STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
THOMAS B. HOUCK, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The State appeals the trial court's dismissal of a grand theft information charging Houck with possession of stolen property. The appellate court holds that knowing and intentional possession of stolen property is properly charged under Florida's theft statute, reverses the dismissal on that ground, but remands because the trial court did not address whether the State could prove guilty knowledge.
Knowing and intentional possession of stolen property is properly charged under the theft statute, Section 812.014 Florida Statutes (1977). The trial court's stated reason for dismissal was incorrect. However, the question of whether the State could prove guilty knowledge was not ruled upon by the trial court and must be addressed on remand.
[1] Knowing and intentional possession of stolen property can be charged under the general theft statute.
[2] A motion to dismiss an information based on the incorrect statutory basis for the charge should be reversed if the statutory basis is later found to be correct.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“knowing and intentional possession of stolen property is properly charged under the theft statute, Section 812.014 Florida Statutes (1977)”
Establishes the central holding that possession of stolen property falls within the scope of the theft statute.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDefendant Houck was found in possession of a stolen CB radio in a boat during a marine equipment check. The radio had been reported stolen two months …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Grand Theft Statute Construction cases and more on FLexlaw
BERANEK, Judge.
This is an appeal by the State from an order dismissing an information charging defendant with grand theft under Section 812.014 Florida Statutes (1977). Defendant/appellee filed a motion to dismiss the information pursuant to Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.190(c)(4). The State did not traverse the motion and at the hearing thereon the State stipulated to the facts stated in defendant’s motion.
The defendant was found in possession of stolen property.1 The State charged theft under Section 812.014 Florida Statutes (1977). The trial court dismissed the information on the announced basis that possession of stolen property could not be charged under the theft statute (Section 812.014 Florida Statutes (1977)), but instead the State was limited to a charge under Section 812.019 Florida Statutes (1977), relating to dealing in stolen property.
In view of State v. Lewis, 364 So. 2d 1223 (Fla.1978); State v. Allen, 362 So. 2d 10 (Fla.1978), and Lancaster v. State, 369 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); we hold that knowing and intentional possession of stolen property is properly charged under the theft statute, Section 812.014 Florida Statutes (1977). Thus, the trial court’s stated reason for dismissal was incorrect. The defendant argues that even if the stated reason was incorrect that the motion to dismiss was properly granted because there was absolutely no evidence indicating guilty knowledge on defendant’s part. At the hearing on the motion to dismiss the State conceded it could show no connection whatsoever between the actual taking of the property and the defendant. If the State could show no more than mere naked possession without knowledge of the stolen character, the information would be properly dismissed under State v. Graham, 238 So. 2d 618 (Fla.1970), and Monk v. State, 336 So. 2d 1284 (Fla.2d DCA 1976). From our review of the record, we are convinced that this argument was not presented to or ruled upon by the trial court. The motion to dismiss and the argument thereon were designed solely to test whether the charge was proper under Section 812.014 Florida Statutes (1977) or Section 812.019 Florida Statutes (1977). The order of dismissal is thus reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings wherein the trial court may rule initially on the question of defendant’s guilty knowledge.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
ANSTEAD, J., concurs.
DAUKSCH, J., concurs specially with opinion.
. A C.B. radio was found in a boat of which defendant was in possession. The radio had been reported stolen two months prior to its having been found on the boat. The boat was stopped for an equipment check by a marine officer.
DAUKSCH, Judge,
concurring specially:
I quite agree with the opinion of Judge Beranek but must note that the “(c)(4) motion” filed by the defendant was unsworn thus must be refiled if the trial court is to rule upon it. The requirement that a motion under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.190(c)(4) be under oath is to provide for prosecution against an accused who would escape prosecution by lying in a motion to dismiss. Of course, if the motion is unsworn perjury is not committed thus an accused may escape prosecution by lying and without the oath would also escape perjury prosecution.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Santini v. State, 404 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)…icipated in planing the thefts and on the later possession of the stolen property. There is adequate proof of specific criminal intent and knowledge of the stolen character of the goods. See State v. Allen, 362 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1978); State v. Houck, 374 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979). As to Counts II and III, appellant contends that the State failed to prove that the stolen merchandise was valued at more than $100, but this contention is raised for the first time on appeal, and was not raised in the trial c…
-
State v. McNEILL, 407 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)…e (Fla. 5th DCA Case No. 79-36, opinion filed November 25, 1981). Section 812.014 now encompasses not only the actual theft of property but also the crime of possession of stolen property. State v. Lewis, 364 So. 2d 1223 (Fla.1978); State v. Houck, 374 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979). Under the statute it is a crime for one to use the property of another “with the intent to appropriate the property to his own use or the use of any person not entitled thereto.” Therefore, an Information, as the one in the pres…1 / 2
-
Jones v. State, 691 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…robbery — but the record does not show it. On the other hand, the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for the crime of theft. Appellant knew that the victim’s money was stolen, but he accepted a share of it anyway. See State v. Houck, 374 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979)(the knowing and intentional possession of stolen property falls within theft statute). Accordingly, I would reverse appellant’s conviction for the crime of robbery and direct the trial court to enter judgment for petit theft, a c…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Allen, 362 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1978)
- State v. Lewis, 364 So. 2d 1223 (Fla. 1978)
- State v. Graham, 238 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 1970)
- Lancaster v. State, 369 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)
- Monk v. State, 336 So. 2d 1284 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)