JAMES C. FRALEY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A Florida appellate court reversed the denial of a motion to suppress evidence in a drug case, holding that a police officer's intrusion into a suspect's pocket during a stop-and-frisk exceeded the permissible scope of a Terry search where the pat-down had not revealed any bulges or hard objects suggesting a weapon.
The court held that even assuming the initial detention and pat-down of outer clothing were justified, the search exceeded its permissible scope when the officer reached into appellant's pocket without having discovered evidence during the pat-down that would reasonably suggest the presence of a weapon. The scope of a search must be strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances that rendered its initiation permissible.
[1] A "stop and frisk" search is permissible only if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person is engaged in criminal activity and that the person is armed and p…
[2] The scope of a "stop and frisk" search is limited to a pat-down of the outer clothing for weapons.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“such a search may not extend beyond a pat down of the outer clothing, unless the pat down or other circumstances lead the officer to conclude that a subject has a weapon on his person.”
Establishes the legal standard governing the permissible scope of a Terry frisk search
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn January 11, 1978, at 3:07 A.M., appellant Fraley approached a residence in West Palm Beach where a police officer was stationed. The officer conduc…
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MOORE, Judge.
This is an appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress evidence. Upon denial of his motion, appellant entered a plea of nolo contendere, reserving his right to appeal that ruling. He contends the seizure of a small cellophane bag of cocaine from his left front pocket, obtained during a “stop and frisk” search, was illegal. We agree and reverse.
During the early morning hours of January 11, 1978, several narcotics related arrests were consummated at or near a residence in West Palm Beach, Florida. At 3:07 A.M., appellant approached the residence and was met “at the front” by a lone police officer who had been stationed there to insure that no one entered the residence while a search warrant was being obtained by other officers. After identifying himself, the officer commenced a frisk of appellant pursuant to the provisions of Section 901.151 Florida Statutes (1977). After patting down the appellant in a limited, protective search of appellant’s outer clothing, the officer reached into appellant’s left front pocket and removed a small cellophane packet containing a quantity of cocaine. The officer testified that the pat down search revealed no bulges or hard objects in appellant’s pockets. Notwithstanding this information, the officer proceeded to first reach into appellant’s right front pocket and then into his left front pocket from which he obtained the cocaine.
Assuming, without deciding, that the totality of the circumstances justified the officer’s temporary detention of appellant and the limited, protective search of appellant’s outer clothing, such a search may not extend beyond a pat down of the outer clothing, unless the pat down or other circumstances lead the officer to conclude that a subject has a weapon on his person. Meeks v. State, 356 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1978) cert. den. 364 So. 2d 892 (Fla.1978). The scope of a search must be strictly tied to, and justified by, the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
The scope of the search of appellant was unreasonable because, prior to the intrusion into appellant’s pockets, the officer’s pat down had not disclosed evidence which would have reasonably supported a belief that appellant was carrying a weapon. See People v. Collins, 1 Cal.3d 658, 83 Cal.Rptr. 179, 463 P. 2d 403 (1970). Accordingly, even if the pat down was justified at its inception, the search became impermissible in its scope when the officer reached into appellant’s pocket.
The trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress is reversed and this cause is remanded with instructions to discharge the appellant.
Reversed and Remanded.
DOWNEY, C. J., and LETTS, J., concur.
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Dunn v. State, 382 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)…Cal.3d 379, 82 Cal.Rptr. 379,461 P. 2d 659 (1969). Clearly then, since Officer Byrd knew the lump in appellant’s pocket was not a weapon he could not legally reach into the pocket and pull out the plastic bag. 356 So. 2d at 46. In Fraley v. State, 374 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979), the Fourth District Court of Appeal followed our lead by reaching the same conclusion. Regardless of these decisions, we have chosen to revisit the issue raised by this case because a legitimate argument can be made that when a…
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Terrtric Doctor v. State, 573 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)…nd felt it, only to discover that it felt like contraband, not a weapon. [*161] There is a factual difference between this case and Gray v. State, 550 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989), Dunn v. State, 382 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980), Fraley v. State, 374 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979), and State v. Broadnax, 98 Wash.2d 289, 654 P. 2d 96 (1982), which last mentioned case discusses the inappropriateness of the plain view doctrine when the original intrusion was not justified. The majority opinion does not approv…
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Wilkerson v. State, 376 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)…e of a pat-down for weapons. 99 S.Ct. at 2255 Florida courts have hitherto followed the above rule in a number of recent cases: St. John v. State, 356 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Meeks v. State, 356 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); Fraley v. State, 374 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979). Moreover Florida’s Stop and Frisk Law, Section 901.151(5), Fla.Stat (1977), complies with Terry by requiring the frisk to extend only to that area necessary to disclose the presence of a weapon. . Such action would be in compli…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1968)
- Meeks v. State, 356 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)