BRUCE RUSSELL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Russell was convicted of battery of a law enforcement officer after stealing cigarettes and resisting arrest. The trial court denied his request for a jury instruction on voluntary intoxication as a defense, ruling that battery is a general intent crime. The appellate court reversed, holding that battery is a specific intent crime under Florida law because the statute requires proof of intent.
Battery of a law enforcement officer is a specific intent crime because the Florida statute defining battery requires proof that the defendant intentionally touched, struck, or caused bodily harm. Therefore, voluntary intoxication is a valid defense, and the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on this defense.
[1] Voluntary intoxication is a defense to specific intent crimes.
[2] A specific intent crime requires a particular intent as a necessary element of the crime itself.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A specific intent crime is one in which a particular intent is a necessary element of the crime itself.”
Establishes the legal standard for distinguishing specific intent from general intent crimes.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRussell stole a carton of cigarettes from a supermarket and then fought with police officers who arrested him. He was charged with two counts of batte…
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GRIMES, Chief Judge.
Following an episode during which appellant stole a carton of cigarettes from a supermarket and then fought with the police officers who arrested him for that offense, the state charged appellant with two counts of battery of a law enforcement officer, petit theft, and disorderly intoxication. At the trial, appellant sought to have the court instruct the jury on the defense of voluntary intoxication with respect to the first three charges. The court granted this request as to petit theft but denied it as to battery of a law enforcement officer. The premise for the denial was that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to battery of a law enforcement officer because that offense is a general and not a specific intent crime. The jury found appellant guilty of attempted battery of a law enforcement officer, battery of a law enforcement offi cer, petit theft, and disorderly intoxication. Subsequently, the court entered judgments and sentences on the four verdicts.
The one point which appellant raises here is whether the court erred in ruling that battery of a law enforcement officer is not a specific intent crime. The point is critical to this appeal because voluntary intoxication is a defense to a specific intent crime. Fouts v. State, 374 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). A specific intent crime is one in which a particular intent is a necessary element of the crime itself. Garner v. State, 28 Fla. 113, 9 So. 835 (1891); 21 Am.Jur.2d, Criminal Law § 82 (1965). Accordingly, we must examine our statutes to determine whether intent is an essential element of battery.1
In Section 784.03, Florida Statutes (1977), the legislature has defined battery as follows:
(1) A person commits battery if he:
(a) Actually and intentionally touches or strikes another person against the will of the other; or (b) Intentionally causes bodily harm to an individual.
From this definition, it is evident that battery is, at least in this state, a specific intent crime. The use of the word “intentionally” clearly makes a defendant’s intent to touch, strike, or cause bodily harm an element of the crime.2
Consequently, we reverse appellant’s convictions for attempted battery of a law enforcement officer and battery of a law enforcement officer and remand for a new trial on these charges. We affirm the other two convictions.
HOBSON and BOARDMAN, JJ., concur. . For the purposes of this discussion we will not differentiate between battery and battery of a law enforcement officer. If battery is a specific intent crime, it necessarily follows that battery of a law enforcement officer is also a specific intent crime.
. While battery may have been a general intent crime at common law, the legislature had the power when it defined the offense, as it did for the first time in 1974, Ch. 74-383, § 19, Laws of Fla., to make it a specific intent crime. See Bell v. State, 354 So. 2d 1266 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (19 total)
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Linehan v. State, 442 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)…oxicant has spent itself. See Stasio, supra, 396 A. 2d at 1132. See also Cirack, supra at 709, and State v. McNally, 336 So. 2d 713, 715 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976), as to the defense of insanity induced by intoxication. To the extent that Russell v. State, 373 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), may appear to be inconsistent with our present holding, we recede from Russell. Russell found that the inclusion of the word “intentionally” in section 784.03, Florida Statutes (1977), made battery a specific intent crime to whic…
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Edwards v. State, 428 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…from cross-examination of a state witness, is not supported by empirical evidence, and the defendant denies being intoxicated. 395 So. 2d at 1209. Voluntary intoxication is a defense to any crime requiring specific intent. [*359] Russell v. State, 373 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Fouts v. State, 374 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), overruled on other grounds, Parker v. State, 408 So. 2d 1037 (Fla.1982). The crime of murder has as a requisite element specific intent which, where disputed by factual evidence,…
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Mellins v. State, 395 So. 2d 1207 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)…hold otherwise would seriously jeopardize the right of the accused to refrain from testifying. Weaver v. State, 370 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979). Voluntary intoxication is a defense to the crime of battery on a police officer, Russell v. State, 373 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), as in other crimes requiring a specific intent. Fouts v. State, 374 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). Where intent is a requisite. element of the offense charged and there is some evidence to support this defense, the question is one…
Previewing 3 of 19 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Garner v. State, 28 Fla. 113 (Fla. 1891)
- Fouts v. State, 374 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- Bell v. State, 354 So. 2d 1266 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)