STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
WILLIE JAMES WARD, APPELLEE
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Florida appeals a trial court's dismissal of vehicular homicide charges against Ward based on an expert neurologist's opinion that Ward was suffering a seizure at the time of a fatal collision. The appellate court reverses, holding that vehicular homicide under Florida's statute requires only reckless conduct, not the 'wantonness' required for manslaughter, and that expert opinion does not conclusively establish the defendant's innocence as a matter of law.
The trial court's dismissal is reversed on two grounds: (1) vehicular homicide under Section 782.071 requires proof of 'reckless' conduct, not 'culpable negligence' or 'wantonness' as required for manslaughter under Section 782.07, and (2) expert opinion that the defendant suffered a seizure is not conclusive evidence that establishes the defendant's innocence as a matter of law, and a jury may weigh such evidence along with other facts in determining whether the defendant was actually seizing.
[1] A motion to dismiss under Fla.R.Crim.P. …
[2] The "reckless" standard of conduct required for vehicular homicide is distinct from the "culpable negligence" standard required for manslaughter.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The legislature did not intend the word "reckless" used in the vehicular homicide statute to mean the same thing as the word "culpable" used in the manslaughter statute.”
Establishes that vehicular homicide requires a lower standard of conduct (reckless) than manslaughter (culpable negligence)
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWard was charged with vehicular homicide resulting from a head-on collision on April 17, 1978. Ward had a history of petit mal epilepsy and was treate…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellee was charged with vehicular homicide resulting from a head-on collision that occurred April 17, 1978. He pled not guilty and later filed a motion to dismiss under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.190(c)(4).
Appellee founded his motion on the deposition of a neurologist who had previously treated him for petit mal epilepsy. The neurologist, in response to a hypothetical question outlining the events leading up to the collision, stated the opinion that Ward was suffering a seizure at the time of the fatal incident.
The trial judge granted appellee’s motion on the ground that there were no material disputed facts and the undisputed facts did not establish a prima facie case of guilt. Specifically, the judge stated in his order that the medical opinion — not traversed by the state — established a lack on appellee’s part of the “conscious intent to drive a car in the fashion which would give rise to the wantonness required under our culpable negligence homocide [sic] Statutes . . .”
We reverse, on two grounds. First, the “conscious intent” and “wantonness” the trial judge mentioned are descriptions derived from Filmon v. State, 336 So. 2d 586 (Fla.1976), which case the judge cited in his order. Filmon, however, involved Section 782.07, Florida Statutes (1975), the manslaughter statute, whereas the information in the instant case charged Ward with violation of Section 782.071, the vehicular homicide statute. The latter statute defines the offense charged here as “the killing of a human being by the operation of a motor vehicle by another in a reckless manner likely to cause the death of, or great bodily harm to, another.”
The Florida Supreme Court, in an opinion rendered after the order dismissing the charges against Ward, held that the legislature created a lesser included offense to a Section 782.07 manslaughter when it created Section 782.071, and that therefore the standard of proof for vehicular homicide is less than that for manslaughter. McCreary v. State, 371 So. 2d 1024 (Fla.1979). Most important for our purposes is the court’s discussion, at 1026, of the conduct required for liability under each of the statutes:
The legislature did not intend the word “reckless” used in the vehicular homicide statute to mean the same thing as the word “culpable” used in the manslaughter statute. Had the legislature intended that vehicular homicide and manslaughter be the same offense with the same standard of proof and only that there be a reduced penalty for the former, then it simply could have provided that vehicular homicide is the killing of a human being by the operation of a motor vehicle in a culpably negligent manner. A Rule 3.190(c)(4) motion is, in effect, a motion for summary judgment. Given the holding in McCreary that vehicular homicide is a lesser included offense, and given the court’s statement that “reckless” rather than “culpable” behavior is sufficient for conviction for vehicular homicide, the dismissal cannot stand. It is possible, for example, that a jury could find Ward to have been reckless for operating a vehicle even though, according to his neurologist, he had known for some time that he was subject to seizures. (In fact, the neurologist expressed surprise that Ward was still operating a motor vehicle at the time of the fatality, in light of his epilepsy.)
There is, perhaps, a more fundamental reason for reversing. It is true that the state stipulated to the neurologist’s expertise. It is also true that the expert’s opinion was his response to a hypothetical propounded by the state, not by Ward’s counsel. And it may well be that Ward indeed was under the influence of a seizure when the collision occurred. But the neurologist’s testimony was expert opinion, not conclusive evidence. A jury would not be bound to find appellee not guilty merely because of an expert’s opinion; rather, it could weigh the opinion, along with other evidence presented, in determining whether the appellee had in fact suffered a seizure. Byrd v. State, 297 So. 2d 22 (Fla.1974); Trolinger v. State, 300 So. 2d 310 (Fla.2d DCA 1974), cert. den. 310 So. 2d 740 (Fla.1975).
ERVIN, Acting C. J., and BOOTH and LARRY G. SMITH, JJ., concur.
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In the Interest of W.E.B., III v. State, 553 So. 2d 323 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)…using the word “reckless” as requiring proof of willful or wanton conduct where the conduct “must be intentionally embarked upon by the actor with the realization that it probably will cause injury to another.” 451 So. 2d at 503); and State v. Ward, 374 So. 2d 1128 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (in dicta, court noting that it would be possible for jury to find defendant to have been reckless for operating a vehicle knowing that he was subject to seizures). To that end, we disagree with the trial court — which reviewed…
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Cronin v. State, 470 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)…cted. See Collins v. State, 431 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); Trucci v. State, 438 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). A jury is free to weigh an expert’s testimony, and may reject it. Sands v. State, 403 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); State v. Ward, 374 So. 2d 1128 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). Nevertheless, once such testimony is adduced, the jury should be instructed on what to do with it. Here, the jury was not so instructed; consequently, there is a reasonable possibility the jury could have been misled. Appellant…
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Nettles v. State, 409 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)…failure to be convinced by it. It is well settled that expert testimony is not binding on the trier of facts. South Venice Corp. v. Caspersen, 229 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1969); Trolinger v. State, 300 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1974); State v. Ward, 374 So. 2d 1128 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). The court has discretion to accept or reject the opinion of an expert even though it is uncontroverted. Robertson v. Robertson, 106 So. 2d 590 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1958). Behm v. Division of Administration State Dept. of Transportation…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- McCREARY v. State, 371 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 1979)
- Filmon v. State, 336 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 1976)
- Byrd v. State, 297 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1974)
- Trolinger v. State, 300 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)
- Rahming v. State, 310 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 1975)
- Trolinger v. State, 310 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 1975)