ALBERT WILLIAMS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that the trial judge cannot retain jurisdiction over a sentence for an attempted offense if the statute only enumerates the completed offense.
Appellant was convicted of attempted sexual battery and sentenced. The trial judge retained jurisdiction over the first one-third of the sentence purs…
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PER CURIAM.
Albert Williams, appellant, was convicted of attempted sexual battery and sentenced to a term of thirty years in prison. The trial judge retained jurisdiction over the first one-third of the appellant’s sentence, pursuant to Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.1978). We affirm the appellant’s conviction, but reverse the retention of jurisdiction by the lower court.
Section 947.16(3) enumerates various offenses and provides that when a criminal defendant is convicted of an enumerated offense, the trial judge may retain jurisdiction for the first one-third of the defendant’s sentence. The obvious purpose behind the statute is to prohibit parole of a criminal defendant convicted of an enumerated offense, without the approval of the trial judge, until after that defendant has served the first one-third of the sentence imposed. While the statute expressly includes sexual battery as an enumerated offense, it makes no mention of “attempts.” Therefore, the question raised by the present appeal is whether the trial judge may retain jurisdiction pursuant to Section 947.16(3) when the appellant was convicted of an attempt to commit an enumerated offense? We hold that Section 947.16(3) does not apply to attempts.
It is, of course, a well-established principle of statutory construction that when a statute expressly enumerates a list of included offenses, it impliedly excludes from its operation any offenses not expressly enumerated. See Thayer v. State, 335 So. 2d 815 (Fla.1976); Graham v. Azar, 204 So. 2d 193 (Fla.1967). Applying this principle, we find that the legislative intent was to limit the application of Section 947.16(3) to the expressly enumerated offenses, and not to extend the application of this section to attempts to commit those offenses. The judgment is affirmed, but the retention of jurisdiction over the sentence pursuant to Section 947.16(3) is hereby stricken.
HOBSON, Acting C. J., and BOARD-MAN and DANAHY, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By (11 total)
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Carter v. State, 464 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)…pursuant to section 947.-16(3). We agree. The purpose of the statute is to prohibit parole of a criminal defendant without the approval of the trial judge until after that defendant has served a specified portion of his sentence. Williams v. State, 374 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). However, parole is no longer available to the defendant because he was sentenced pursuant to the guidelines. § 921.001(8). Thus, the court erred in retaining jurisdiction over defendant’s sentence. See Davis v. State, 458 So. 2d…
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Williamson v. State, 388 So. 2d 1345 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…he first third of the maximum sentence imposed. It is apparent that, since burglary is not one of the specified crimes, the section could not properly be invoked in this case. Robinson v. State, 368 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Williams v. State, 374 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).7 The reservation of jurisdiction under Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.1978), is stricken from the judgment under review, which is otherwise affirmed. Affirmed in part, reversed in part. . The leniency of the plea ar…
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Williams v. State, 470 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)…to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983). The purpose of the retention statute is to prohibit the parole of a defendant without the trial judge’s approval until after the defendant has served a specified part of his sentence. Williams v. State, 374 So. 2d 1086 (Fla.2d DCA 1979). Parole, however, is not available to defendant because he was sentenced pursuant to the sentencing guidelines. § 921.001(8), Fla. Stat. (1983). Thus, the trial court erred in retaining jurisdiction over defendant’s sentence. Emory…
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- Thayer v. State, 335 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1976)
- Grady A. Barnard v. Crews, 204 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1967)