KENNETH W. PROCTOR, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that the trial court erred by failing to follow mandatory sentencing procedures for juveniles tried as adults, specifically by not referencing statutory criteria and not issuing a written order.
A juvenile was transferred to adult court, pled guilty to two counts of burglary, and was sentenced to prison. The trial court made a verbal statement…
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SCHEB, Judge.
In this case we deal with the procedures which a trial court must follow when sentencing a juvenile who has been tried as an adult.
The state filed a petition requesting that the juvenile court adjudge appellant a delinquent, charging that he had committed two counts of burglary. Subsequently, that court transferred appellant to the adult division of the circuit court where he pled guilty to both counts. At the sentencing hearing, counsel for the state and appellant made arguments of aggravation and mitigation. Following these arguments the court made the following statement:
THE COURT: Mr. Proctor, you are a hardened criminal at seventeen years of age. Looking at your juvenile record, breaking and entering on several occasions, robbery, burglary, probation in this court after you are certified as an adult, that probation being revoked for subsequent crimes. There is no alternative at this time for me other than a jail sentence of some duration.
The court then sentenced appellant to two concurrent four-year terms in prison.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in sentencing him without following the procedures set out in Section 39.111(6), Florida Statutes (Supp.1978). We agree. The court failed to make any reference to the six criteria contained in Section 39.111 which deal with the suitability of adult sanctions. Further, the court failed to put its decision to imprison appellant in writing. These procedures are mandatory and necessitate a reversal. Johnson v. State, 871 So. 2d 566 (Fla.2d DCA 1979).
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment, but remand for resentencing pursuant to the provisions of Section 39.-111(6).
GRIMES, C. J., and RYDER, J., concur.
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Cited By (12 total)
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State v. Learnhart Rhoden, 448 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 1984)…So. 2d 838 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). The district court’s decision is supported by Sawyer v. State, 421 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Leach v. State, 407 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); Batch v. State, 405 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); Proctor v. State, 373 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); and Johnson v. State, 371 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). The state contends that the issue is whether the trial court’s noncompliance with the provisions of section 39.111(6) is fundamental error. The state argues that the Fifth…
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Eve Postell v. State, 383 So. 2d 1159 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…g the case for trial as if the child were an adult. The child shall thereafter be subject to prosecution, trial, and sentencing as if the child were an adult but subject to the provisions of s. 39.111(6).” (emphasis supplied). See Proctor v. State, 373 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), and Johnson v. State, 371 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979) (holding that a child who has been transferred after a waiver hearing is exclusively subject to the sentencing provisions of Chapter 39). Since the Legislature in Section 39…
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Pimentel v. State, 442 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…356 So. 2d 1256 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978) (habitual offender); Eastwood v. Hall, 258 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972) (waiver of speedy trial rule). The cases relied upon by the defendant, Rhoden v. State, 421 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), Proctor v. State, 373 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), Johnson v. State, 371 So. 2d [*229] 556 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)2 are distinguishable in that the record in those cases failed to contain an indication that the requisite criteria had been considered.3 Upon the state’s suggestion in M…
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