed by each of the parties. This opinion is not meant to suggest any impropriety whatsoever on the part of the parties in arranging for a division of the fees, but only that such determinations are questions which must be resolved by the trial court before the entry of summary judgment could have been properly rendered as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 1.510, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.
Accordingly, the summary judgment appealed is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
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Weed v. State, 411 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 1982)…ADKINS, Justice. This is a petition for writ of certiorari seeking review of a decision by the District Court of Appeal, First District, reported as State v. Weed, 373 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), which conflicts with Robinson v. Lasher, 368 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); State v. Thaddies, 364 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); State ex rel. Smith v. Nesbitt, 355 So. 2d 202 (Fla.3d DCA 1978); State ex rel. Williams v. Cowar…
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Robert A. Shupack, P.A. v. Marcus, 606 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)…f Disciplinary Rule 2-107, and was, therefore, invalid.2 See Dade County v. Goldstein, 384 So. 2d 183, 189 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (lead counsel may compensate co-counsel for legal services performed if done in accordance with DR 2-107); Bell v. Cristol, 373 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (legal fees may be divided if agreement met the requirements of DR 2-107). See generally, Spence, Payne, Masington & Grossman, P.A. v. Philip M. Gerson, P.A., 483 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 3d DCA) (agreement to employ attorney was void whe…
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State v. Wilkins, 528 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)….S. 21, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974), and United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 102 S.Ct. 2485, 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982), that in order to do so after a mistrial the state must show a justifiable basis for enhancing charges. In State v. Weed, 373 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), reversed on other grounds, 411 So. 2d 863 (Fla.1982), defendants were charged by Information with misdemeanor possession of marijuana. The trial resulted in a mistrial after the jury became deadlocked. The state then moved to am…
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