DONALD EARL MILES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Donald Earl Miles appealed his conviction for second degree grand theft, challenging the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on attempted second degree grand theft and his enhanced sentence as a habitual felony offender. The court affirmed the conviction but vacated and remanded the sentence, finding the habitual felony offender enhancement improper.
The court held that there is no separate crime of attempted second degree grand theft because the theft statute's use of the word 'endeavors' is equivalent to 'attempts,' making attempt inherent in the definition of the major offense. Additionally, the court held that Florida Statutes Section 775.084 requires two prior out-of-state convictions to establish habitual felony offender status, not merely one.
[1] The definition of a major offense that includes the attempt to commit the act precludes a separate crime of attempt.
[2] A statute defining an offense by using the term 'endeavors' encompasses the act of attempting to commit that offense.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When the definition of the major offense charged includes the attempt to commit that act, there can be no separate crime of attempt.”
Establishes the legal principle that attempted grand theft is not a separate crime under Florida law because 'endeavors' in the theft statute encompasses attempt.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMiles was convicted of second degree grand theft. At sentencing, the trial court enhanced his sentence to ten years as a habitual felony offender base…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Appeal Of Sentence cases and more on FLexlaw
GRIMES, Chief Judge.
Appellant seeks reversal of his conviction for second degree grand theft because the court refused his request to charge the jury on attempted second degree grand theft. Appellant would prevail if there were such a crime as attempted grand theft. Lomax v. State, 345 So. 2d 719 (Fla.1977). However, we believe that the legislature’s use of the word “endeavors” in the theft statute, Section 812.014(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.1978), is equivalent to the use of the word “attempts.” To endeavor to do something means to make an attempt to do it. When the definition of the major offense charged includes the attempt to commit that act, there can be no separate crime of attempt. State v. Thomas, 362 So. 2d 1348 (Fla.1978). Thus, because there is no crime of attempted second degree grand theft, the court did not err in refusing to charge on it.
On the other hand, we find merit in appellant’s objection to his enhanced sentence of ten years as an habitual felony offender. Section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1977), provides in pertinent part as follows:
(1) As used in this act:
(a) “Habitual felony offender” means a defendant for whom the court may impose an extended term of imprisonment, as provided in this section, if it finds that:
1. The defendant has:
a. Previously been convicted of a felony in this state;
b. Twice previously been convicted of a misdemeanor of the first degree in this state or of another qualified offense for which the defendant was convicted after the defendant’s 18th birthday;
(c) “Qualified offense” means any offense in violation of a law of another state or of the United States that was punishable under the law of such state or the United States at the time of its commission by the defendant by death or imprisonment exceeding 1 year or that was equivalent in penalty to a misdemeanor of the first degree. (Emphasis supplied.)
The only previous conviction which the court relied upon in sentencing appellant as an habitual felony offender was an Alabama conviction for manslaughter. However, the plain wording of the statute requires two out-of-state convictions. Shead v. State, 367 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). The words “of another qualified offense” in Section 775.084(1)(a)1.b. cannot be read, as the state suggests, to require only one qualified offense because of the words “Twice previously been convicted” which first appear in the same subsection. Moreover, to adopt the state’s argument would mean that two first degree misdemeanors committed within the State of Florida would be required to declare a person an habitual felony offender whereas a single first degree misdemeanor from another state would suffice.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court, but we vacate the sentence and remand for the purpose of sentencing appellant without enhancement.
OTT, J., and STRICKLAND, J. TIM, Associate Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (12 total)
-
State v. Sykes, 434 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 1983)…tute3 to operate with reference to them. Therefore, there is no such offense in Florida as attempted second-degree grand theft. Bell v. State, 382 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); McIntyre v. State, 380 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Miles v. State, 374 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). The jury should not have been instructed that attempt was a lesser included offense, nor should they have been given the option of finding respondent guilty of this nonexistent crime as a lesser included offense. [*328] The distr…
-
Jones v. State, 466 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)…ss than $20,000.” “The legislature’s use of the word ‘endeavors’ in the theft statute [§ 812.014(1), Fla.Stat. (1979) ] is equivalent to the use of the word ‘attempts.’ To endeavor to do something means to make an attempt to do it.” Miles v. State, 374 So. 2d 1167,1168 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). “This statute is different from the previous grand larceny statute in that no distinction is made between the theft and the ‘endeavor.’ ‘[E]ndeavor’ means ‘attempt’ and the law now makes no distinction between the actual ste…
-
Brown v. State, 400 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)…HOBSON, Acting Chief Judge. Appellant’s judgment and sentence as to attempted grand theft is reversed. See Miles v. State, 374 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), and McIntyre v. State, 380 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). Further, in view of the fact that appellant was insolvent, the trial court erred in assessing him court costs in the amount of $500 and requiring him to pay $10 to the Cr…
Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Lomax v. State, 345 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1977)
- Shead v. State, 367 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- State v. Thomas, 362 So. 2d 1348 (Fla. 1978)