OLLIE D. POWELL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE; JIMMY LEE HINES, APPELLANT, V. STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that the jury's finding of sanity was supported by competent lay testimony and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding a witness competent to testify.
Appellants were convicted of strong-arm robbery. Appellant Hines claimed insanity, and both appellants challenged the competency of a state witness. T…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellants dispute their joint conviction of the strong-arm robbery of a small Apalachicola grocery store.
Appellant Hines claims that he was entitled to a judgment of acquittal by reason of insanity, and both appellants contend the trial court committed reversible error in finding a state witness mentally competent to testify. We affirm on both points.
It is well established in Florida law that a defendant’s mental condition at the time of the offense is a question of fact for the jury. Byrd v. State, 297 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1974); Jones v. State, 332 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 1976). Our review of the record reveals competent lay testimony supporting the jury’s finding that Hines was sane at the time of the offense, notwithstanding the expert psychologist’s testimony to the contrary.
On the second point, it appears that state witness Charlie Miller was able to understand the nature and obligations of the oath as well as to perceive, remember and narrate the incident. Therefore, despite Miller’s previous mental instability, there was no abuse of discretion in allowing him to testify about the incident before the jury. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Robinson, 68 So. 2d 406 (Fla.1953); District of Columbia v. Armes, 107 U.S. 519, 2 S.Ct. 840, 27 L.Ed. 618 (1883).
AFFIRMED.
McCORD, Acting C. J., and BOOTH and LARRY G. SMITH, JJ., concur.
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Kaelin v. State, 410 So. 2d 1355 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)…tify. The prerequisites of competency have been universally recognized. A witness must have sufficient intelligence to understand the nature and obligations of the oath and the ability to perceive, remember and narrate the incident. Powell v. State, 373 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). We will first consider the issue of Mr. Cohn’s qualifications to act as Claire’s interpreter. Although Cohn was not Board certified, he was an experienced interpreter for the deaf. He is certified by the National Registry of In…
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Authorities Cited
- Dist. of Columbia v. Armes, 107 U.S. 519 (U.S. 1882)
- Jones v. State, 332 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 1976)
- Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Robinson, 68 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1953)
- Byrd v. State, 297 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1974)