STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
ROBERT H. KUHN AND REBECCA W. KUHN, HIS WIFE, APPELLEES
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State Farm appeals a summary judgment awarding uninsured motorist benefits to an insured who was injured while operating a motorcycle and sought coverage under a separate truck policy. The court reverses, holding that Florida's anti-stacking statute restricts coverage to the policy on the vehicle involved in the accident, regardless of other policies issued to the same insured.
An insured is restricted to the coverage contained in the policy covering the vehicle involved in the accident. Because Kuhn's motorcycle was involved in the accident and he had rejected uninsured motorist coverage on that policy, he cannot recover uninsured motorist benefits under the truck policy despite having such coverage there.
[1] An insured is restricted to the uninsured motorist coverage on the vehicle involved in the accident, even if other vehicles owned by the insured have applicable coverage.
[2] A statute prohibiting the stacking of motor vehicle insurance coverages restricts an insured to the coverage contained in the policy covering the vehicle operated at the…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the policy shall provide that the insured or named insured is protected only to the extent of the coverage he has on the vehicle involved in the accident.”
The core provision of the anti-stacking statute that limits coverage to the policy on the vehicle involved in the accident
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceState Farm issued two separate policies to Robert Kuhn: one on a motorcycle (which Kuhn rejected uninsured motorist coverage for) and one on a pickup …
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PER CURIAM.
In this declaratory judgment action defendant insurer appeals a partial summary judgment determining that plaintiff insured is entitled to uninsured motorist benefits.
Appellant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, had issued to the appellee, Robert H. Kuhn, two separate liability insurance policies, one for his motorcycle and the other for his pickup truck. The truck policy provided uninsured motorist coverage. Kuhn had rejected in writing such coverage for his motorcycle. While riding his motorcycle, Kuhn sustained injuries when an automobile owned and operated by Dana Tucker struck the motorcycle. Tucker had no liability insurance and Kuhn made demand upon State Farm for the uninsured motorist benefits under the truck policy. State Farm denied coverage and Kuhn filed the instant suit for declaratory relief. Subsequently both parties moved for summary judgment, which after hearing was entered in favor of Kuhn. From the judgment finding that Kuhn is entitled to uninsured motorist benefits, State Farm perfected this appeal.
The dispositive question presented for our determination is whether Kuhn is precluded by Section 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1977), below, from recovery of the uninsured motorist benefits provided in the truck policy.
“627.4132 Stacking of coverages prohibited. — If an insured or named insured is protected by any type of motor vehicle insurance policy for liability, uninsured motorist, personal injury protection, or any other coverage, the policy shall provide that the insured or named insured is protected only to the extent of the coverage he has on the vehicle involved in the accident. However, if none of the insured’s or named insured’s vehicles is involved in the accident, coverage is available only to the extent of coverage on any one of the vehicles with applicable coverage. Coverage on any other vehicles shall not be added to or stacked upon that coverage. This section shall not apply to reduce the coverage available by reason of insurance policies insuring different named insureds.” [Emphasis Supplied]
The well established principle of law is that where the words used and the grammatical construction employed in a statute are clear and they convey a definite mean ing, the legislature is presumed to have meant what it said and, therefore, it is unnecessary to resort to the rules of statutory construction. Hialeah, Inc. v. B & G Horse Transp., Inc., 368 So. 2d 930 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
A reading of Section 627.4132 clearly evidences a two fold purpose: (1) to prohibit the stacking of coverages, and (2) to restrict an insured to the coverage contained in the policy covering the vehicle which he was operating at the time of the accident. McLellan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 366 So. 2d 811, 812 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979). Kuhn’s motorcycle being the vehicle involved in accident, Kuhn is restricted to the coverage in the policy issued on the motorcycle. Having rejected uninsured motorist coverage thereon, he is not entitled to the uninsured motorist benefits provided for in his truck policy under the plain terms of the statute.
In an attempt to circumvent Section 627.4132, Kuhn argues that his motorcycle is not a “vehicle.” However, we must reject this argument for the reasons cited in Standard Marine Insurance Company v. Allyn, 333 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).
Accordingly, the judgment for Kuhn is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court to enter judgment for State Farm.
Reversed and remanded.
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Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Lark Lynette Lambert, 444 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1983)…tual Automobile Insurance Co., 388 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Wimpee, 376 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 385 So. 2d 762 (Fla.1980); and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Kuhn, 374 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 383 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. We have resolved this conflict in our decision in New Hampshire Insurance Group v. Harbach, 439 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. 1983). For the rea…
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State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wimpee, 376 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)…above policy and facts for the injury complained of. The judgment is REVERSED with instruction to enter summary judgment for appellant State Farm. SCHEB, Acting C. J., and OTT, J., concur. . State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Kuhn, 374 So. 2d 1079 (Fla.3d DCA, 1979).…
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Indomenico v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 388 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…ction 627.4132, Florida Statutes (1977), the effect of our holding in Valdes v. Prudence Mutual Casualty Company, 207 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968) would have permitted recovery. However, under State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Kuhn, 374 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), we observed: A reading of Section 627.4132 clearly evidences a two fold purpose: (1) to prohibit the stacking of coverages, and (2) to restrict an insured to the coverage contained in the policy covering the vehicle which he was…
Previewing 3 of 24 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- McLELLAN v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 366 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979)
- Standard Marine Ins. Co. v. Allyn, 333 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)
- Hialeah, Inc. v. B & G Horse Transp., Inc., 368 So. 2d 930 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)