D. G., A CHILD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Court reversed delinquency adjudication for giving a false name to police, holding that Section 843.03's "disguises himself" language requires physical concealment, not merely false identification.
Section 843.03, Fla.Stat. (1977) prohibiting disguising oneself to obstruct law enforcement requires physical concealment of appearance and does not apply to merely providing a false name.
[1] Providing a false name to police does not constitute disguising oneself under Section 843.03, Fla.Stat., which requires physical concealment of appearance.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant and two other boys were stopped by police after curfew and asked to identify themselves. Appellant gave the false name "Johnny Yarn," which …
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HOBSON, Acting Chief Judge.
Appellant appeals an order adjudicating him delinquent and placing him on probation for one year. The pertinent facts are that appellant and two other boys were stopped by a police officer after curfew and asked to identify themselves. Appellant gave his name, appropriately enough, as “Johnny Yarn”, which the police officer later determined was incorrect, and which eventually resulted in a petition for delinquency being filed against appellant for violation of Section 843.03, Fla.Stat. (1977), which states:
Whoever in any manner disguises himself with intent to obstruct the due execution of the law, or with the intent to intimidate, hinder or interrupt any officer, beverage enforcement agent, or other person in the legal performance of his duty or the exercise of his rights under the constitution or the laws of the state, whether such intent is effected or not, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in Section 775.082 or Section 775.083.
Since there was no allegation that appellant physically concealed himself in dress or appearance, but only gave the police a false name, we reverse on authority of our recent opinion in Hartley v. State, 372 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). The order is quashed and the case remanded to the trial court with directions to discharge appellant.
OTT and RYDER, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Leland v. State, 386 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)….Stat. (1979)], by the sole act of giving, as here, a false name to a police officer upon being stopped by said officer, and (b) a person’s probation may not be revoked for violating the above statute, as here, based on such conduct. D. G. v. State, 375 So. 2d 868 (Fla.2d DCA 1979); Hartley v. State, 372 So. 2d 1180 (Fla.2d DCA 1979). Reversed and remanded.…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Carroll W. Tharp, Jr., 372 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- Hartley v. State, 372 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)