DOROTHY SMITH, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Dorothy Smith appealed the revocation of her probation following a grand larceny conviction. The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed the revocation based on her failure to report to a required program but reversed the portion based on financial penalties, holding that the trial court failed to make findings regarding her financial ability to pay.
The court affirmed the revocation based on Smith's failure to report to T.A.S.C., finding sufficient competent evidence of this violation. However, the court reversed the revocation portion based on financial penalties because the trial court failed to make an affirmative finding that Smith, as an indigent, had the financial ability to make the required restitution and supervision payments.
[1] A trial court may revoke probation based on competent evidence of a single violation, even if other alleged violations are not sufficiently proven.
[2] A probationer's failure to report to a required program constitutes a sufficient ground for revocation of probation.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Our review of the record shows that it is devoid of any evidence showing appellant had the ability to make the required payments.”
Establishes that the trial court failed to find financial ability before revoking probation based on failure to pay restitution and supervision costs.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn March 1977, Smith pleaded nolo contendere to grand larceny and was placed on probation for two years. In December 1977, her probation supervisor fi…
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KEHOE, Judge.
Appellant, defendant below, brings this appeal from an order of revocation of probation entered after a hearing by the trial court. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
In March of 1977, appellant entered a plea of nolo contendere to a charge of grand larceny. She was adjudicated guilty and placed on probation for two years.
In December of 1977, appellant’s probation supervisor filed an affidavit of violation of probation against appellant alleging that she had violated certain of the conditions of her parole by, among other things, failing to report to T.A.S.C. located at 7805 N.E. Miami Court, Miami, Florida, failing to make restitution in the amount of $30.00, and by failing to pay $10.00 per month toward the cost of her supervision (total arreage of $90.00). After a hearing on the affidavit, the trial court entered the order appealed revoking appellant’s probation and sentencing her to the Division of Corrections for two years based upon her earlier conviction for grand larceny. From this order, appellant appeals.
Appellant contends that the trial court’s revocation of her probation was violative of her due process rights.
First, she argues that the evidence presented by the prosecution was not legally sufficient to establish the violation of her failure to report to T.A.S.C. because the evidence adduced was merely hearsay.
We disagree. Our review of the record reveals that there was sufficient competent evidence to show appellant’s failure to report to T.A.S.C. as required. See, e. g., Rathburn v. State, 353 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Combs v. State, 351 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Wheeler v. State, 344 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); Couch v. State, 341 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); and Singletary v. State, 290 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974).
Therefore, that portion of the order appealed revoking appellant’s probation on the ground of her failure to report to T.A.S.C. is affirmed. Second, appellant argues that the revocation of her probation was improper because the trial court made no affirmative finding that she, as an indigent, was financially able to make restitution or pay the supervision charges.
We agree with this point. Our review of the record shows that it is devoid of any evidence showing appellant had the ability to make the required payments.
Accordingly, that portion of the order appealed revoking appellant’s probation on this ground is reversed. See, e. g., Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 94 S.Ct. 2116, 40 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974); Page v. State, 363 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Depson v. State, 363 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); and Jones v. State, 360 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
We reiterate that the ground of appellant’s failure to report to T.A.S.C., which was required as a condition of her probation, was a sufficient basis to support-the trial court’s order revoking her probation. See Franklin v. State, 226 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Hamrick v. State, 519 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)…tution which was a condition of probation. The trial judge entered this order without determining, as required, that the defendant could make the payments but willfully did not do so, Mack v. State, 440 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Smith v. State, 373 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Jones v. State, 360 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), because, when the probation was imposed, Hamrick had specifically agreed to make restitution regardless of his ability to pay.1 Because we agree with the state’s concession2 th…
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Lattimore v. State, 433 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…hat the defendant had willfully and not without fault failed to maintain employment, Chatman v. State, 365 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); and (b) that he had the financial ability to pay for the cost of his probationary supervision, Smith v. State, 373 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). In all other respects, the order of revocation of probation and entry of judgment and sentence thereon are affirmed. Affirmed as modified.…
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Pope v. State, 444 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)…a violation of probation for failure to pay costs of supervision unless the state demonstrates his financial ability to pay. Edwards v. State, 439 So. 2d 1028 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Lattimore v. State, 433 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Smith v. State, 373 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). The unrebut-ted testimony before the court established that defendant Pope had never been employed and had no apparent ability to pay. We vacate the finding of violation of probation for failure to pay costs of supervision. Aff…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (U.S. 1974)
- Singletary v. State, 290 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974)
- Frank v. State, 360 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
- Combs v. State, 351 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)
- Page v. State, 363 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)
- Franklin v. State, 226 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969)
- Wheeler v. State, 344 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)
- Depson v. State, 363 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)
- Couch v. State, 341 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)
- Rathburn v. State, 353 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)