DREW DEICHES, PETITIONER,
v.
THE HONORABLE FRANK N. KANEY, CIRCUIT JUDGE, ORANGE COUNTY, FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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A criminal defendant sought a writ of prohibition challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to discharge based on violation of speedy trial rights under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191. The court held that speedy trial time commenced from his arrest for loitering and prowling, even though the eventual charge was based on the same criminal episode (attempting to pass a forged prescription), and ruled that the 180-day speedy trial deadline had expired, requiring discharge.
The court held that speedy trial time commences when a person is taken into custody as a result of the conduct or criminal episode giving rise to the crime charge, and runs from the original arrest date even when subsequent charges for the same criminal episode are filed months later. Since more than 180 days had elapsed since the original arrest, the defendant was entitled to discharge.
[1] Speedy trial time commences when a person is taken into custody as a result of the conduct or criminal episode giving rise to the crime charged, even if the initial arres…
[2] When charges arising from the same incident are dropped and later refiled, speedy trial time is measured from the date of the initial arrest.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“although earlier charges arising from the same incident are dropped, speedy trial time on charges later filed, but based on the same incident, is still measured from the date of the arrest on the earlier charges.”
Establishes the key legal principle that speedy trial time runs from the original arrest date even when later charges on the same criminal episode are filed after the initial charges are dropped.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDefendant was arrested on October 4, 1978, for loitering and prowling and carrying a concealed weapon after police pursued him from a pharmacy followi…
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BERANEK, JOHN R., Associate Judge.
Defendant seeks a writ of prohibition contending the trial court erroneously denied his motion for discharge under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191 governing speedy trial. We find that the time for speedy trial has expired and grant the writ.
Defendant was arrested and taken into custody on October 4, 1978, on charges of loitering and prowling in violation of Section 856.021, Florida Statutes (1977), and possession of a concealed weapon in violation of Section 790.01, Florida Statutes (1977). The events giving rise to this arrest are clearly set forth in an affidavit of the arresting officer. This officer was advised by radio that a subject might be trying to pass a forged prescription at a particular drug store. The officer went to the drug store at which time an individual was walking toward the door. The pharmacist informed the officer that the individual walking out of the store was the one who had tried to pass the forged prescription. The officer immediately exited and heard a car engine start. The defendant was seen driving away at a high rate of speed. In his haste, he turned into an alley behind the drug store which happened to be a dead end. The arresting officer stopped him there and arrested him for carrying a concealed weapon and for loitering and prowling. The suspected forged prescription was retrieved from the pharmacist and taken into evidence in regard to the case.
Apparently, defendant was not prosecuted on the loitering and weapon charges which were misdemeanors. However, on December 18, 1978, an information was filed charging petitioner with unlawfully attempting to acquire possession of a controlled substance by attempting to pass the forged prescription in violation of Florida Statutes Chapter 893. Defendant moved for discharge pursuant to Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191 after more than 180 days elapsed from the date of his initial arrest. The trial court denied the motion. We find this to have been error. In State v. Thaddies, 364 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), this Court stated:
In similar circumstances this Court has held that although earlier charges arising from the same incident are dropped, speedy trial time on charges later filed, but based on the same incident, is still measured from the date of the arrest on the earlier charges. Clark v. State, 318 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).
Rule 3.191(a)(1) provides that speedy trial time commences when a person is “taken into custody as a result of the conduct or criminal episode giving rise to the crime charge.” Here, the criminal episode was the attempt to pass the forged prescription. The officers pursued the defendant from the scene of this crime and might well have arrested him for the crime when they trapped him in the dead-end alley. The fact that he was actually arrested for loitering and prowling does not change the situation.
We conclude that speedy trial time ran and the trial court should have granted the motion for discharge. The writ of prohibition is granted and the case remanded to the trial court with orders to discharge the defendant.
PROHIBITION GRANTED; CASE REMANDED.
DAUKSCH, J., and DOWNEY, JAMES C., Associate Judge, concur.
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Bates v. The Honorable Richard B. Keating, 396 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)…eger v. Fish, 106 Fla. 564, 143 So. 605 (1932). We are obliged to follow that precedent. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973). Indeed, we have done so in previous cases. Gordon v. Savage, 383 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Deiches v. Kaney, 375 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 5th DCA 1979). In the case at hand, the sixty-day period had expired, and no order of extension had been rendered. Therefore, petitioner is entitled to be discharged. State v. Acurse, 347 So. 2d 828 (Fla.3d DCA 1977). Accordingly, the writ of…
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State v. Lynch, 445 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)…two cases relied upon by Lynch cannot be reconciled with the definition of “criminal episode” which requires that the separate offenses arise from the same conduct or episode: Crain v. State, 302 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974), and Deiches v. Kaney, 375 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 5th DCA 1979). In Crain, the defendant was arrested for the offense of driving an automobile while under the influence of a prohibited drug. During the investigation of the incident, the police discovered marijuana in the trunk of his car. He…
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State v. van Winkle, 407 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)…on for discharge, appellee successfully argued that the arrest on the attempted murder charge and the discovery of the marijuana involved a single criminal episode. In granting ap-pellee’s motion to discharge, the court relied upon Deiches v. Kaney, 375 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 5th DCA 1979) and Crain v. State, 302 So. 2d 433 (Fla.2d DCA 1974). In Deiches, a police officer responded to a call that a suspect may be trying to pass a forged prescription at a particular drug store. The officer went to the drug store and…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Clark v. State, 318 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)
- State v. Thaddies, 364 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)